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•. 
PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
October 9, 1981 Conference 
List 1, Sheet 1 
No. 81-9 
WASHINGTON, et al. 
v. 
SEATTLE SCHOOL 
DIST. NO. 1, et al. 
~from CA 9 (~, 
N~: Wright, dissenting) 
Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Appellants contest the CA's decision holding 
unconstitutional a state initiative that prohibits local school 
boards -- in the absence of a need to remedy constitutional 
violations -- from assigning students to schools other than the 
Note TAe C/1'1 h~ lei tl.l/ftJtt,sfrfafro.llif.( t(.rt ~~~,· -Jl(S'i. ir15 Jnlfrar;vE .. 
-rAe. 1'1!1rtf!rue S(t"U{rr'lf/J per'IV(If'> 5u(n"1 ttl Casl' 5 ot ro~St,TtJ7,on.A{ 
lltcJ/~trci-fl<:. r~~ d(tfS"tcJ'\1( ~7 t}Je (J?-7 --;_n11 ,ual:.e ,, t:/tFf'rcult (.:>'('a. Sft~te 
ro e v~r l'-e5.f:. I""' d-f.(, tMt:tfti.J~ ttefrot\ e,t-osr-ti/LI( - fVen wA~i'l r/llo)e p.,..6) /'0.. ttd / 
li.Jefe noT (tJ-Itst,r~,.u·t~J11AIItj Nqltff·f'/, Th1s. (>&>rrrc! Sf.;i6H<?f!Trt.( ft('t'f!td'Vt -f~rn~ (.Otlr--f 
one geographically nearest or next nearest the student's 
residence. 1 
2. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW: The Washington 
Constitution charges the State with a duty "to make ample 
provision for the education of all children residing within its 
borders, without distinction or preference on account of race, 
color, caste, or sex." Art. IX, § 1. Appellants aver that "no 
washington school district has ever been judicially declared to 
have committed a single act of intentional racial segregation in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in the operation of public 
schools." Juris. Statement 4. Against this backdrop, the 
appellee Seattle school board in 1977 adopted a resolution aimed 
at eliminating perceived racial imbalance in the district's 
schools. 2 To implement the resolution, the board adopted in March 
1978 a plan of race-conscious student assignments. Similar 
student assignment policies were adopted and implemented by the 
appellee school districts of Tacoma and Pasco. 
Meanwhile, an organization of citizens opposed to the 
student assignment policies, appellant CiVIC, drafted and 
campaigned for Initiative 350, which the State's voters adopted 
at the November 1978 general election. The initiative provides 
1similar issues are raised in Crawford v. Board of 
Education, No. 81-38, which is also scheduled for consideration 
at th2 October 9 conference. 
The school board defined racial imbalance to exist when 
the combined minority enrollment in a school exceeded the 
district-wide average by 20%. It also provided that "the single 
minority enrollment ••• of no school will exceed 50 percent of 
the student body." 
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that "no school board ••• shall directly or indirectly require 
any student to attend a school other than a school which is 
geographically nearest or next nearest the student's place of 
residence ..•• " wash. Rev. Code§ 28A.26.010 (Cum. Supp. 1981). 
It provides exceptions "[i]f a student requires special 
education, care or guidance"; "[i]f there are health or safety 
hazards" between the student's residence and the neighborhood 
school; or if the neighborhood school "is unfit or inadequate 
because of overcrowding, unsafe conditions or lack of physical 
facilities." Ibid. Initiative 350 also expressly provides that 
it "shall not prevent any court of competent jurisdiction from -adjuidicating constitutional issues relating to the public 
schools." Id. § 28A.26.060. 
Following the November 1978 election, the appellee school 
districts, together with certain individual plaintiffs, brought 
suit in federal court challenging the constitutionality of 
Initiative 350. The court permitted extensive intervention by 
parties who claimed that the school districts operated 
unconstitutional dual school systems. The court later bifurcated 
the proceedings to delay consideration of the intervenors' 
claims. The United States was permitted to intervene on behalf 
of the plaintiffs. 
Following an extended trial, the DC (Voorhees - W.D. Wash.) 
declared Initiative 350 unconstitutional and permanently enjoined 
its enforcement. The court based its judgment on three grounds: 
(1) "[Initiative 350] forbids mandatory student 
assignments for racial reasons but permits such 
- 4 -
student assignments for purposes unrelated to 
race, (2) a racially discriminatory purpose was 
one of the factors which caused Initiative 350 to 
be adopted, and (3) the initiative is overly 
inclusive in that it permits only court-ordered 
busing of students for racial purposes even 
though a school board may be under a constitu-
tional duty to do so even in the absence of a 
court order." App. to Juris. Statement A-27. 
The DC refused to award attorney's fees to the appellee 
school districts since their litigation expenses were already 
financed through public funds. The court also refused to award 
attorney's fees to the intervenors because their role in the 
first phase of the litigation had been de minimis. The court 
noted that it would entertain a motion for fees following 
completion of that phase of the litigation devoted to 
intervenors' claims of unlawful segregation within the school 
districts. 
TheCA affirmed by a divided vote. Relying on this Court's 
decision in Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969), and the 
decision of the DC in Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710 (W.D.N.Y. 
1970), aff'd, 402 u.s. 935 (1971), the CA held that Initiative 
350 is unconstitutinal because it embodies an impermissible 
legislative classification based on race. 3 The statute 
"legislatively differentiates student assignment for purposes of 
achieving racial balance from student assignment for any other 
significant reason." App. to Juris. Statement B-5. It is of no 
consequence that the classification is established covertly by 
3Accordingly, the court expressly declined to address the 
second and third grounds on which the DC relied. 
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omission, rather than expressly on the face of the statute. 4 
The court also concluded, in support of its central holding, 
that Initiative 350 "radically restructures the political process 
of Washington by allowing a state-wide majority to usurp 
traditional local authority over local school board educational 
policies." Id., at B-7. TheCA recognized this Court's holding 
in Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 u.s. 406, 413-14 (1977), 
that a school board may rescind previously adopted desegregation 
measures that the board was under no constitutional duty to adopt 
in the first place. In this case, however, "a different 
governmental body - the state-wide electorate - rescinded a 
policy voluntarily enacted by locally elected school boards " 
App. to Juris. Statement B-11. The State's interest in restoring 
traditional neighborhood school assignment practices was 
insufficiently compelling to override the interest of local 
school boards in promulgating their own educational policies. 
Finally, the CA considered the cross-appeal of appellees 
challenging the DC's denial of attorney's fees. The court held 
that the DC had abused its discretion in denying fees to the 
school districts. Successful plaintiffs ordinarily should 
recover attorney's fees unless an award would be unjust. That 
the school districts are publicly funded entities does not render 
an award to them unjust. The court also abused its discretion in 
4The court relied on the DC's finding that Initiative 350 
"was conceived, drafted, advocated and adopted for the specific 
purpose of overriding the decision of the Seattle School Board to 
balance Seattle schools racially by means of student 
assignments." App. to Juris. Statement B-4, B-6 n.4. 
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denying an award to the intervenors. Although their 
participation in the first phase of the trial was not 
substantial, the intervenors did devote substantial time and 
effort preparing for the bifurcated second phase. That the 
second phase may have been rendered unnecessary by virtue of the 
DC's holding on the constitutionality of Initiative 350 does not 
preclude an award of fees. "To retrospectively deny attorney's 
fees because an issue is not considered or because a party's 
participation proves unnecessary would have the effect of 
discouraging the intervention of what in future cases may be 
essential parties." 
In dissent Judge Wright argued that although Initiative 350 
does treat student assignments to achieve racial balance 
differently than student assignments for other purposes, that 
difference is not a racial classification. It is a means of 
expressing a preference for neighborhood schools and 
dissatisfaction with the burdens of mandatory busing. Merely 
addressing a problem that involves a racial minority does not 
create ipso facto a racial classification. The majority has 
chosen to find such a classification in order to avoid the 
laborious inquiry into intent that would otherwise be required. 5 
3. CONTENTIONS: (1) Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 
supra, indicates that a school board may constitutionally rescind 
desegregation measures that it was under no constitutional duty 
5Judge Wright also reached, and rejected, the other 
grounds on which the DC relied in invalidating the Initiative. 
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to adopt. Presumably, this is so despite the fact that the 
decision to rescind is taken with the knowledge that racial 
matters are involved. Otherwise, no governmental entity would be 
able to curtail "affirmative action" programs. If a local school 
board is permitted to take such action, the superior legislative 
authority of the State should be allowed to do so as well. 
(2} The CA's opinion confuses treatment of racial problems 
with treatment on the basis of race. In so doing, it distorts 
equal protection analysis in order to avoid the inquiry into 
intent and motive that plainly is required. 6 This departure is 
not sanctioned by Lee and Hunter. Those cases establish the 
principle that a governmental body may not "stack the political 
deck" against a minority that seeks adoption of laws in its 
interest. In this case, however, the State-- and not the local 
school boards bears primary responsibility under the state 
constitution for educational policy. Proponents of mandatory 
busing must convince either the legislature or the electorate 
that their cause is worthy. But they do not confront any special 
burden in the governmental process not shared by proponents of 
every other proposal affecting educational policy. 
(3} The DC's decision is at odds with those of four CA's 
which have upheld the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 
1974, 20 u.s.c. § 1701 et seq. That statute expresses a 
6Appellants request that the Court articulate the 
criteria for determining illicit discriminatory intent in an 
initiative or referendum. They object to the DC's decision not 
to investigate the probable intent of the voters in determining 
whether Initiative 350 was motivated by racial bias. 
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congressional declaration of policy in favor .of neighborhood 
schools and forbids federal courts and agencies from ordering 
transportation of students to schools other than those closest or 
next closest to their homes. 
(4) Nothing in the legislative history of either the Civil 
Rights Attorneys' Fees Award Act, 42 u.s.c. § 1988, or the 
Emergency School Aid Act, 20 u.s.c. § 3205, indicates that 
Congress intended municipal corporations to receive attorney's 
fees from the State that created them. The "private attorney 
general" rationale is particularly inapt here, because the 
appellee school districts have financed their lawsuit from funds 
already appropriated by the State for such purposes. 
4. RESPONSE: The appellee school districts have moved to 
dismiss or affirm. They track the CA's opinion in arguing that 
the decisions below were compelled by Lee and Hunter. Initiative 
350 treats racial student assignment matters differently from 
other student assignment matters. By foreclosing the attainment 
of important minority educational goals at the local level, it 
"structures the political process in a nonneutral manner." And, 
since the law establishes a racial classification, it is 
presumptively invalid, regardless of intent. 
Appellees submit that the CA's decision does not preclude a 
school board from reversing a decision voluntarily to desegregate 
its schools. The reversal, however, must avoid the creation of a 
racial classification in the use of student assignments. 
Initiative 350 is also quite different from the Equal Educational 
Opportunity Act of 1974. That law expressly preserves the 
- 9 -
authority of local school boards voluntarily to desegregate. See 
20 u.s.c. § 1716. 
Appellees also maintain that the DC was correct in its 
alternative finding that Initiative 350 was adopted with a 
discriminatory purpose. The initiative will result in increased 
school segregation to the detriment of minorities; the history of 
the initiative indicates it was adopted to reverse the Seattle 
desegregation plan; proponents departed from normal procedures by 
seeking approval of the initiative at the state, rather than 
local, level. The DC was also correct in concluding that the 
initiative is impermissibly overinclusive. It prohibits all 
voluntary efforts to desegregate, regardless of whether they are 
necessary to satisfy perceived constitutional requirements. 
School boards ought to be free to desegregate their schools 
without awaiting a court order declaring the boards' policies 
unconstitutional. (The State contends that Initiative 350 
permits school boards to use busing when necessary to remedy 
constitutional violations.) 
Turning to the attorney's fee question, appellees maintain 
that nothing in the relevant statutes or in their legislative 
histories indicates a congressional intention to limit fee awards 
to private parties. The policy of the statutes is to encourage 
litigation vindicating civil rights. That policy is served no 
less by awards to publicly funded litigants than by awards to 
private parties. Moreover, the State is incorrect in implying 
that an award would duplicate funding already provided by the 
- 10 -
State. The appellees' budgets are funded by local property taxes 
as well as state appropriations. 
The appellee intervenors have also filed a motion to dismiss 
or affirm. The States of Arizona, Kansas, Nebraska, and Utah , 
as amici curiae, have filed a brief in support of the 
jurisdictional statement. They argue, inter alia, that a 
statutory racial classification dictates different results for 
members of different races, by reason of their race. Initiative 
350 creates a classification among reasons for mandatory busing. 
It does not create a racial classification on its face. Rather, 
it indicates an intent to adopt a policy against the use of 
racial classifications in assigning students to schools. It may 
be that the statute was adopted for discriminatory reasons, but 
that is impossible to know without further inquiry into intent. 
Finally, the SG has filed a memorandum urging the Court to 
note probable jurisdiction. Although the United States 
intervened on behalf of the appellees in the DC, the SG notes 
that the United States now supports the appellants in arguing 
that Initiative 350 should be upheld. Should the Court reverse 
the CA, it may either remand the case for consideration of the 
remaining grounds on which the DC relied, or it may decide those 
issues itself. The SG does not address the attorney's fee issue. 
5. DISCUSSION: This case presents two questions. The 
first, which concerns the constitutionality of Initiative 350, is 
within the Court's appellate jurisdiction and is plainly 
substantial. The second, which concerns the award of attorney's 
fees to the appellee school districts, is not an appealable 
C-111 
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~
question. Nevertheless, it too presents an important and ~ ~ 
unresolved issue which the Court may wish to address should it ~ 
note probable jurisdiction to consider the first question. ~ 
The CA held that Initiative 350 creates an impermissible I 
racial cl~ssi~ication. That holding is signifi~ant, in par t 
----- > 
because it obviates the need to investigate purpose and intent. 
Unlike most laws that create racial classifications, Initiative 
350 does not expressly confer benefits or impose disadvantages on 
the basis of race. Rather, by omission, it prohibits the 
~
assignment of all children beyond their neighborhood schools for 
the purpose of achieving racial balance. To treat this decision 
as one creating a racial classification is, in effect, to 
conclusively presume that the voters' opposition to busing is a 
manifestation of racial discrimination. The presumption may be 
true, but it ought to be established through the sort of 
investigation this Court has required in testing allegations of 
discriminatory intent. 
Despite all of CA may have en justified by this 
Court's decision Erickson, ra. At issue in J~W 
Hunter was a city both repealed existing 
ordinances forbid housing d' crimination and required the 
approval of a precondition to enactment of new 
ordinances. All other ordinances regulating the real estate 
market could become effective merely upon passage by the City 
Council. The Court determined that the charter amendment created 
a racial distinction among that class of persons who would seek 
the enactment of ordinances regulating the real estate market. 
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393 u.s., at 390. The Court also condemned the amendment because 
it placed "special burdens on racial minorities within the 
governmental process." Id. at 391. 
Hunter was decided before this Court's recent elaboration of 
the differences between racial classification, disparate impact, 
and discriminatory intent in cases such as washington v. Davis, 
426 U.S. 229 (1976), and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan 
Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). In addition, Hunter may 
best be explained as prohibitting the imposition of special 
burdens on minorities who seek legal protection through the 
legislative process. Initiative 350 imposes no similar burdens. 
As the SG argues in his memorandum, the initiative, at most, 
reallocates responsibility for student assignment from the school 
board to the State. the met ods of legislative 
ch~ e1~level in a way that burdens minorities. 
Contrary to theCA's reasoning, it is doubtful that the Equal 
Protection Clause~ se forbids such reallocations of authority. 
This appeal raises one final issue worth discussing, and 
that is the extent to which governmental entities may rescind 
measures designed for the benefit of racial minorities without 
running afoul of the presumption against racial classifications. 
As appellants note, the Court in Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 
supra, intimated that such rescissions are permissible, provided 
that adoption of the measures was not constitutionally compelled 
in the first place. The discussion in Brinkman, however, is 
abbreviated and this appeal presents the opportunity for more 
thorough consideration. 
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I would note probable jurisdiction. 
Appellees have filed motions to dismiss or affirm~ the 
United States and amici have filed briefs in support of the 
jurisdictional statement. 
9/21/81 Folse DC and CA Opns in 
Juris. Statement 
~ 1)21 - u~t-qt~ ~ · - -
~~~~~3s-a 
tJ. ;.;~; ~~~~bJ~ 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell March 20, 1982 
From: David Levi 
Nos. 81-9 & 81-38: Washington v. Seattle School District 
Crawford v. Board of Education of Los 
Angeles 
Question Presented 
Whether the state may limit .........---. the power of local 
I c-1 'school boards to order mandatory busing when this busing is 
not required by the Fourteenth Amendment? 
2 • 
./"( 
Whether the state may limit the power of state 
\\ 
courts to order mandatory busing to instances in which a 
federal court would order mandatory busing? 
I do not pretend to have mastered these 
exceptionally difficult cases, but I hope that the following 
summary and analysis is useful. I conclude that the two cases 
are analytically indistinguishable--although the two anti-
busing laws differ greatly in their particulars--and that they 
are both constitutional. 
I. Facts and Decisions Below 
A. The Washington Initiative 
Initiative 350 was passed in November, 1978, at a 
state-wide election. The initiative forbids any school board 
from "directly or indirectly" requiring "any student to attend 
a school other than the school which is geographically nearest 
or next nearest the student's place of residence." There are 
three exception__§ to this prohibition included in the -
initiative: if a student requires special education, if there 
are health or safety hazards, or if the school nearest or next 
nearest is unsafe or overcrowded, the student may be assigned 
to a more distant school. The Initiative does not bar any 
·~. 
3 0 
voluntary programs: magnet schools "or any other voluntary 
option offered to students" are still permissible. Further, 
l r /7_. _ 
the Initiative does not purport to limit the power of any ~~ 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--,, 
~t "from adjudicating constitutional issues relating to the 1-o ~ 
p~ls." ~/"'~ 
In short, the Initiative prohibits busing beyond the}~~ 
"next ~ear est" sc~l, unless the busing is court ordered. ~~ ~ 
Although the Initiative is not specifically directed to busing J1~~ 
for racial desegregation, the history of the Initiative 
Uo 
indicates that this was one of its prime targets. 
Specifically, Seattle had just adopted a wide-ranging plan of 
mandatory busing for integration. Note, however, that the 
Initiative would permit voluntary programs and would also 
permit assignment (and busing) to the "next nearest" school to 
be made on the basis of race. 
The District Judge held that the Initiative violated A)~ 
the Fourteenth Amendment for three reasons: "(1) it forbids 
mandatory student assignments for racial reasons but permits 
such student assignments for purposes unrelated to race, (2) a 
racially discriminatory purpose was one of the facts which 
caused Initiative 350 to be adopted, and (3) the intiative is 
overly inclusive in that it permits only court-ordered busing 
of students for racial purposes even though a school board may 
be under a constitutional duty to do so even in the absence of 
a court order." 
... 
4. 
The CA9 affirmed on the basis of the District C lftf 
AJ~ '- \. 
Court's first rationale only: "the statute was correctly --rr-~> 
... z;~ struck down as an impermissible legislative class1f1cat1on /'-~-- .. : 
''di-~ 
based on racial criteria." Judge ~ly~s opinion is not a modeld~ti.~"•·t" 
of clarity. His argument proceeds in three parts. First, he 
argues that although the Initiative does not embody an 
explicit racial classification it does in effect: it permits 
busing for three reasons but not for the purpose of achieving 
racial balance. Having established that Initiative 350 
employs a racial classification, he then argues that such a 
classification is impermissible under the decision of this 
Court in ~unter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) and Lee v. 
Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710 (W.D.N.Y. 1970) (3-Judge Court), 
aff'd, 402 U.S. 935 (1971). These decisions establish that ~/<A--
the political process may not be re-structured in such a way 
as to make it more difficult for racial minorities to achieve 
their legislative goals. Under this principle the Initiative 
must be condemned: "[I]t is manifest that Initiative 350 both 
creates a constitutionally-suspect racial classification and 
radically restructures the political process of Washington by 
allowing a state-wide majority to usurp traditional local 
authority over local school baord educational policies." 
Finally, Judge Ely argues that the classification cannot be 
supported by any compelling interest. The State's interest in 
a state-wide neighborhood school policy is not as strong as 
the interest "of the locally elected school boards and the 
5. 
community they represent in promulgating their own educational 
policy. Therefore, we hold that Initiative 350, which attempts 
to wrest from local control the formulation and implementation 
of educational and desgregation policies, is not supported by 
any compelling state interest." Judge Wright dissented. 
B. The California Proposition 
Proposition 1, an initiative measure amending 
article I, section 7 (a) of the California Constitution, was 
adopted at a state-wide election on November 6, 1979. The 
proposition instructs that no state court shall order busing 
"(1) except to remedy a specific violation by such party that 
would also constitute a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, and (2) unless a federal court would be 
permitted under federal decisional law to impose that 
obligation or responsibility upon such party to remedy the 
specific violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th 
Amendment." Although restricting the power of state courts, ---the Proposition leaves the powers of local school boards 
intact: "Nothing herein shall prohibit the governing board of --a school district from voluntarily continuing or commencing a 
school integration plan." 
The state court found that the Proposition was 
constitutional. School boards remain under a ~~tate law dut~\/ -
6. 
to desegregate the school regardless of the cause of 
segregation. In fulfilling their duty the Boards maY..-? rder 
busing; but no state court may order the Boards to require -
~g (unless a federal court would order busing). The effect ~1-LYV 
of the proposition is simply "to withdraw one desegregative f~ · I 
technique from the state court's arsenal of remedies available 
to alleviate unintended, non-purposeful segregation, but to 
leave all other available techniques intact." The court 
rejected the argument that the proposition was invalid under 
Reitman v. Mulkey, 1967, 387 U.S. 369 or Hunter v. Erickson, 
supra. The proposition did not authorize private 
discrimination as in Mulkey. Nor can the recission of a state 
law remedy be said to violate the rule in Hunter. Such a 
conclusion would be illogical: "If a state is not under a 
federal duty to adopt a particular act in the first place .•• 
recisision of the act cannot be unconstitutional." 
II. Relevant Case Law 
There are four relevant decisions, the most 
important of which is Hunter v. Erickson. 
1. Hunter v. Erickson 
In 1964 the Akron City Council enacted a fair 
housing ordinance establishing a Commission on Equal 
7. 
Opportunity in Housing. Following passage of this ordinance, 
a proposal for charter amendment was placed on the ballot at a 
general election upon petition of more than 10% of the 
electorate. The charter amendment provided that "Any 
ordinance enacted by the Council of The City of Akron which 
---~_... 
regulates the use, sale, ......,. lease .•. of real property ••. on 
the basis of rac_e, color, religion, national origin or 
ancestry must first be approved by a majority of the electors 
~~----~------------------------------
voting on the question at a regular or general election before 
said ordinance shall be effective." As a result of the 
charter amendment, the 1964 fair housing ordinance was no 
longer valid. 
The Court (per White, J.) held that the charter 
amendment was unconstitutional. In general, measures passed 
by the City Council became law in 30 days and were subject to 
referendum only if 10% of the electors signed an appropriate 
The effect of the charter amendment was that ) ~f dfr 
~kr­
ordinances to end housing discrimination--unlike any other , 
ordinances--were automatically subject to a referendum. This ~  
/'JA~~~·..J~ ~""'·~ 
petition. 
was "an explicitly racial classification treating raciai~--~ 
.__....... ...-. "-'"...... ~-----------...... ---
housing matters differently from other racial and housing 
matters." The effect of this explicit racial classification 
was to place "special burdens on racial minorities within the 
governmental process." 
It is noteworthy that the Court did "not hold that 
mere repeal of an existing ordinance violates the Fourteenth 
8. 
Amendment." Thus, had the fair housing ordinance been 
repealed in the normal way--by a referendum following upon a 
petition of 10% of the voters--there would have been no 
constitutional violation. 
~.f4,-
In concurrence Justice Harlan emphasized 1\ t h a t 
minorities could not complain if any particular governmental 
process--e.g. bicameralism--made it more difficult to pass 
equal rights legislation. "In the case before us, however, 
the city of Akron has not attempted to allocate governmental 
power on the basis of any general principle. Here, we have a 
provision that has the clear purpose of making it more 
difficult for certain racial and religious minorities to 
achieve legislation that is in their interest." Through the 
existing referendum process Akron voters could always repeal 
any particular fair housing measure that they disliked. The 
effect of the charter amendment, however, was to make it 
difficult to pass a fair housing law even when the electorate 
was not aroused to passionate opposition. 
2. Lee v. Nyquist 
This decision by a 3-judge court (Hayes, Henderson, 
Burke) was summarily affirmed by this Court. 
The state statute at issue in Lee provided that "no 
student shall be assigned or compelled to attend any school on 
account of race, creed, color, or national origin, or for the 
9. 
purpose of achieving equality in attendance or increased 
attendance or reduced attendance, at any school, of persons of 
one or more particular races, creeds, colors, or national 
origins" unless "with the express approval of a board of 
education having jurisdiction, a majority of the members of 
such board having been elected." In short, the statute 
prohibited state education officials and appointed school 
boards from assigning students on the basis of race. Buffalo 
has an appointed Board of Education, and parents of children 
attending Buffalo schools brought suit to challenge the 
statute. 
Writing for the court, Judge Hayes held that the 
statute was invalid under the 14th Amendment. The court 
rested its decision on Hunter. "The principle of Hunter is 
~·~ tha~t e state creates an 'explicitly racial classification' 
whenever it differentiates between the treatment of problems 
involving racial matters and that afforded other problems in 
the same area." The New York statute "by prohibiting the 
implementation of plans designed to alleviate racial imbalance 
in the schools except with the approval of a local elected 
board ••. creates a single exception to the broad supervisory 
powers the state Commissioner of Educatione exercises over 
local publich education. 
II . ~ 
clearly rac1al classification, 
The statute thus creates a ~  
treating educational matters 
involving racial criteria differently from other educational 
10. 
matters and making it more difficult to deal with racial 
imbalance in the public schools." 
3. Reitman v. Mulkey (1967) 
~-7J~~~k~ 
Reitman pre~n~::--t~ -~~ 
...y' 
(White, J.) invalidated Proposition 14, an amendment to the 
California constitution. Proposition 14 provided that neither 
the State nor local governments "shall deny, limit or abridge, 
the right of any person ••• to decline to sell, lease or 
rent such property to such person or persons as he, in his 
absolute discretion, chooses." The Court found that 
\__ Proposition 14 did more than just repeal existing laws 
regulating private discrimination in housing, it authorized 
private discrimination in the housing market. 
Justice Harlan dissented. "[A]ll that has happended 
is that California has effected a pro tanto repeal of its 
prior statutes forbidding private discrimination. This runs 
no more afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment than would have 
California's failure to pass any such antidiscrimination 
statutes in the first instance." He argued that the Court 
""' ,, -
should permit J:!l£: political process a degree of leeway and 
flexibility in dealing with racial matters: "When legislation 
in this field is unsuccessful there should be wide 
opportunities for legislative amendment, as well as for change 
through such processes as the popular initiative and 
11. 
referendum. Here the electorate itself overwhelmingly 
wished to overrule and check its own legislature on a matter 
left open by the Federal Constitution." 
4. Dayton Bd. of Ed. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 
(1977) 
In Dayton I a subsequent School Board rescinded the 
resolutions adopted by an earlier Board. Justice Rehnquist 
found no constitutional violation in such a recission: 
"The Board had not acted to undo operative 
regulations affecting the assignment of pupils or 
other aspects of the management of school affairs, 
cf Reitman, but simply repudiated a resolution of a 
predecessor Board stating that it recognized its own 
fault in not taking affirmative action at an earlier 
date. We agree with the Court of Appeals' treatment 
of this aciton, wherein that court said: 
'The question of whether a rescission of 
previous Board action is in and of itself a 
violation of appellants' constitutional rights is 
inextricably bound up with the question of whether 
the Board was under a constitutional duty to take 
the action which it initially took •.... If the Board 
was not under such a duty, then the rescission of 
the initial action in and of itself cannot be a 
constitutional violation.'" 
III. Analysis 
The question in both cases is whether the particular 
limitation on school assignments so changes the "rules of the 
game" that the holding in Hunter is applicable. Both cases 
12. 
are susceptible to such an analysis. The California 
limitation on the state court's power to order busing is an 
unusual limit on the courts' authority and one which makes it 
more difficult to proponents of busing to get the relief they 
seek. Moreover, the rules have been changed in a general way-
-a particular exericise of authority was not repealed. 
Arguably, proponents of desegregation have been particularly 
burdened by a unique alteration in judicial process. 
Similarly, with respect to the Washington case one 
may argue that the limit on the local school board's authority 
marks a change in the rules that particularly burdens those 
who favor busing for desegregation and those who favor 
desegregation generally. Lee, supra, is closely analogous. 
The 3-judge court there held that a limit on power 
appointed boards of education to order busing for 
desegregation placed a unique limitation of the powers of 
state boards. Likewise, one could argue that the limit on the 
ability of local school boards to bus imposes a unique limit 
on the traditional powers of the local school board. 
Alternatively, one may a~e that whereas the school board may 
order busing for some reasons, it may not order busing for 
desegregation. Thus, the Initiative imposes a non-neutral 
limit on the school board's power to order busing. Moreover, 
as in Hunter, the rules of the game have been changed. Under 
Dayton it is clear that the Seattle Board of Education itself 
could have repealed its desegregation plan. Further, it is 
likely that even the State through initiative could repeal the 
Seattle plan. But here no particular plan has been repealed. 
Rather, as a general matter busing by local school boards has 
been removed from the array of local school board powers. 
On the other hand, strong arguments can be advanced ~ 
for distinguishing Hunter. 
----------~---- ---- To begin with I start with t~~ 
(:
otion in Harlan's dissent in Reitman that the Court ought not 
~ make it impossible for legislatures and voters to experiment 
ith race related programs. Putting Hunter to the side, one 
would think that a state ought to be able to try affirmative 
action program of various sorts--busing, hiring, etc--but yet 
retain the freedom to terminate such programs if they prove 
unsuccessful. 
Moreover, taking I think that 
both of these cases can be distinguished. To begin with the ~ _ 
regulation in Hunter and Lee embodied an explicit racial U~ 
·~ 
classification. Here we have at least facial neutrality. In ~ 
the California cas:--all-::ing ordered by a state court ~
prohibited. No mention is made of busing for one purpose as 
opposed to another. Again, in Washington the Initiative 
permits busing for reasons of safety or school overcrowding 
but prohibits busing for any other purpose without particular 
regard to busing for integration. 
Further, it is not clear to me that the burden on 
busing proponents is comparable to the burden placed on 
proponents of fair housing in Hunter. In California, busing 
.L'to 
proponents may seek integration by busing or by other 
techniques from local school boards. Indeed, they may 
continue to seek court ordered integration from the state 
courts; these courts may order integration through means 
other than busing--e.g. magnet schools. In washington the 
burden seems somewhat greater. Even so, the proponents of 
integration may still seek their goal through voluntary busing 
plans and through any other voluntary programs. Further, I 
believe that mandatory busing for integration may be ordered 
in Washington after the Initiative so long as the student is 
not bussed beyond the next nearest school. From this 
perspective, it is as if the Initiative placed a 30 minute ~ 
limit on non-court ordered busing. In the Pasco school ----. 
district, for example, there are many schools near the black 
neighborhoods but very few in the white neighborhoods. 
Ironically, after the initiative, white students can be bussed 
to the "next nearest school"--which would be in black 
neighborhoods-- although blacks may not be bussed out of their 
neighborhoods since the next nearest school is still in the 
black quarter. 
Perhaps most convincingly, Hunter may be I distinguished in line with the suggestion in Dayton that a 
school board may rescind its own previous action. In Hunter 
the city council was restructured by the city electorate so as 
to disfavor one classification of legislation. Here by 
contrast there is simply recission of powers previously 
.J..Jo 
granted by the state to some other body--school boards or 
~~ 
courts. Thus, in the California case the state has withdrawn ~J-1) 
granted 
J I \\ 
Similarly, in Washington a power to the state courts. 
the state regathers to itself some of the sovereign power -- ~---- ~-'----------------------------
delegated to local school boards. Had Ohio state passed 
legislation removing fair housing legislation or racial 
legislation generally from the power of local municipalities 
Hunter would be more closely analogous. 
I can see no reason why the state should not be able ------..-- - .... 
to withdraw powers it has previously granted. Suppose that in ~ 
4/1/~ partially funding local school boards the state stipulated
that funds were not to be used for mandatory busing--unless t-1-~ 
required by the federal constitution--or for any affirmative ~~ 
action without state authorization. That would seem perfectly 
appropriate to me if the state's reason was to maintain some 
consistent state policy on the treatment of race. Similarly, 
suppose that in passing some state anti-discrimination law the 
State chooses not to provide for punitive damages for 
plaintiffs. Would that fall afoul of the Hunter principle 
because other plaintiffs under state law may seek such 
damages? If as an initial matter the state may order such 
restrictions, why may it not alter its grant of authority 
subsequently? 
In addition, the Hunter characterization is quite 
slippery. The Initiative process is well established in the 
West. It is not clear to me that there has been any change in 
.LUo 
the political process in Washington. Busing opponents--
stymied at the local level--took their grievance to the State 
level. That is the typical pattern. Had busing proponents 
lost at the local level they too may have sought relief at the 
next level. Similarly, it is not clear to me that the 
California proposition works any change in the political 
process. It changes the variety of relief one may attain from 
a state court, but I am not sure that state court remedies 
ought to be viewed as a part of the political process--
although the argument is credible. 
In short, I think that Hunter is distinguishable in 
both cases. I acknowledge that the California proposition is 
somewhat easier to uphold. Because it involves judicial 
remedies rather than some change in the political process, 
Hunter seems less clearly applicable. Moreover, since it 
permits so many other avenues for relief--from local school 
boards, as well as from state courts--the burden on busing 
proponents appears slight. Obviously, the Court wi 11 feel 
some pressure to reaffirm its faith in integration, and so to 
invalidate one of these measures. Perhaps the Washington 
Initiative would be less vulnerable to attack had it been 
aimed solely at the Seattle plan--although I doubt respondents 
would agree to this. Yet it would seem odd to permit the 
state wide electorate to abolish a local plan but not permit 
the electorate to set state wide policy as a general matter • 
. ' 
.J.. , • 
On balance, I think that the similarities between 
the two schemes are stronger than the differences, and would 
uphold both. 
LU'U.TL •• • ••••••••••••••••• v otea on .... . ............. , 1 Y . .• 
Argued .. ........ . ........ , 19 .. . Assigned .. . ............... , 19 . . . No. 81-9 
Submitted ................ , 19 . . . Announced .. . ....... . ..... , 19 . . . 
WASHINGTON 
vs. 
SEATTLE SCH. DIST., il 
MERITS MOTION HOLD CERT. 
JURISDI CTIONAL 
STATEMEN'l' ABSEN T NOT VOTING 
FOR 
G D N POST DI S AFF REV AFF G D 
Burger, Ch. J ... . .... . . . • •• • • 0 • • •••• 0 •• ••• • • 0 •• • 
..... ... ...... ~ .... .. .. Brennan, J ........................... . 
~::::::::: : :::·:::::::::·:: ::z. ::::::::·.·.·. ·.·· v·. ·.·.·.·. ·. ·. · .. ·.·.·.· ·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.· ·.· ·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·. ·. 
Marshall, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .,;,/ .......... ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... . 
Blackmun, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . / . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... . . . ..... . ..... . .... . 
Powell, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . z· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......................... . 
Rehnquist, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ . . . . . . . . . .......................... . 
Stevens, J .. . . . ........ . .. .. . ............... . . . ........................................ . 
O.'.Connor., . J ... ....... ..... . ....... V. . ..... ..... . .. .... ........................... . 
CHAMBERS OF 
.ittJtrttttt Ofourl qf tfrt ~tb ,itattg 
Jlaglfinghrn. ~. QI. 2(l~~~ 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
June 1, 1982 ~ 
Re: 81-9 - washington v. 
Seattle School District No. 1 
Dear Harry, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
cpm 
CHAMBERS OF 
..JUSTICE w .. . ..J . BRENNAN, ..JR. 
-,ju:prmtt <IJ!tnrlltf f4t ~b ,jtatt.s-
~rurJrittgLm. ~.OJ. 20.?~~ 
June 1, 1982 






cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.§upr~tttt <!Jo-:url of flr~~i:t.ro ~ta:Ug 
~agfrin:ghrn, ~. <!J. 2Dgt)!.~ 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
Re: 81-9 - Washington v. Seattle School 
District 
Dear Harry : 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
Justice Blackmun 














.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARS HALL 
-
~ttpttmt ~ou.rt of Utt ~tti±tb .§tafts 
'IDasirtngton,[3. ~· 20,?>!-~ 
June 2, 1982 I 
Re: No. 81 - 9 - Washington v. Seattle School District 
Dear Harry: 




cc: The Conference 
' ~ . " 
2nd DRAFT 








From: Justice Blackmun 
Circulated: _________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-9 
WASHINGTON, ET AL., APPELLANTS v. SEATTLE 
SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1 ET AL 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[June -, 1982] 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
We are presented here with an extraordinary question: 
whether an elected local school board may use the Four-
teenth Amendment to defend its program of busing for inte-
gration from attack by the State. 
I 
A 
Seattle School District No. 1 (District), which is largely co-
terminous with the city of Seattle, Wash., is charged by state 
law with administering 112 schools and educating approxi-
mately 54,000 public school students. About 37% of these 
children are of Negro, Asian, American Indian, or Hispanic 
ancestry. Because segregated housing patterns in Seattle 
have created racially imbalanced schools, the District histori-
cally has taken steps to alleviate the isolation of minority stu-
dents; since 1963, it has permitted students to transfer from 
their neighborhood schools to help cure the District's racial 
imbalance. 1 
1 In 1971, the District implemented a program of mandatory reassign-
ments to integrate certain of its middle schools. This prompted an at-
tempt to recall four school board members who had voted for the program. 
That attempt narrowly failed. See 473 F. Supp. 996, 1006 (WD Wash. 
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Despite these efforts, the District in 1977 came under in-
creasing pressure to accelerate its program of desegrega-
tion. 2 In response, the District's Board of Directors (School 
Board) enacted a resolution defining "racial imbalance" as 
"the situation that exists when the combined minority stu-
dent enrollment in a school exceeds the districtwide com-
bined average by 20 percentage points, provided that the sin-
gle minority enrollment . . . of no school will exceed 50 
percent of the student body." 473 F. Supp. 996, 1006 (WD 
Wash. 1979). The District resolved to eliminate all such im-
balance from the Seattle public schools by the beginning of 
the 1979-1980 academic year. 3 
In September 1977, the District implemented a "magnet" 
program, designed to alleviate racial isolation by enhancing 
educational offerings at certain schools, thereby encouraging 
voluntary student transfers. A "disproportionate amount of 
the overall movement" inspired by the program was under-
taken by Negro students, however, id., at 1006, and racial 
imbalance in the Seattle schools was found to have actually 
increased between the 1970-1971 and 1977-1978 academic 
years. The District therefore concluded that mandatory re-
1979). 
2 Several community organizations threatened legal action if the District 
did not initiate a more effective integration effort, while the Mayor of Seat-
tle and a number of community leaders, by letter dated May 20, 1977, 
urged the District to adopt "a definition of racial isolation and measurable 
goals leading to the elimination of racial isolation in the Seattle Public 
Schools prior to a Court ordered and mandated desegregation remedy." 
App. 139. 
3 The District Court found that the actions of the School Board were 
prompted by its members' "desire to ward off threatened litigation, their 
desire to prevent the threatened loss of federal funds, their desire to re-
lieve the black students of the disproportionate burden which they had 
borne in the voluntary efforts to balance the schools racially and their per-
ception that racial balance in the schools promotes the attainment of equal 
educational opportunity and is beneficial in the preparation of all students 
for democratic citizenship regardless of their race." 473 F. Supp., at 1007. 
------ --- ---
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assignment of students was necessary if racial isolation in its 
schools was to be eliminated. Accordingly, in March 1978, 
the School Board enacted the so-called "Seattle Plan" for de-
segregation. The plan, which makes extensive use of busing 
and mandatory reassignments, desegregates elementary 
schools by "pairing'' and "triading'' predominantly minority 
with predominantly white attendance areas, and by basing 
student assignments on attendance zones rather than on 
race. The racial makeup of secondary schools is moderated 
by "feeding'' them from the desegregated elementary 
schools. App. 142-143. The District represents that the 
plan results in the reassignment of roughly equal numbers of 
white and minority students, and allows most students to 
spend roughly half of their academic careers attending a 
school near their homes. Brief for Appellee Seattle School 
District 5. 
The desegregation program, implemented in the 1978--1979 
academic year, apparently was effective: the District Court 
found that the Seattle Plan "has substantially reduced the 
number of racially imbalanced schools in the district and has 
substantially reduced the percentage of minority students in 
those schools which remain racially imbalanced." 473 F. 
Supp., at 1007. 
B 
In late 1977, shortly before the Seattle Plan was formally 
adopted by the District, a number of Seattle residents who 
opposed the desegregation strategies being discussed by the 
School Board formed an organization called the Citizens for 
Voluntary Integration Committee (CiVIC). This organiza-
tion, which the District Court found "was formed because of 
its founders' opposition to The Seattle Plan," 473 F. Supp., at 
1007, attempted to enjoin implementation of the Board's 
mandatory desegregation program though litigation in state 
court; when these efforts failed, CiVIC drafted a statewide 
initiative designed to terminate the use of mandatory busing 
81-9-0PINION 
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for purposes of racial integration. 4 This proposal, known as 
Initiative 350, provided that "no school board ... shall di-
rectly or indirectly require any student to attend a school 
other than the school which is geographically nearest or next 
nearest the student's place of residence ... and which offers 
the course of study pursued by such student. . .. " See 
Wash. Rev. Code § 28A.26.010 (1981). 5 The initiative then 
set out, however, a number of broad exceptions to this re-
quirement: a student may be assigned beyond his neighbor-
hood school if he "requires special education, care or guid-
ance," or if "there are health or safety hazards, either natural 
or man made, or physical barriers or obstacles ... between 
the student's place of residence and the nearest or next 
nearest school," or if "the school nearest or next nearest to 
his place of residence is unfit or inadequate because of over-
crowding, unsafe conditions or lack of physical facilities." 
See ibid. Initiative 350 also specifically proscribed use of 
seven enumerated methods of "indirec[t]" student assign-
ment-among them the redefinition of attendance zones, the 
pairing of schools, and the use of "feeder'' schools-that are a 
part of the Seattle Plan. See § 28A.26.030. The initiative 
envisioned busing for racial purposes in only one circum-
stance: it did not purport to "prevent any court of competent 
jurisdiction from adjudicating constitutional issues relating to 
the public schools." See § 28A.26.060. 
' Washington's Constitution reserves to the people of the State "the 
power to propose bills, laws, and to enact or reject the same at the polls, 
independent of the legislature." Wash. Const. Art. II , § 1. Such initia-
tives are placed on the ballot upon the petition of 8% of the State's voters 
registered and voting for governor at the last preceding regular guberna-
torial election. § l(a). If passed by the electorate, an initiative may not 
be repealed by the state legislature for two years, although it may be 
amended within two years by a vote of two-thirds of each house of the leg-
islature. § 41. See generally Comment, Judicial Review of Laws En-
acted by Popular Vote, 55 Wash. L. Rev. 175 (1979). 
5 The text of Initiative 350 is now codified as Wash. Rev. Code 
§§ 28A.26.010-28A.26.900 (1981) . 
. ------------------
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Its proponents placed Initiative 350 on the Washington bal-
lot for the November 1978 general election. During the en-
suing campaign, the District Court concluded, the leadership 
of CiVIC "acted legally and responsibly," and did not address 
"its appeals to the racial biases of the voters." 4 73 F. Supp., 
at 1009. At the same time, however, the court's findings 
demonstrate that the initiative was directed solely at deseg-
regative busing in general, and at the Seattle Plan in particu-
lar. Thus, "[e]xcept for the assignment of students to effect 
racial balancing, the drafters of Initiative 350 attempted to 
preserve to school districts the maximum flexibility in the as-
signment of students," id., at 1008, and "[e]xcept for racially-
balancing purposes" the initiative "permits local school dis-
tricts to assign students other than to their nearest or next 
nearest schools for most, if not all, of the major reasons for 
which students are at present assigned to schools other than 
their nearest or next nearest schools." I d., at 1010.6 In 
campaigning for the measure, CiVIC officials accurately rep-
resented that its passage would result in "no loss of school 
district flexibility other than in busing for desegregation pur-
poses," id., at 1008, and it is evident that the campaign fo-
cused almost exclusively on the wisdom of "forced busing'' for 
integration. See id., at 1009. 
On November 8, 1978, two months after the Seattle Plan 
went into effect, Initiative 350 passed by a substantial mar-
gin, drawing almost 66% of the vote statewide. The 
initative failed to attract majority support in two state legis-
lative districts, both in Seattle. In the city as a whole, how-
ever, the initiative passed with some 61% of the vote. 
Within the month, the District, together with the Tacoma 
and Pasco school districts, 7 initiated this suit against the 
6 At the beginning of the 1978--1979 academic year, approximately 
300,000 of the 769,040 students enrolled in Washington's public schools 
were bused to school. Ninety-five percent of these students were trans-
ported for reasons unrelated to race. 473 F. Supp., at 1002. 
7 Along with Seattle, Tacoma School District No. 10 and Pasco School 
District No. 1 are the only districts in the State of Washington with com-
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State in United States District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Washington, challenging the constitutionality of Ini-
tiative 350 under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. The United States and several 
community organizations intervened in support of the Dis-
trict 8; CiVIC intervened on behalf of the defendants. 
After a nine-day trial, the District Court made extensive 
and detailed findings of fact. The court determined that 
"[t]hose Seattle schools which are most crowded are located 
in those areas of the city where the preponderance of minor-
ity families live." 473 F. Supp., at 1001. Yet the court 
found that Initiative 350, if implemented, "will prevent the 
racial balancing of a significant number of Seattle schools and 
will cause the school system to become more racially imbal-
anced than it presently is," "will make it impossible for Ta-
coma schools to maintain their present racial balance," and 
will make "doubtful" the prospects for integration of the 
Pasco schools. /d., at 1010; see id., at 1001, 1011. Except 
for desegregative busing, however, the court found that "al-
most all of the busing of students currently taking place in 
prehensive integration programs, and therefore the three are the only dis-
tricts affected by Initiative 350. See 473 F. Supp., at 1009. Since 1965, 
Pasco has made use of school closures and a mandatory busing program to 
overcome the racial isolation caused by segregated housing patterns; if stu-
dents attended the schools nearest their homes, three of Pasco's seven ele-
mentary schools would have a primarily white and three a primarily minor-
ity student body. Id., at 1002-1003. The Tacoma school district has 
made use of school closures, racially controlled enrollment at magnet 
schools, and voluntary transfers-though not mandatory busing-to en-
hance racial balance in its schools. I d., at 1003-1004. 
~ Several of the intervenor plaintiffs also alleged that the District had en-
gaged in de jure segregation, and therefore was operating an unconstitu-
tional dual school system. The District Court therefore bifurcated the liti-
gation, first addressing the constitutionality of Initiative 350. Because of 
the court's conclusions on that question, the allegations of de jure segrega-
tion did not go to trial and have not been addressed by the District Court or 
by the Court of Appeals. 
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[Washington] is permitted by Initiative 350." ld., at 1010. 
And while the court found that "racial bias ... is a factor in 
the opposition to the 'busing' of students to obtain racial bal-
ance," id., at 1001, it also found that voters were moved to 
support Initiative 350 for "a number of reasons," so that "[i]t 
is impossible to ascertain all of those. reasons [o]r to deter-
mine the relative impact of those reasons upon the elector-
ate." Id., at 1010. 
The District Court then held Initiative 350 unconstitu-
tional, for three independent reasons. The court first con-
cluded that the initiative established an impermissible racial 
classification, in violation of Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U. S. 
385 (1969), and Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710 (WDNY 
1970) (three-judge court), summarily affd, 402 U. S. 935 
(1971), "because it permits busing for non-racial reasons but 
forbids it for racial reasons." 473 F. Supp., at 1012. The 
court next held Initiative 350 invalid because "a racially dis-
criminatory purpose was one of the factors which motivated 
the conception and adoption of the initiative." I d., at 1013. 9 
Finally, the District Court reasoned that Initiative 350 was 
unconstitutionally overbroad, because in the absence of a 
court order it barred even school boards that had engaged in 
de jure segregation from taking steps to foster integration. 10 
9 The District Court acknowledged that it was impossible to determine 
whether the supporters of Initiative 350 "subjectively [had] a racially dis-
criminatory intent or purpose," because "[a]s to that subjective intent the 
secret ballot raises an impenetrable barrier." 473 F. Supp., at 1014. The 
court looked instead to objective factors, noting that it "marked [a] depar-
ture from the norm ... for the autonomy of school boards to be restricted 
relative to the assignment of students," and that it marked a similar "de-
parture from the procedural norm" for "an administrative decision of a 
subordinate local unit of government ... [to be] overridden in a statewide 
initiative." /d., at 1016. These factors, when coupled with the "racially 
disproportionate impact of the initiative," its "historical background," and 
"the sequence of events leading to its adoption," were found to demon-
strate that a "racially discriminatory intent or purpose was at least one 
motivating factor in the adoption of the initiative." Ibid. 
10 The District Court noted that school boards that had practiced de jure 
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ld., at 1016. The court permanently enjoined implementa-
tion of the initiative's restrictions. 
On the merits, a divided panel of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, relying entirely on 
the District Court's first rationale. 633 F. 2d 1338 (1980). 11 
By subjecting desegregative student assignments to unique 
treatment,· the Court of Appeals concluded, Initiative 350 
"both creates a constitutionally-suspect racial classification 
and radically restructures the political process of Washington 
by allowing a state-wide majority to usurp traditional local 
authority over local school board educational policies." 633 
F. 2d, at 1344. In doing so, the court continued, the initia-
tive "remove[ s] from local school boards their existing au-
thority, and in large part their capability, to enact programs 
designed to desegregate the schools." !d., at 1346 (emphasis 
in original; citation omitted). The court found such a result 
contrary to the principles of Hunter v. Erickson, supra, and 
Lee v. Nyquist, supra. The court acknowledged that the 
issue would be a different one had a successor school board 
attempted to rescind the Seattle Plan. Here, however, "a 
different governmental body-the state-wide electorate-re-
scinded a policy voluntarily enacted by locally elected school 
boards already subject to local political control." 633 F. 2d, 
at 1346. 12 
segregation are under an affirmative obligation to eliminate the effects of 
that practice. 473 F. Supp., at 1016. See Columbus Board of Education 
v. Penick, 443 U. S. 449, 458-459 (1979). 
11 The Court of Appeals therefore did not address the District Court's al-
ternative finding that Initiative 350 had been adopted for discriminatory 
reasons, or its conclusion that the initiative was overbroad. 633 F. 2d, at 
1342. 
12 After the decision on the merits, the District Court had declined to 
award attorney's fees to the plaintiff school districts because the districts 
are state-funded entities. App. to Juris. Statement C-1. The Court of 
Appeals reversed on this issue, concluding that the District Court had 
abused its discretion in denying fees. The Court of Appeals determined 
---------
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The State appealed to this Court. We noted probable ju-
risdiction to address an issue of significance to our Nation's 
system of education. -- U. S. -- (1981). 
II 
A 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment guarantees racial minorities the right to full participa-
tion in the political life of the community. It is beyond dis- \ 
pute, of course, that given racial or ethnic groups may not be 
denied the franchise, or precluded from entering into the po-
litical process in a reliable and meaningful manner. See 
White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973); Nixon v. Herndon, 
273 U. S. 536 (1927). But the Fourteenth Amendment also 
reaches "a political structure that treats all individuals as 
equals," Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55, 84 (1980) (STEVENS, 
J.' concurring in the judgment), yet more subtly distorts gov-
ernmental processes in such a way as to place special burdens 
on the ability of minority groups to achieve beneficial 
legislation. 
This principle received its clearest expresion in Hunter v. 
Erickson, supra, a case that involved attempts to overturn 
antidiscrimination legislation in Akron, Ohio. The Akron 
city council, pursuant to its ordinary legislative processes, 
had enacted a fair housing ordinance. In response, the local 
citizenry, using an established referendum procedure, see 
393 U. S., at 390, and n. 6; 393-394, and n. * (Harlan, J., con-
curring), amended the city charter to provide that ordinances 
regulating real estate transactions "on the basis of race, 
color, religion, national origin or ancestry must first be ap-
that the school districts fell within the language of the attorney's fees stat-
utes, 42 U. S. C. § 1988 and 20 U. S. C. § 3205, seen. 28, 'infra, and it rea-
soned that "[a]s long as a publicly-funded organization advances important 
constitutional values, it is eligible for fees under the statutes." 633 F. 2d, 
at 1348. 
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proved by a majority of the electors voting on the question at 
a regular or general election before said ordinance shall be ef-
fective." I d., at 387. This action "not only suspended the 
operation of the existing ordinance forbidding housing dis-
crimination, but also required the approval of the electors be-
fore any future [fair housing] ordinance could take effect." 
I d., at 389-390. In essence, the amendment changed the re-
quirements for the adoption of one type of local legislation: to 
enact an ordinance barring housing discrimination on the 
basis of race or religion, proponents had to obtain the ap-
proval of the city council and of a majority of the voters city-
wide. To enact an ordinance preventing housing discrimina-
tion on other grounds, or to enact any other type of housing 
ordinance, proponents needed the support of only the city 
council. 
In striking down the charter amendment, the Hunter 
Court recognized that, on its face, the provision "draws no 
distinctions among racial and religious groups." 393 U. S., 
at 390. But it did differentiate "between those groups who 
sought the law's protection against racial ... discriminations 
in the sale and rental of real estate and those who sought to 
regulate real property transactions in the pursuit of other 
ends," ibid., thus "disadvantag[ing] those who would benefit 
from laws barring racial . . . discriminations as against those 
who would bar other discriminations or who would otherwise 
regulate the real estate market in their favor." I d., at 391. 
In "reality," the burden imposed by such an arrangement 
necessarily "falls on the minority. The majority needs no 
protection against discrimination and if it did, a referendum 
might be bothersome but no more than that." Ibid. In ef-
fect, then, the charter amendment served as an "explicitly 
racial classification treating racial housing matters differ-
ently from other racial and housing matters." Id., at 389. 
This made the amendment constitutionally suspect: "the 
State may no more disadvantage any particular group by 
making it more difficult to enact legislation in its behalf than 
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it may dilute any person's vote or give any group a smaller 
representation than another of comparable size." I d., at 393 
(emphasis added). 
Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710 (WDNY 1970) (three-
judge court), offers an application of the Hunter doctrine in a 
setting strikingly similar to the one now before us. That 
case involved the New York education system, which made 
use of both elected and appointed school boards and which 
conferred extensive authority on state education officials. 
In an effort to eliminate de facto segregation in New York's 
schools, those officials had directed the city of Buffalo-a 
municipality with an appointed school board-to implement 
an integration plan. While these developments were pro-
ceeding, however, the New York Legislature enacted a stat-
ute barring state education officials and appointed-though 
not elected-school boards from "assign[ing] or compell[ing] 
[students} to attend any school on account of race ... or for 
the purpose of achieving [racial] equality in attendance . . . at 
any school." 318 F. Supp., at 712. 13 
Applying Hunter, the three-judge District Court invali-
dated the statute, noting that under the provision "[t]he 
Commissioner [of Education] and local appointed officials are 
prohibited from acting in [student assignment] matters only 
where racial criteria are involved." I d., at 719. In th 
court's view, the statute therefore "place[d] burdens on the 
implementation of educational policies designed to deal with 
race on the local level" by "treating educational matters in-
volving racial criteria differently from other educational mat-
ters and making it more difficult to deal with racial imbalance 
in the public schools." Id., at 719 (emphasis in original). 
This drew an impermissible distinction "between the treat-
ment of problems involving racial matters and that afforded 
other problems in the same area." Id., at 718. This Court 
13 As does Initiative 350, the New York statute apparently permitted vol-
untary student transfers to achieve integration. See n. 16, infra. 
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affirmed the District Court's judgment without opinion. 402 
u. s. 935 (1971). 
These cases yield a simple but central principle. As Jus-
tice Harlan noted while concurring in the Court's opinion in 
Hunter, laws structuring political institutions or allocating 
political power according to "neutral principles"-such as the 
executive veto, or the typically burdensome requirements for 
amending state constitutions-are not subject to equal pro-
tection attack, though they may "make it more difficult for 
minorities to achieve favorable legislation." 393 U. S., at 
394. Because such laws make it more difficult for every 
group in the community to enact comparable laws, they "pro-
vid[e] a just framework within which the diverse political 
groups in our society may fairly compete." I d., at 393. 
Thus, the political majority may generally restructure the po-
litical process to place obstacles in the path of everyone seek-
ing to secure the benefits of governmental action. But a dif-
ferent analysis is required when the State allocates 
governmental power non-neutrally, by explicitly using the 
racial nature of a decision to determine the decisionmaking 
process. State action of this kind, the Court said, "places 
special burdens on racial minorities within the governmental 
process," id., at 391 (emphasis added), thereby "making it 
more difficult for certain racial arrl religious minorities [than 
for other members of the comm1..nity] to achieve legislation 
that is in their interest." I d., at 395 (emphasis added) (Har-
lan, J., concurring). Such a structuring of the political proc-
ess, the Court said, was "no more permissible than [is] deny-
ing [members of a racial minority] the vote, on an equal basis 
with others." I d., at 391. 
III 
We believe that the Court of Appeals properly focused on 
Hunter and Lee, for we find the principle of those cases dis-
positive of the issue here. In our view, Initiative 350 must 
fall because it does "not attemp[t] to allocate governmental 
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power on the basis of any general principle." Hunter v. 
Erickson, 393 U. S., at 395 (Harlan, J., concurring). In-
stead, it uses the racial nature of an issue to define the gov-
ernmental decisionmaking structure, and thus imposes sub-
stantial and unique burdens on racial minorities. 
A 
Noting that Initiative 350 nowhere mentions "race" or 
"integration," appellants suggest that the legislation has no 
racial overtones; they maintain that Hunter is inapposite be-
cause the initiative simply permits busing for certain enumer-
ated purposes while neutrally forbidding it for all other rea-
sons. We find it difficult to believe that appellants' analysis 
is seriously advanced, however, for despite its facial neutral-
ity there is little doubt that the initiative was effectively 
drawn for racial purposes. Neither the initiative's sponsors, 
nor the District Court, nor the Court of Appeals had any dif-
ficulty perceiving the racial nature of the issue settled by Ini-
tiative 350. Thus, the District Court found that the text of 
the referendum was carefully tailored to interfere only with 
desegregative busing. 14 Proponents of the initiative candidly 
"represented that there would be no loss of school district 
flexibility other than in busing for desegregation purposes." 
473 F. Supp., at 1008. And, as we have noted, Initiative 350 
in fact ..tllows school districts to bus their students "for most, 
if not all," of the non-integrative purposes required by their 
educational policies. !d., at 1010. The Washington elector-
ate surely was aware of this, for it was "assured" by CiVIC 
officials that "'99% of the school districts in the state'"-
those that lacked mandatory integration programs-"would 
not be affected by the passage of 350." ld., at 1008-1009. 
It is beyond reasonable dispute, then, that the initiative was 
"The Court of Appeals accepted the District Court's characterization of 
the initiative, and even the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals agreed 
that Initiative 350 addresses a "racial" problem. 633 F. 2d, at 1353. 
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enacted '"because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse ef-
fects upon" busing for integration. Personnel Adminis-
trator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256, 279 (1979). 
Even accepting the view that Initiative 350 was enacted 
for such a purpose, the United States-which has changed its 
position during the course of this litigation, and now supports 
the State-maintains that busing for integration, unlike the 
fair housing ordinance involved in Hunter, is not a peculiarly 
"racial" issue at all. Brief for United States 17, n. 18. 
Again, we are not persuaded. It undoubtedly is true, as the 
United States suggests, that the proponents of mandatory 
integration cannot be classified by race: Negroes and whites 
may be counted among both the supporters and the oppo-
nents of Initiative 350. And it should be equally clear that 
white as well as Negro children benefit from exposure to 
"ethnic and racial diversity in the classroom." Columbus 
Board of .Education v. Penick, 443 U. S. 449, 486 (1979) 
(POWELL, J., dissenting). See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 
U. S. 717, 783 (1974) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). 15 But nei-
ther of these factors serves to distinguish Hunter, for we 
may fairly assume that members of the racial majority both 
favored and benefited from Akron's fair housing ordinance. 
Cf. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman,-- U. S. --, --
(1982) (slip op. 11-12, and n. 17); Gladstone, Realtors v. Vil-
lage of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 111, 115 (1979). 
In any event, our cases suggest that desegregation of the 
public schools, like the Akron open housing ordinance, at bot-
tom inures primarily to the benefit of the minority, and is de-
15 Appellants and the United States do not challenge the propriety of 
race-conscious student assignments for the purpose of achieving integra-
tion, even absent a finding of prior de jure segregation. We therefore do 
not specifically pass on that issue. See generally Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenberg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 16 (1971); North Carolina 
State Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U. S. 43, 45 (1971). Cf. Univer-
sity of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 300, n. 39, 312-314 
(1978) (opinion of POWELL, J.). 
- - ----- - -------------
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signed for that purpose. Education has come to be "a princi-
pal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in 
preparing him for later professional training, and in helping 
him to adjust normally to his environment." Brown v. 
Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 493 (1954). When that 
environment is largely shaped by members of different racial 
and cultural groups, minority children can achieve their full 
measure of success only if they learn to function in-and are 
fully accepted by-the larger community. Attending aneth-
nically diverse school may help accomplish this goal by pre-
paring minority children "for citizenship in our pluralistic so-
ciety," Estes v. Metropolitan Branches of the Dallas 
NAACP, 444 U. S. 437, 451 (1980) (POWELL, J., dissenting), 
while, we may hope, teaching members of the racial majority 
"to live in harmony and mutual respect" with children of mi-
nority heritage. Columbus Board of Education v. Penick, 
443 U. S., at 485, n. 5 (POWELL, J., dissenting). Lee v. 
Nyquist settles this point, for the Court there accepted the 
proposition that mandatory desegregation strategies present 
the type of racial issue implicated by the Hunter doctrine. 16 
•• The United States seeks to distinguish Lee by suggesting that the stat-
ute there at issue "clearly prohibited" all attempts to ameliorate racial im-
balance in the schools, while Initiative 350 permits voluntary desegrega-
tion efforts. Brief for United States 25. Even assuming that this 
distinction would otherwise be of constitutional significance, its premise is 
not accurate. The legislation challenged in Lee did permit voluntary inte-
gration efforts, for it expressly exempted from its restrictions "the assign-
ment of a pupil in the manner requested or authorized by his parents or 
guardian." 318 F. Supp., at 712. Thus, as the District Court in Lee 
noted, the statute "denie[d] appointed officials the power to implement 
non-voluntary programs for the improvement of racial balance." I d., at 
715 (emphasis added). The difficulty in Lee-as in this case-stemmed 
from the Lee District Court's conclusion that a voluntary program would 
not serve to integrate the community's schools: "Voluntary plans for 
achieving racial balance ... have not had a significant impact on the prob-
lems of racial segregation in the Buffalo public schools; indeed it would ap-
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It is undeniable that busing for integration-particularly 
when ordered by a federal court-now engenders consider-
ably more controversy than does the sort of fair housing ordi-
nance debated in Hunter. See Estes v. Metropolitan 
Branches ofthe Dallas NAACP, 444 U. S., at 448-451 (Pow-
ELL, J., dissenting). But in the absence of a constitutional vi-
olation, the desirability and efficacy of school desegregation 
are matters to be resolved through the political process. 
For present purposes, it is enough that minorities may con-
sider busing for integration to be "legislation that is in their 
interest." Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U. S., at 395 (Harlan, 
J., concurring). Given the racial focus oflnitiative 350, this 
suffices to trigger application of the Hunter doctrine. 
B 
We are also satisfied that the practical effect of Initiative 
350 is to work a reallocation of power of the kind condemned 
in Hunter. The initiative removes the authority to address a 
racial problem-and only a racial problem-from the existing 
decisionmaking body, in such a way as to burden minority in-
terests. Those favoring the elimination of de facto school 
segregation now must seek relief from the state legislature, 
or from the statewide electorate. Yet authority over all 
other student assignment decisions, as well as over most 
other areas of educational policy, remains vested in the local 
school board. Indeed, by specifically exempting from Initia-
tive 350's proscriptions most non-racial reasons for assigning 
students away from their neighborhood schools, the initiative 
expressly requires those championing school integration to 
surmount a considerably higher hurdle than persons seeking 
comparable legislative action. As in Hunter, then, the com-
munity's political mechanisms are modified to place effective 
challenged in Lee and Initiative 350 operated in precisely the same way to 
"deny ... student[s] the right to attend a fully integrated school." Brief 
for United States 25. 
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decisionmaking authority over a racial issue at a different 
level of government. 17 In a very obvious sense, the initiative 
thus "disadvantages those who would benefit from laws bar-
ring" de facto desegregation "as against those who . . . would 
otherwise regulate" student assignment decisions; "the real-
ity is that the law's impact falls on the minority." Hunter v. 
Erickson, 393 U. S., at 391. 
The state appellants and the United States, in response to 
this line of analysis, argue that Initiative 350 has not worked 
any reallocation of power. They note that the State neces-
sarily retains plenary authority over Washington's system of 
education, and therefore they suggest that the initiative 
amounts to nothing more than an unexceptional example of a 
17 In Hunter, the procedures for enacting racial legislation were modified 
in such a way as to place effective control in the hands of the citywide elec-
torate; here, the power to enact racial legislation has been reallocated. In 
each case, the effect of the challenged action was to redraw decisionmaking 
authority over racial matters-and only over racial matters-in such a way 
as to place comparative burdens on minorities. While the United States 
observes that the proponents of integrated schools remain free to use 
Washington's initiative system to further their ends, that was true in 
Hunter as well: proponents of open housing were not barred from invoking 
Akron's initiative procedures to repeal the charter amendment, or to enact 
fair housing legislation of their own. It surely is an excessively formal ex-
ercise, then, to argue that the procedural revisions at issue in Hunter im-
posed special burdens on minorities, but that the selective allocation of 
decisionmaking authority worked by Initiative 350 does not erect compara-
ble political obstacles. Indeed, in a sense the situation here is less favor-
able to minority interests than was the arrangement in Hunter, for the Ak-
ron charter amendment at least made provision for the passage of fair 
housing legislation, while Initiative 350 on its face forbids virtually all man-
datory desegregation strategies. The United States would note that Ini-
tiative 350's "modification of state policy [was] not the result of any unusual 
political procedure," Brief for United States 30, for initiatives and refer-
enda are often used by the Washington electorate. But that observation 
hardly serves to distinguish this case from Hunter , since the fair housing 
charter amendment was added through the unexceptional use of Akron's 
initiative procedure. See 393 U. S., at 387. 
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State's intervention in its own school system. In effect, they 
maintain that the State functions as a "super school board," 
Tr. of Oral Arg. 5, 17, which typically involves itself in all ar-
eas of educational policy. And, the argument continues, if 
the State is the body that usually makes decisions in this 
area, Initiative 350 worked a simple change in policy rather 
than a forbidden reallocation of power. Cf. Crawford v. Los 
Angeles Board of Education, post. 
This at first glance would seem to be a potent argument, 
for States traditionally have been accorded the widest lati-
tude in ordering their internal governmental processes, see 
Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U. S. 60, 71 (1978), and 
school boards, as creatures of the State, obviously must give 
effect to policies announced by the state legislature. But 
"insisting that a State may distribute legislative power as it 
desires ... furnish[es] no justification for a legislative struc-
ture which otherwise would violate the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Nor does the implementation of this change through 
popular referendum immunize it." Hunter v. Erickson, 393 
U. S., at 392. The issue here, after all, is not whether 
Washington has the authority to intervene in the affairs of 
local school boards; it is, rather, whether the State has exer-
cised that authority in a manner consistent with the Equal 
Protection Clause. As the Court noted in Hunter, "though 
Akron might have proceeded by majority vote ... on all its 
municipal legislation, it has instead chosen a more complex 
system. Having done so, the State may no more disad-
vantage any particular group by making it more difficult to 
enact legislation in its behalf than it may dilute any person's 
vote." I d., at 392-393. Washington also has chosen to 
make use of a more complex governmental structure, and a 
close examination both of the Washington statutes and of the 
Court's decisions in related areas convinces us that Hunter is 
fully applicable here. 
At the outset, it is irrelevant that the State might have 
vested all decisonmaking authority in itself, so long as the po-
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litical structure it in fact erected imposes comparative bur-
dens on minority interests; that much is settled by Hunter 
and by Lee. 18 And until the passage of Initiative 350, Wash-
ington law in fact had established the local school board, 
rather than the State, as the entity charged with making de-
cisions of the type at issue here. Like all 50 States, see Brief 
for National School Boards Assn. as Amicus Curiae 11, 
14-16, Washington of course is ultimately responsible for pro-
viding education within its borders, see Wash. Const., Art. 
IX; Wash. Rev. Code§ 28A.02.010 (1981); ch. 28A.41 (estab-
lishing a uniform school financing system); Seattle School 
Dist. v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P. 2d 71 (1978), and it 
therefore has set certain procedural requirements and mini-
mum educational standards to be met by each school. See, 
e. g., §§ 28A.Ol.010, 28A.Ol.020 (length of school day and 
year); ch. 28A.27 (mandatory attendance); ch. 28A.67 
(teacher qualifications); ch. 28A.05 and 
§§ 28A.58. 750-28A.58. 754 (curriculum). But Washington 
has chosen to meet its educational responsibilities primarily 
through "state and local officials, boards, and committees," 
§ 28A.02.020, and the responsibility to devise and tailor edu-
cational programs to suit local needs has emphatically been 
vested in the local school boards. 
Thus "each common school district board of directors" is 
made "accountable for the proper operation of [its] district to 
the local community and its electorate." § 28A.58. 758(1). 
To this end, each school board is "vested with the final 
responsibility for the setting of policies ensuring quality in 
the content and extent of its educational program" (emphasis 
" The Court noted in Hunter that Akron "might have proceeded by ma-
jority vote ... on all its municipal legislation," 393 U. S., at 392; the char-
ter amendment was invalidated because the citizens of Akron did not re-
serve all power to themselves, but rather distributed it in a non-neutral 
manner. In Lee, of course, the State had unquestioned authority to vest 
all power over education in state officials. 
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added). Ibid. School boards are given responsibility for, 
among many other things, "establish[ing] performance crite-
ria" for personnel and programs, for assigning staff "accord-
ing to board enumerated classroom and program needs," for 
setting requirements concerning hours of instruction, for 
establishing curriculum standards "relevant to the particular 
needs of district students or the unusual characteristics of the 
district," and for evaluating teaching materials. 
§ 28A.58. 758(2). School boards are generally directed to 
"develop a program identifying student learning objectives 
for their district[s]," §§ 28A.58.090; see also § 28A.58.092, to 
select instructional materials, § 28A. 58.103, to stock libraries 
as they deem necessary, § 28A.58.104, and to initiate a vari-
ety of optional programs. See, e. g., §§28A.34.010, 
28A.35.010, 28A.58.105. School boards, of course, are given 
broad corporate powers. §§ 28A.58.010, 28A.58.075, 
28A.59.180. Significantly for present purposes, school 
boards are directed to determine which students should be 
bused to school and to provide those students with transpor-
tation. § 28A.24.055. 
Indeed, the notion of school board responsibility for local 
educational programs is so firmly rooted that local boards are 
subject to disclosure and reporting provisions specifically de-
signed to ensure the board's "accountability" to the people of 
the community for "the educational programs in the school 
distric[t]." § 28A.58. 758(3). And, perhaps most relevantly 
here, before the adoption of Initiative 350 the Washington 
Supreme Court had found it within the general discretion of 
local school authorities to settle problems related to the de-
nial of "equal educational opportunity." 19 Citizens Against 
'
9 Indeed, even the State's efforts to help ensure equal opportunity in 
education and to encourage desegregation are cast in cooperative terms, 
and are designed to assist school districts in implementing programs of 
their choosing. See, e. g., Wash. Rev. Code §§28A.21.010(3), 
28A.21.136(1) and (3) (1981); cf. § 28A.58.245(3). 
- ---- -- ------------
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Mandatory Bussing v. Palmason, 80 Wash. 2d 445, 453, 495 
P. 2d 657, 663 (1972). It therefore had squarely held that a 
program of desegregative busing was a proper means of fur-
thering the school board's responsibility to "administe[r] the 
schools in such a way as to provide a sound education for all 
children." ld., at 456, 495 P. 2d, at 664. 20 See State ex rel. 
Citizens Against Mandatory Bussing v. Brooks, 80 Wash. 2d 
121, 492 P. 2d 536 (1972); State ex rel. Lukens v. Spokane 
School District, 147 Wash. 467, 474, 266 P. 189, 191 (1928). 21 
Given this statutory structure, we have little difficulty con-
cluding that Initiative 350 worked a major reordering of the 
State's educational decisionmaking process. Before adop-
tion of the initiative, the power to determine what programs 
would most appropriately fill a school district's educational 
needs-including programs involving student assignment and 
desegregation-was firmly committed to the local board's 
discretion. The question whether to provide an integrated 
learning e'nvironment rather than a system of neig_hborhood 
schools surely involved a decision of that sort. See Citizens 
Against Mandatory Bussing v. Palmason, 80 Wash. 2d, at 
459-460, 495 P. 2d, at 666-667. After passage of Initiative 
350, authority over all but one of those areas remained in the 
20 The Washington Supreme Court noted that "as long as the school board 
authorized or required students to attend schools geographically situated 
close to their homes, they had such a right. But the right existed only 
because it was given to them by the school authorities." 80 Wash. 2d, at 
452, 495 P. 2d, at 662. 
21 We also note that the State has not attempted to reserve to itself exclu-
sive power to deal with racial issues generally. Municipalities in Washing-
ton have been given broad powers of self-government, see generally Wash. 
Const., Arndt. 40; Wash. Rev. Code §§ 35.22.020, 35.23.440, 35.27.370, 
35.30.010 (1981); Wash. Rev. Code Tit. 35A (Optional Municipal Code), and 
Washington courts specifically have held that municipalities have the 
power to enact antidiscrimination ordinances. See, e. g. , Seattle Newspa-
per-Web Pressmen's Union Local No. 26 v. City of Seattle, 24 Wash. App. 
462, 604 P. 2d 170 (1979). Cf. 5 E. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations 
§ 19.23, p. 425 (3d eel. rev. 1981). 
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hands of the local board. By placing power over desegrega-
tive busing at the state level, then, Initiative 350 plainly "dif-
ferentiates between the treatment of problems involving ra-
cial matters and that afforded other problems in the same 
area." Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F.Supp., at 718. The District 
Court and the Court of Appeals similarly concluded that the 
initiative restructured the Washington political process, and 
we see no reason to challenge the determinations of courts fa-
miliar with local law. Cf. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S., at 
769 (WHITE, J., dissenting). 
That we reach this conclusion should come as no surprise, 
for when faced with a similar educational scheme in Milliken 
v. Bradley, supra, 22 the Court concluded that the actions of a 
local school board could not be attributed to the State that 
had created it. We there addressed the Michigan education 
system, which vests in the State constitutional responsibility 
for providing education: "'The policy of [Michigan] has been 
to retain control of its school system, to be administered 
throughout the State under State laws by local State agen-
cies ... to carry out the delegated functions given [them] by 
the legislature."' Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S., at 794 
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting), quoting School District of the 
City of Lansing v. State Board of Education, 367 Mich. 591, 
595, 116 N.W. 2d 866, 868 (1962). See Milliken v. Bradley, 
supra, at 726, n. 5. To fulfill this responsibility, the State of 
Michigan provided a substantial measure of school district 
funding, established standards for teacher certification, de-
termined part of the curriculum, set a minimum school term, 
approved bus routes and textbooks, established disciplinary 
procedures, and under certain circumstances had the power 
even to remove local school board members. See id., at 
795-796 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). See id., at 726, n. 5, 
22 One amicus observes that many States employ a similar educational 
structure. See Brief for National School Boards Assn. as Amicus Curiae 
11, 14-16, App. 1a-10a. 
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727 (describing State controls over education); id., at 768 and 
n. 4 (WHITE, J., dissenting) (same); id., at 794 (MARSHALL, 
J., dissenting) (same). 
Yet the Court, noting that "[n]o single tradition in public 
education is more deeply rooted than local control over the 
operation of schools," concluded that the "Michigan educa-
tional structure ... in common with most States, provides 
for a large measure of local control." !d., at 741-742. Rely-
ing on this analysis, the Court determined that a Michigan 
school board's assignment policies could not be attributed to 
the State, and therefore declined to permit interdistrict bus-
ing as a remedy for one school district's acts of unconstitu-
tional segregation. If local school boards operating under a 
similar statutory structure are considered separate entities 
for purposes of constitutional adjudication when they make 
segregative assignment decisions, it is difficult to see why a 
different analysis should apply when a local board's deseg-
regative policy is at issue. 
In any event, we believe that the question here is again 
settled by Lee. There, state control of the educational 
system was fully as complete as it now is in Washington. 
See generally N.Y. Educ. Law §§ 305, 306, 308-310 (McKin-
ney) (1969 and Supp. 1981). The state statute under attack 
reallocated power over mandatory desegregation in two 
ways: it transferred authority from the State Commissioner 
of Education to local elected school boards, and it shifted au-
thority from local appointed school boards to the state legisla-
ture. 23 When presented with this restructuring of the politi-
cal process, the District Court declared that it could 
"conceive of no more compelling case for the application of 
the Hunter principle." 318 F. Supp., at 719. This Court of 
course affirmed the District Court's judgment. We see no 
z• When authority to initiate desegregation programs was removed from 
appointed school boards and from state education officials, the only body 
capable of exercising power over such programs was the state legislature. 
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relevant distinction between this case and Lee; indeed, it is 
difficult to imagine a more precise parallel. 24 
c 
To be sure, "the simple repeal or modification of deseg-
regation or anti-discrimination laws, without more, never has 
been viewed as embodying a presumptively invalid racial 
classification." Crawford v. Los Angeles Board of Educa-
tion, post, at--, (slip op. 10). See Dayton Board of Edu-
cation v. Brinkman, 443 U. S. 526, 531, n. 5 (1979); Hunter 
v. Erickson, 393 U. 8., at 390, n. 5. As Justice Harlan 
noted in Hunter, the voters of the polity may express their 
displeasure through an established legislative or referendum 
procedure when particular legislation "arouses passionate op-
position." Id., at 395 (concurring opinion). Had Akron's 
fair housing ordinance been defeated at a referendum, for ex-
ample, "Negroes would undoubtedly [have lost] an important 
2
' The United States makes only one attempt to distinguish Lee in this 
regard: Lee is inapposite, the United States maintains, because the statute 
at issue there "blocked desegregation efforts even by 'a school district sub-
ject to a pre-existing order to eliminate segregation in its schools,'" and 
therefore-purportedly in contrast to Initiative 350-"interfere[d] with the 
efforts of individual school districts to eliminate de jure segregation." 
Brief for the United States 25, quoting Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp., at 
715. If by this statement the United States seeks to place the District 
Court's holding and this Court's affirmance in Lee on the ground that the 
New York statute interfered with Buffalo's attempts to eliminate de jure 
segregation, its submission is simply inaccurate. At the time of the Lee 
litigation, Buffalo had not been found guilty of practicing intentional seg-
regation. See Arthur v. Nyquist, 573 F. 2d 134, 137 (CA2 1978). As the 
United States notes, Buffalo was under a "pre-existing order to eliminate 
segregation in its schools"-but that order was issued by the New York 
Commissioner of Education, because he had found Buffalo's schools de 
facto segregated. Appeal of Dixon, 4 N.Y. Educ. Dept. Reports 115 
(1965). See Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp., at 714-715. Lee did not con-
cern de jure segregation; it is to be explained only as a straightforward 
application of the Hunter doctrine. 
-~-- ~---
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political battle, but they would not thereby [have been] de-
nied equal protection." I d., at 394. 
Initiative 350, however, works something more than the 
"mere repeal" of a desegregation law by the political entity 
that created it. It burdens all future attempts to integrate 
Washington schools in districts throughout the State, by 
lodging decisionmaking authority over the question at a new 
and remote level of government. Indeed, the initiative, like 
the charter amendment at issue in Hunter, has its most per-
nicious effect on integration programs that do "not arouse ex-
traordinary controversy." !d., at 396 (emphasis in original). 
In such situations the initiative makes the enactment of ra-
cially beneficial legislation difficult, though the particular 
program involved might not have inspired opposition had it 
been promulgated through the usual legislative processes 
used for comparable legislation. 25 This imposes direct and 
undeniable burdens on minority interests. "If a govern-· 
mental institution is to be fair, one group cannot always be 
expected to win," id., at 394; by the same token, one group 
cannot be subjected to a debilitating and often insurmount-
able disadvantage. 
IV 
In the end, appellants are reduced to suggesting that 
Hunter has been effectively overruled by more recent deci-
sions of this Court. As they read it, Hunter applied a simple 
25 That phenomenon is graphically demonstrated by the circumstances of 
this litigation. The long-standing desegregation programs in Pasco and 
Tacoma, as well as the Seattle middle school integration plan, have func-
tioned for years without creating undue controversy. Yet they have been 
swept away, along with the Seattle Plan, by Initiative 350. As a practical 
matter, it seems most unlikely that proponents of desegregative busing in 
smaller communities such as Tacoma or Pasco will be able to obtain the 
statewide support now needed to permit them to desegregate the schools 
in their communities. 
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"disparate impact" analysis: it invalidated a facially neutral 
ordinance because of the law's adverse effects upon racial mi-
norities. Appellants therefore contend that Hunter was 
swept away, along with the disparate impact approach to 
equal protection, in Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229 
(1976), and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. 
Corp., 429 U. S. 252 (1977). Cf. James v. Valtierra, 402 
u. s. 137 (1971). 
Appellants unquestionably are correct when they suggest 
that "purposeful discrimination is 'the condition that offends 
the Constitution,"' Personnel Administrator of Massachu-
setts v. Feeney, 442 U. S., at 274, quoting Swann v. Char-
lotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 16 
(1971), for the "central purpose of the Equal Protection 
Clause .... is the prevention of official conduct discriminating 
on the basis of race." Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S., at 
239. Thus, when facially neutral' legislation is subjected to 
equal protection attack, an inquiry into intent is necessary, to 
determine whether the legislation in some sense was de-
signed to accord disparate treatment on the basis of racial 
considerations. Appellants' suggestion that this analysis 
somehow conflicts with Hunter, however, misapprehends the 
basis of the Hunter doctrine. We have not insisted on a par-
ticularized inquiry into motivation in all equal protection 
cases: "A racial classification, regardless of purported moti-
vation, is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only upon 
an extraordinary justification." Personnel Administrator of 
Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U. S., at 272. And legislation 
of the kind challenged in Hunter falls into this inherently sus-
pect category. 26 
There is one immediate and crucial difference between 
Hunter and the cases cited by appellants. While decisions 
such as Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights consid-
''" The State does not suggest that Initiative 350 furthers the kind of com-
pelling interest necessary to overcome the strict scrutiny applied to ex-
plicit racial classifications. 
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ered classifications facially unrelated to race, the charter 
amendment at issue in Hunter dealt in explicitly racial terms 
with legislation designed to benefit minorities "as minor-
ities," not legislation intended to benefit some larger group of 
underprivileged citizens among whom minorities were dis-
proportionately represented. This does not mean, of course, 
that every attempt to address a racial issue gives rise to an 
impermissible racial classification. See Crawford v. Los An-
geles Board of Education, post. But when the political proc-
ess or the decisionmaking mechanism used to address racially 
conscious legislation-and only such legislation-is singled 
out for peculiar and disadvantageous treatment, the govern-
mental action plainly "rests on 'distinctions based on race.'" 
James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S., at 141, quoting Hunter v. 
Erickson, 393 U. S., at 391. And when the State's alloca-
tion of power places unusual burdens on the ability of racial 
groups 'to enact legislation specifically designed to overcome 
the "special condition" of prejudice, the governmental action 
seriously "curtail[s] the operation of those political processes 
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities." United 
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152-153, n. 4 
(1938). In a most direct sense, this implicates the judiciary's 
special role in safeguarding the interests of those groups that 
are "relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as 
to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian 
political process." San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 
411 u. s. 1, 28 (1973). 27 
Hunter recognized the considerations addressed above, 
and it therefore rested on a principle that has been vital for 
over a century-that "the core of the Fourteenth Amend-
27 We also note that singling out the political processes affecting racial is-
sues for uniquely disadvantageous treatment inevitably raises dangers of 
impermissible motivation. When political institutions are more generally 
restructured, as JUSTICE BRENNAN has noted in another context: "The 
very breadth of [the] scheme ... negates any suggestion" of improper pur-
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ment is the prevention of meaningful and unjustified official 
distinctions based on race." 393 U. S., at 391. Just such 
distinctions infected the reallocation of decisionmaking au-
thority considered in Hunter, for minorities are no less pow-
erless with the vote than without it when a racial criterion is 
used to assign governmental power in such a way as to ex-
clude particular racial groups "from effective participation in 
the political proces[s]." Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S., at 94 
(WHITE, J., dissenting). Certainly, a state requirement that 
"desegregation or anti-discrimination laws," Crawford v. Los 
Angeles Board of Education, post, at -- (slip op. 10), and 
only such laws, be passed by unanimous vote of the legisla-
ture would be constitutionally suspect. It would be equally 
questionable for a community to require that laws or ordi-
nances "designed to ameliorate race relations or to protect 
racial minorities," id., at -- (slip op. 11), be confirmed by 
popular vote of the electorate as a whole, while comparable 
legislation is exempted from a similar procedure. The 
amendment addressed in Hunter-and, as we have ex-
plained, the legislation at issue here-was less obviously per-
nicious than are these examples, but was no different in 
principle. 
v 
In reaching this conclusion, we do not undervalue the mag-
nitude of the State's interest in its system of education. 
Washington could have reserved to state officials the right to 
make all decisions in the areas of education and student as-
signment. It has chosen, however, to use a more elaborate 
system; having done so, the State is obligated to operate that 
system within the confines of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
That, we believe, it has failed to do. 28 
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Affirmed. 
28 Appellants also challenge the Court of Appeals' award of attorney's 
fees to the school district plaintiffs, see n. 12, supra, arguing that state-
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funded entities are not eligible to receive such awards from the State. In 
our view, this contention is without merit. The districts are plainly par-
ties covered by the language of the fees statutes. See 42 U. S. C. § 1988 
(1976 ed., Supp. IV) ("In any action ... to enforce a provision of sections 
1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title ... the court, in its discretion, 
may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable 
attorney's fee as part of its costs.") (emphasis added); 20 U. S. C. § 3205 
(1976 ed., Supp. IV) ("Upon the entry of a final order by a court of the 
United States against a ... State ... for failure to comply with ... the 
fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States as [it] per-
tain[s] to elementary and secondary education, the court, in its discretion 
... may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reason-
able attorney's fee as part of its costs.") (emphasis added). Nothing in the 
history of the statutes suggests that this language was meant to exclude 
state-funded entities. To the contrary, the Courts of Appeals have held 
with substantial unanimity that publicly-funded legal services organiza-
tions may be awarded fees. See, e. g., Dennis v. Chang, 611 F. 2d 1302 
(CA9 1980); Holley v. Lavine, 605 F. 2d 638 (CA2 1979), cert. denied sub 
nom. Blum v. Holley, 446 U. S. 913 (1980); Lund v. Affleck, 587 F. 2d 75 
(CAl 1978). And when it enacted § 1988, Congress cited with approval a 
decision awarding fees to a state-funded organization. See H.R. Rep. No. 
94-1558, p. 8, n. 16 (1976) (citing Incarcerated Men of Allen County Jail v. 
Fair, 507 F. 2d 281 (CA6 1974). In any event, the underlying congres-
sional policies are served by awarding fees in cases such as the one before 
us: no matter what the source of their funds, school boards have limited 
budgets, and allowing them fees "encourage[s] compliance with and en-
forcement of the civil rights laws." Dennis v. Chang, 611 F. 2d, at 1306. 
See id., at 1306-1307. While appellants suggest that it is incongruous for 
a State to pay attorney's fees to one of its school boards, it seems no less 
incongruous that a local board would feel the need to sue the State for a 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. We see no reason to disturb the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals on this point. 
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Justice Powell, dissenting. 
~h the enactment of Initiative 
people of the State of 
.) 
washington~ have adopted a 
neighborhood school policy. The policy is binding on 
local school boards but in no way affects the authority of 
state or federal courts to order school transportation to 
remedy violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor does 
2. 
the Initiative affect the power of local school districts 
to establish voluntary transfer programs for racial 
integration or for any other purpose. 
The Court does not hold that the adoption of an 
identical policy by local school districts would be 
unconstitutional. Rather, 
vt 
.tRQ Ccrm: t holds 
1\. 
that the 
~f such a policy at the State level--~G~ 
~ ~ 
at the local level--violates the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. I dissent from the Court's 
a_ 
into the structure of A state 
government. "[T]he Fourteenth Amendment leaves the States 
free to distribute the powers of government as they will 
between their legislative and judicial branches." Hughes 
v. Superior Court, 339 u.s. 460, 467 (1950). In my view, 
~~ 
~ leaves the States equally free to distribute the powers 
I\. 
of government between State and local governmental bodies. 
63 the Seattle School District No. 1 
sought to promote the racial integration of its schools 
through voluntary transfer programs. In 1977 
implemented a school "magnet" program that "succeeded in 
3. 
promoting [voluntary] student movement to a greater degree 
than •.. ever before." 473 F. Supp., 1006. In December, 
1977, however, the District approved a new policy of 
mandatory student reassignment in an effort to speed the 
process of desegregation. The District was not then--nor 
11-~~~ 
is it now--under a court order to desegregate.~  £o ~ 
~f~d L4.- 4"'v 
The adoption of mandatory busing was opposed by ~ 
~~~ 
a group of citizens who formed an organization called the 
Citizens for Voluntary Integration Committee (CiVIC}. As 
~~ 1?artu-r, J-
its name implies, CiV' C favored the achiev ment of racial 
1f-~du~ ~~J'-~trrn~~~~~~  
integration through voluntary programs. ~
... 
~h .. , ' ~ef'~n t e D1str1ct s 
A 
mandatory plan through ~ legal
through preparation of an alternative voluntar~ 
-t t.£t..L-=. I 
racial balancing plan, and through means of a statewide · ---~ 
initiative limiting the use of mandatory school 
reassignment. After its legal efforts failed, and after 
the District formally adopted a mandatory busing plan, 
CiVIC concentrated its efforts on enacting a statewide 
initiative, known as Initiative 350. 1 At the November, 
1 Art. II, §1, of the Washington Constitution 
reserves legislative authority in the people: "[T]he 
Footnote continued on next page. 
1978, general election, the voters of the State adopted 
the Initiative by 
fwv -!<>~ 2 
a sub~tanti~ majority. 
"\. 
Initiative 350 sets forth a neighborhood school 
policy binding on local school districts. 3 It establishes 
a general rule prohibiting school districts from "directly 
or indirectly requir[ing] any student to attend a school 
other than the school which is geographically nearest or 
next nearest the student's place of residence." Wash. Rev. 
people reserve to themselves the power to propose bills, 
laws, and to enact or reject the same at the polls, 
independent of the legislature, and also reserve power, at 
their own option, to approve or reject at the polls any 
act, item, section or part of any bill, act or law passed 
by the legislature." Legislation adopted by initiative or 
approved by referendum may not be amended or repealed by 
the legislature for two years thereafter except upon a 
two-thirds vote of each house of the legislature. Art. II, 
§41. 
2The District Court found that in campaigning for 
Initiative 350, the leadership of CiVIC acted "legally and 
responsibly" and had not "directed its appeals to the 
racial biases of the voters. Indeed, "CiVIC, its agents 
and consultants deliberately took steps to avoid race 
becoming an issue in the campaign, since, they felt, its / 
interjection into the campaign would have lost support for 
the initiative." 473 F. Supp., at 1009. Proponents of 
Initiative 350 argued that mandatory busing ultimately 
would lead to greate}" s.egregation of the schools ?us.,.. to_ .... 'J-. 
"whitefli t"~~~~~~~
e Init1ative ~aeeed by almost 66% of the statewide v 
vote. In Seattle the Initiative passed by over 61% of the 
vote. It failed in ?:two of Seattle~' s legislative 
districts--one predominan ly black and one redominantly 
white. ~ 
3The drafters of Initiative 350 used three federal 
enactments as their models: The Esch Amendment, 20 u.s.c. 
§1714(a), the Byrd Amendment, P.L. 94-206, §209, 90 Stat. 
22, and the Eagleton-Biden Amendment. P.L. 95-205, 91 
Stat. 1460. The Initiative is strikingly similar in its 
provisions and exceptions to these federal enactments. 
5. 
Code §28A. 26.010 (1981) • The rule may be avoided in 
individual instances only if the student requires special 
education; if there are health or safety hazards between 
the student's residence and the nearest or next nearest 
school; or if the nearby schools are overcrowded, unsafe, 
or lacking in physical facilities. Ibid. 
The Initiative includes two broad and 
significant limitations upon the scope of its neighborhood 
school pol icy. In keeping with CiVIC's preference for 
voluntary integration, the Initiative expressly provides 
that nothing in the Initiative shall "preclude the 
establishment of schools offering specialized or enriched 
educational programs which students may voluntarily choose 
to attend, 
4 students." 
or of any other voluntary option offered to 
~~~/.a~~, 
Moreover,A the authority of state and federal 
courts to order mandatory school assignments to remedy 
constitutional violations is left untouched by the 
Initiative: "This chapter shall not prevent any court of 
4In addition to this reservation of authority to 
school districts, the Initiative also reserves "the 
authority of any school district to close school 
facilities." 28A.26.030. 
6. 
competent jurisdiction from adjudicating constitutional 
issues relating to the public schools." 5 
This suit was filed in United States District 
Court shortly after the Initiative was enacted. The 
Seattle School District, joined by the Tacoma and Pasco 
School Districts6 and certain individual plaintiffs, 
argued that the Initiative violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court 
} ~ PU..L ~ ~ 1..-v d ~l.4A.- ~ ~~· 
agreed and advanced three reasons for its conclusion: the 
"" 
Initiative creates a racial classification by forbidding 
student assignments for racial reasons while permitting it 
for other reaso::4", J he ni tiative was adopted because 
intent to discriminate~ the Initiative is overbroad 
5unlike the constitutional amendment at issue in 
Crawford v. Los Angeles Bd. Q!. Ed., __ u.s. __ {1982), 
Initiative 350 places no lim1ts on the State courts in 
their interpretation of the State Constitution. Thus, if 
mandatory school assignments were required by the State 
Constitution-- although not by the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the Federal Constitution--Initiative 350 would not hinder 
a State from enforcing the State constitution. 
6Tacoma School District No. 10 and Pasco School 
District No. 1 are the only other school districts in 
Washington with extensive integration programs. Pasco has 
relied upon school closings and mandatory busing to 
achieve racial balance in its schools. Only minority 
children are bused under the Pasco plan. 473 F. Supp., at 
1002. In addition to school closings, the Tacoma 
integration plan relies upon voluntary techniques--magnet 
schools and voluntary transfers. 
7 . 
hat it forbids a school board from busing students eve 
__ ____,,..._ though the school board might be 
Supp, at 1012. 7 
$u_~~~l 
rJhe Court of Appeals affirmed bwt only on th~ 
1 . 
basis of tl:le Bis Lr ict --coli't-t:' s fiJ::st -reas-on. · '!'he oour t 
0 
~ found that although the Initiative does not refer to race 
expressly, it effectively "embodies a constitutionally-
suspect classification based on racial criteria because it 
legislatively differentiates student assignment for 
purposes of achieving racial balance from student 
assignment for any other significant reason ... a Relying 
~be-decisio~ of tbi• ~ct ~unter v. Erickson, 393 
1\ ' 
u.s. 385 {1969), the court concluded that Initiative 350 
"both creates a constitutionally-suspect racial 
7certain of the intervenor plaintiffs argued that 
the school districts had operated unconstitutional dual 
school systems. Because of its invalidation of Initiative 
350, however, the District Court did not reach this claim. 
8The Court of Appeals relied upon the District 
Court's finding of fact that "[e]xcept for racially 
balancing purposes, Initiative 350 permits local school 
districts to assign students other than to their nearest 
or next nearest schools for most, if not all, of the major 
reasons for which students are at present assigned to 
schools other than their nearest or next nearest schools." 
8. 
classification and radically restructures the political 
process of washington by allowing a state-wide majority to 
usurp traditional local authority over local school board 
educational policies." 633 F. 2d, at 1344. 9 Finding the 
Initiative invalid on this basis, the Court found it 
unnecessary to address the District Court's alternative 
holdings. 10 
9Although the Court of Appeals stated that 
Initiative 350 "radically restructures the political 
process" and "wrest[s] from local control the formulation 
and implementation of educational and desegregation 
policies," the court nowhere sought to support these 
conclusory statements. Nor were any findings made by the 
District Court with respect to the Washington political 
system. Indeed, it is apparent that both the District 
Court and the Court of Appeals considered that the 
Initiative embodied a "constitutionally-suspect 
classification based on racial criteria" simply because it 
deals with a matter connected to race relations. -
~ --. 
10Judge Wright dissented. In his view Initiative 
350 could not be said to embody a racial classification. 
The Initiative does not classify individuals on the basis 
of their race. It simply deals with a matter bearing on 
race relations. Moreover, no racial classification' is 
created because the citizens of a State favor mandatory 
school reassignments for some purposes but not for reasons 
of race. The benefits and problems associated with busing 
for one reason are not the same as for another. Finally, ~ 
Judge Wright could not understand how the exercise of~ 
authority by the State could create a racial 
classification. The State had not intervened by altering 
the legislative process in a way that burdened racial 
minorities. Charged by the State Constitution with the 
responsibility for the provision of public education, the 
State had simply exercised its authority to run its own 
school system. 
Judge Wright also addressed the District Court's 
alternative holdings that Initiative 350 is overbroad or 
that it was motivated by discriminatory intent. He found 
no basis for either conclusion. 
The principles that should guide us in reviewing 
the constitutionality of Initiative 350 are well 
established. To begin with, it is no concern of o ; rs how 
the States choose to distribute their sovereign authority 
as among their various institutions. See National League 
of Cities v. Usery, 426 u.s. 833 {1976) ~ Hughes v. 
Superior Court, 339 u.s. 460, 467 {1950). "[A]ccording to 
the institutions of this country, the sovereignty in every 
State resides in the people of the State, and ••. they may 
alter and change their form of government at their own 
pleasure." Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, 47 {1849)~ Hunter 
v. Erickson, 393 u.s. 385, 394 {1969) {Harlan, J. 
concurring). The Constitution does not dictate to the 
States a particular division of authority between 
legislature and judiciary or between state and local 
governing bodies. It does not protect or define 
institutions of local government. As we have noted, the 
States have "extraordinarily wide latitude ••• in creating 
various types of political subdivisions and conferring 
authority upon them." Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 
;; 
10. 
u.s. 60, 71 (1978) . 11 
Thus, a State may choose to run its schools 
from the state legislature or through local school boards 
just as it may choose to address the matter of race 
relations at the State or local level. The only relevant 
constitutional limitation on a State's freedom to order 
its political institutions is that it may not do so in a 
fashion designed to "[place] special burdens on racial 
minorities within the governmental process." Hunter v. 
Erickson, supra, at 391 (emphasis added). 
11In Community Communications Co. v. Boulder, 
u.s. , (1982), the Court explained that all 
soverel'i19 authority in the United States res ides either 
with the Federal government or with the States: 
"The States possess a significant measure of 
sovereignty under our Constitution. But this 
principle contains its own limitation: Ours is 
a 'dual system of government," [Parker v. Brown, 
317 u.s. 341, 351 (1943)] (emhpasis added), 
which has no place for sovereign cities. As 
this Court stated long ago, all sovereign 
authority 'within the goegraphical limits of the 
United States' resides either with 
'the Government of the United States, or [with] 
the States of the Union. There exist within the 
broad domain of sovereignty but these two. 
There may be cities, counties, and other 
organized bodies with limited legislative 
functions, but they are all derived from, or 
exist in, subordination to one or the other of 
these.' United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 
379 (1886) (emphasis added)." 
~ 
See Sailors v. Board of Ed ation, 387 u.s. 105, 109 ~ 
(1967) ("Save and unless the s e, county, or municipal 
government runs afoul of a federally protected right, it 
has vast leeway in the management of its internal 
affairs."); Fortson v. Morris, 385 u.s. 231, 234 (1966). 
11. 
Unlike the internal ordering of 
government, the Constitution has quite a bit more to say 
about the way in which States deal with 
may not act on the basis of a racial classification 
unless necessary to further a compelling state interest. 
See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 u.s. 184, 196 (1964). Nor 
vu-~t-
may they act in an ostensibly neutral fashion i ~ their 
purpose is discriminatory. See Washington v. Davis, 426 
u.s. 229 (1976). Even so, the States retain an area of 
freedom and discretion when dealing with racial matters or 
with questions affecting racial minorities. A neutral 
State law will not be held unconstitutional simply because 
it has a disproportionately adverse effect on a racial 
minority. See id. And a law specifically addressed to a 
racial question will not be invalidated necessarily: The 
Court has recognized a distinction between treatment of 
race relations and treatment of individuals on the basis 
of race. See Crawford v. Los Angeles Bd. of Ed., U.S. 
__ , (1982); ante, at 
Moreover, in certain limited circumstances, the 
Court has held that a State may treat persons differently 
12. 
on the basis of race. See University of California 
Regents v. Bakke, 438 u.S. 265 (1978) . The Court has 
suggested that even in the absence of a finding of a 
~ 
constitutional violation, States or school authorities may 
A 
conclude "that in order to prepare students to live in a 
pluralistic society each school [should] have a prescribed 
ratio of Negro to white students." Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenberg Board of Education, 402 u.s. 1, 16 (1971). 
See University of California Regents v. Bakke, supra, at 
300, n. 39 (opinion of Powell, J.). But this is a matter 
of policy within the State's discretion. we have never 
held, or even intimated, that absent a federal 
constitutional violation, a State must choose to treat 
persons differently on the basis of race. There is no 
obligation on a State to do "more" than the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires. In the absence of a federal 
constitutional violation requiring race-specific remedies, 
a policy of strict racial neutrality by a State would 
violate no federal constitutional principle. In 
particular, a neighborhood school policy and a decision 
not to assign students on the basis of their race, does 
( 
13. 




Application of these w~ principles 
.... 
~~~ 
t se, leads me to a different 
,.~ ... / ;-:-<tL, ':1 Hv:-~ 
con~ion than that reached by the Court. Through the 
• 
~,.££~~ 
Initiative process the State has A' adopteJ a...,Eeighborhood 
sc'tof-p~ ~-::f.~~t~ ~ .. ade / 
~ 
w:i:'t1're-\:l.t respect: te rage. ~he State's decision to 'b/se-4 the 
~~~~~ 
Initiative ~ legislative technique does llOt sriolat e_ any / 
"' , ~~ 
See James v. Valtierra, r 
\ 402 u.s. 1137' 142 (1971). Nor does the State's 
1
~:1~ racial neutrality in student assignments 
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. None of the school districts involved in this 
litigation was required to adopt race specific school 
assignments in order to remedy a federal constitutional 
12see Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 
u.s. 1, 28 (1971) ("Absent a constitutional violation 
there would be no basis for judicially ordering assignment 
of students on racial bas is. All things being equal, 
with no history of discrimination, it might well be 









violation. Any one of them might have cancelled its 
integration program without violating the Federal 
Constitution. 13 
Moreover, t do nee 
~a racial classification. The Initiative in no way 
requires or suggests that persons are to be treated 
differently on account of their race. Indeed, it has 
~ 
precisely the opposite effect: ~~ Initiative 350) 
school districts &iii no longer~ assign students on the 
basis of race absent a court order. Whether this is 
wise policy is not for us to say. Children of all races 
benefit from neighborhood schooling just as children of 
all races benefit from exposure to "ethnic and racial 
diversity in the classroom." Columbus Board of Education 
v. Penick, 443 u.s. 449, 486 (1979) (Powell, J. , 
dissenting). But as the Court explains, whether the 
benefits of mandatory school assignments for the purpose 
of racial integration outweigh the costs, is a question 
13The Court consistently has held "that the Equal 
Protectoin Clause is not violated by the mere repeal of 
( 
~ 
race related legislation or policies that were not 
required by the Federal Constitution in the first place." ~ 






that the political process constitutionally may decide: 
"[I]n the absence of a constitutional violation, the 
desirablili ty and efficacy of school desegregation are 
matters to be resolved through the political process." 
See ante, at 
Certainly, the Initiative treats mandatory 
student reassignments for reasons of race differently from 
reassignments for other reasons. But this difference in 
treatment does not create a racial classification. "The I r{ 
Constitution does not require things which are different 
in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they 
were the same." Tigner v. Texas, 310 u.s. 141, 147 
(1940) • The benefits and burdens associated with the 
assignment of students on the basis of race are unique. 
The State may conclude that mandatory reassignments to 
avoid a safety hazard or overcrowding are justified 
whereas reassignments on the basis of race are not. 
Similarly, the State may decide that an employment 
preference in State hiring for veterans is wise policy but 
conclude that a preference on the basis of race detracts 








Seattle lfp/ss 6/16/82 
SEA13 Sally Possible Substitute language 
for III-A (pp. 13-15) 
Application of these settled principles 
demonstrates the serious error of today's decision - an 
~ 
error that cuts deeply into heretofore unquestioned right 
A 
~ 
of a state to structure decision-making authority ~ its 
government. In washington, as in many other states, use 
of an initiative - a popular referendum - to determine 
state policy is a valid and uniquely democratic 
legislative technique. See James v. Valtierra, at 137, 
142 (1971). In this case, by Initiatve 350, the state 
adopted a policy of racial neutrality in student 
assignments. As there had been no state segregated 
schools, Washington was perfectly free to adopt this 
policy. 
The issue here arises only because the Seattle 
School Board - in the absence of a then established state 
policy and exercising its broad discretion - had chosen to 
adopt race specific school assignments with extensive 
busing. It is not questioned that the school board 
itself, at any time thereafter, could have changed its 
mind and cancelled its integration program without 
violating the federal Constitution. 13 Yet this Court, by 
2. 
a process of reasoning that defies rational understanding, 
. ~ 
holds that neither the leg1slature or the people of the 
~ 
State of Washington could alter what the school board had 
decided. 
The Court holds that the people of washington by 
Initiative 350 created a racial classification, and yet 
concedes that identical action by the Seattle school board 
itself would have created no such classification. This is 
not an easy argument to answer because it seems to make no 
sense. School boards are the creation of supreme state 
authority, whether in a state constitution or by 
legislative enactment. Until today's decision no one 
would have questioned the authority of a state to abolish 
school boards altogether, or to require that they conform 
to any lawful state policy. And in the State of 
Washington, a neighborhood school policy would have been 
lawful. Under today's decision this heretofore undoubted 
supreme authority of a state's electorate is to be 
curtailed whenever a school board - or indeed any other 
state board or local instrumentality - adopts a race 
specific program that arguably benefits racial minorities. 
3. 
Once such a program is adopted, only the local or 
subordinate entity that approved it will have authority to 
change it. The Court offers no authority or relevant 
explanation for this extraordinary subordination of the 
~ 
ultimate sovereign power of a state ~action with respect 
1\ 
to racial matters by subordinate bodies. The Constitution 
of the United States does not require such a bizarre 
result. 
This dissent well could conclude at this point. 
Yet, even if one assumes that somehow the federal 
~~ 
Constitution now imposes special e-onditiens on the 
""' 
exercise of state sovereignty once a local school board 
has acted, this is certainly not a case where a state - in 
moving to change a locally adopted policy - has 
established some racially discriminatory requirement. It 
is essential to bear in mind that no finding has been made 
in this or in any other case, that schools in washington 
J 
have been segregated by state action. Thus, there had 
been no constitutional violation to be remedied by the 
Seattle board or the state. Nor does initiative 350 
authorize or approve segregation in any form or degree. 
4. 
It is neutral on its face, and neutral as public policy. 
It merely limits the discretionary authority of school 
boards to seek racial balance by mandatory busing beyond 
certain limits. The rationale of the initiative is that 
children of all races benefit from neighborhood schooling, 
just as children of all races benefit from exposure to 
"ethnic and racial diversity in the classroom". Columbus 
Board of Education v. Penick, 443 u.s. 449, 486 
(1979) (Powell, J., dissenting). (David: other authority 
for this?) 
Note to David: The above is a rough shot at rewriting 
III-A. There may be flaws in some of my rather simplistic 
reasoning, and also some repetition. I count on you to 
get this straight. But, if I am right, this sort of 
argument has considerable force. The difficulty is that 
having made it, there is not much left to be said. 
In any event, it seems to me that most, if not 
all, of III-B commencing with the last sentence at the 
5. 
bottom of page 14, can be eliminated as a secondary type 
of argument. 
16. 
violate the Equal Protection Clause simply because it must 
deal with a particular, race related issue. See Crawford ? 
v. Los Angeles Board of Education, supra. Nor does the 
State violate the Equal Protection Clause because it fails 
to treat all mandatory school reassignments--whether for 
racial balance or for safety--as if they were the same, 
when, in fact, they are not. 
B 
Finally, I cannot agree with the Court that 
Initiative 350 places "special burdens on racial 
minorities within the governmental process," Hunter v. 
Erickson, supra, at 391~~~;-;;'e~~ 
t4V(iec..~ 
State's distribution of . authority i.,., jtt!Stif4ed. " ~ In my 
view, Initiative 350 is simply a reflection of the State's 
political process at work. It does not alter that process 
in any respect. It does not require, for example, that 
all matters dealing with race--or with integration in the 
schools--must henceforth be submitted to a referendum of 
the people. Cf. Hunter v. Erickson, supra. The State has 
done no more than precisely what the Court has said that 
it should do: It has "resolved through the political 
17. 
process" the "desirability and efficacy of [mandatory] 
school desegregation." Ante, at 
The political process in Washington, as in all 
States, permits persons who are dissatisfied at a local 
level to appeal to the State legislature or the people of 
the State for redress. Such a process is inherent in the 
continued sovereignty of 
~~o~~ it. Nor is 
the Statf." 
fl--,_ &.4-~ 
~ere is nothing 
~ 
there anything singular about 
the State's decision to deal with a matter on the State 
level rather than by delegation to local officials. 
this and certainly no Constitutional violation. 14 
In this case, by means of an Initiative, the 
State of Washington has asserted its authority over one 
14cf. James v. Valtierra, 402 u.s. 137, 142 (1971} 
("(O]f course a lawmaking procedure that 'disadvantages' a 
particular group does not always deny equal protect ion. 
Under any such holding, presumably a Stte would not be 
able to require referendums on any ~ subject unless 
referendums were required on all, because they would 
always disadvantage some group. And this Court would be 
required to analyze governmental structures to determine 
whether a gubernatorial veto provision or a filibuster 
rule is likely to 'disadvantage' any of the diverse an 
shifting groups that make up the American people."}. 
18. 
aspect of public schooling and race relations just as it 
has over many other aspects of public schooling and race 
relations, and over many other areas of life. By 
regulating in this manner, the State has not singled out 
~ 
matters of interest to racial minorities for particular 
-1 
and unusual treatment. The State deals with almost an 
4~~~ 
infinite range of questions at the State level/ ~ 
1~. 
If the assertion of the State's authority over 
its local school boards violates the Fourteenth Amendment 
in this case--because removal of decisiot aking to a 
"remote" political body, see ante, at __ , dilutes the 
political strength of local minority groups--then it is 
~~~ 
difficult to see why any decisio~aking at the StateA level) ~ 
dealing with racial matters would not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause as well. A policy of racial neutrality 
in public hiring or in admission to State University's--if 
imposed by the people of the State, the State legislature, 
or the State Supreme Court in its interpretation of the 
State Constitution--would then be unconstitutional. 
of the States to deal with one of the most 
pressing social issues confronting our society. 
I find nothing in the Constitution, or in the 
~--




th~. Such a rule contradicts the principle 
of State sovereignty that the Constitution 
Nonetheless, 
Court in Hunter v. Erickson, supra, 
~~ 
f olds that Initiative 350 "imposes substantial 
burdens on racial minorities" in the governmental process, 
must be found unconstitutional. See ante, 
the people of 
amendment that "not only suspended the operation of 
existing ordinance forbidding housing discrimination, but 
15The Court also relies at certain critical points 
in its discussion on the summary affirmance in Lee v. 
Ny~uist, 318 F. Supp. 710 (WDNY 1970, summarily aff~402 
u •. 935 (1971}. As we have often noted, however, summary 
affirmances by this Court are of little precedential 
force. See Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 u.s. 490, 
500 (1981}. A summary affirmance "is not to be read as an 
adoption of the reasoning supporting the judgment under 
review." Zobel v. Williams, U.S. __ , n. 13 
(1982}. 
20. 
also required the approval of the electors before any 
future [anti-discrimination] ordinance could take effect." 
393 u.s., at 389-390. Although the charter amendment was 
facially neutral, the Court found that it could be said to 
embody a racial classification: "[T]he reality is that 
the law's impact falls on the minority. The majority 
needs no protection against discrimination." Id., at 391. 
By making it more difficult to pass legislation in favor 
of racial minorities, the amendment placed "special 
burdens on racial minorities within the governmental 
process." Ibid. 
The holding in Hunter rests upon three elements > 
as the court recognizes. First, the Akron amendment 
explicitly addressed a racial matter. Second, the effect 
of the amendment was to deprive minorities of something 
clearly to their benefit--e. g., ___ fair housing laws. 
Finally, the political process was radically altered: 
"racially conscious legislation--and only such 
legislation--[was] singled out for peculiar and 
disadvantageous treatment." Ante, at 27. In the presence 
of these three factors, legislation may be held 
21. 
unconstitutional even though facially neutral and even 
though there has been no finding of a purpose to 
discriminate. 
Each of the elements underlying the holding in 
Hunter is indispensable. The absence of any one of them 
will not provide a basis for condemning state action. 
Thus, if the particular legislation is not expressly 
directed to a racial matter, it will not be 
unconstitutional even though it may harm racial minorities 
and even though it alters the political process. See 
James v. Valtierra, 402 u.s. 137 (1971). Similarly, if 
state action deals expressly with a racial matter and 
alters the governmental process, but fails to burden a 
racial minority, it will not be found unconstitutional. 
See United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. 
Carey, 430 u.s. 144 (1977). Finally, if a State addresses 
~ 
a racial matter by removing a benefit racial minori~ 
consider to be in their interest, but in no way alters the 
political process so as to disadvantage minority groups, a 
constitutional violation will not necessarily be found 
absent a showing of discriminatory intent. Otherwise, a 
22. 
State could never "merely repeal" an affirmative action 
program. See Crawford v. Los Angeles Board of Education, 
U.S. (1982); Hunter v. Erickson, supra, at 390, n. 
5. 
The Court argues that each one of the three 
9-f-. 
Hunter elements is present in this case. ~irst, the Cotl~t 
finds that Initiative 350 deals explicitly with a racial 
tvafl •"%(-~ ~ - --matter j , Seg~d, it argues that mandatory busing A for 
racial integration is in the interest of racial minorities 
even in the absence of a constitutional violation) 
1\ ~ ~A it concludes that the decision by the State to 
regulate mandatory school reassignments for racial 
integration at the "remote" State level, rather than by 
delegation to school officials, subjects racial minorities 
"to a debilitating and often insurmountable disadvantage" 
as compared to other groups. Ante, at 
I will not quarrel with the Court's 
~ 
that Initiative 350 addresses a racial problem despite 
-
facial neutrality and despite ~~ ~~-a~:: .:c:h:ol~~~~ii~~ 
~~~~e.~..., ~ 4VZ-~4o· uQ __,;....., 
reassignments fa~ 
But I find little to support the Court's conclusion that 
Initiative 350 places a~ burden on racial minorities 




matters--and only over racial matters--in such a way as to lv~ · 
~ 
place comparative burdens on minorities." Ante, at 
n. 17. 
The Court states that "our cases suggest 
desegregation of the public schools ... at bottom inures 
primarily to the benefit of the minority, and is designed 
for that purpose." Ante, at But the question 
addressed by Initiative 350 is not the value of racially 
integrated education. Rather, Initiative 350 addresses 
the costs of achieving racial integration through 
tu.,~~~~ ~"=> 
mandatory reassignment~. Just as integration{ benefi~ all .. . 
students, so, too, mandatory reass1gnment on the basis of 
race potentially may harm all students whatever their 
race. Thus, it is far from clear ~ thrt, 
H-J-
in the 
absence of a constitutional violation, ~ the mandatory 
reassignment of students on the basis of race necessarily 
benefits racial minorities or that it is even viewed with 
favor by racial minorities. See Crawford v. Board of 








32 {1982). As the Court indicates, the busing question is 
complex and is best resolved by the political process. 
Moreover, it is significant that Initiative 350 
places no limits on voluntary programs or on court ordered 
reassignments. It permits school districts to order 
school closings for purposes of racial balance. And it 
--~.hA-~~--
permits school districts to order a student to attend the 
1\ 
"next nearest"--rather than nearest--school to promote 
racial integration. Thus, the Tacoma School District's 
~~ 
voluntary integration program is A:et mtleh affected -'(by 
Initiative 350, while the Pasco District--through 
mandatory assignments to the next nearest school--can 
maintain racial balance although now it will be white 
-~ ~~~ 
children who must ride the busses. 1  ~ ...e;tl .. j 
9..-c.. ~ ~ ~~ /f eLL~ ~I .,_,"/ ~) 
T~rough- the techniques of racial integration //")<_. 
A 1 ~
~ 350 
wl:l4eh ~ Initiative-\ leaves open, and i-n l:i9Qt e{ the ~ 
~ ~~~~ ~. 
~uncertain benefitsArQil.pQQ &¥,.( mandatory pupil assi9'fl1fte+lts ( ?,z_ 
~~~~- - --l..l-i.-c.; ~ 
L in the absence of a constitutional violation~ I Cilr::tr::tot say ~ 
~ - k~~-- a..~a 
w~tb certaiRty that Initiative ~g ~±aces a 
1\ 
~ ~ ·~1-a..t.&. ~-
racial minor i ties.l Unlike the fair ~ ...... 
~~~ 
• housing laws at issue in Hunter, we -"~""¥" iohat this 
~~~~~~ 
_rJ ~egi slat:iQ~ II.Ras t:he~ clear purpose of making it more 
difficult for certain racial minorities to achieve 
legislation that is in their interest." 393 u.S., at 395 
(Harlan, J., concurring). 
In the absence of a clear burden on racial 
minorities, Hunter has no application. But Hunter is 
irrelevant to this case for another reason as well. The 
rule in Hunter applies only where the political or 
decisionmaking process has been redrawn "in such a way as 
to place comparative burdens on minorities" Ante, at __ , 
~s a/1-t!o..J '"d'c~ff'J 
n. 17. 50. In this has not 
been redrawn or altered.~ Nor have racial minorities 
asked to bear a unique or comparative burden. 
,.,~~~ 





balance among the much larger group of questions regulated 
at the State level. Racial minorities, if 
4 
they are 
burdened by Initiative 350, are not singled out for unique 
treatment. They are precisely like any other group that 
€0 sometime~ prefer a matter to be delegated to local 
authorities. 
operation of a system with multiple layers of authority. 
Thus, if the admissions committee of a State law school 
developed an affirmative action~~~~~~ 
-:=Jwo'1;_dr~ n~titutional for the oean ~ 
~.h-/-~ 
~1 to intervene by establishing~ criteria for ~ 
stteh pla-Rs or by prohibiting any such plan--even though 
admissions decisions were traditionally left to the 
~~vi-~ 
Committee. l \101:2~ ~ --- H"Rd i:t unconstitutional--or in 
" ~~ 
any way extraordinary--if the matter wttS" 'taken to the 
faculty of the law school or to the faculty of the 
university as a whole. And if the m~~te were 
decided y the University President, the Chancellor of the 
University System, or the Board of Regents, I still would 
find nothing in the Federal Constitution or the decision 
ft._J-
in Hunter ~h would authorize this Court to intervene. 
<ff In short, it seems totally irrelevant whether the State 
~traditionally~ intervened in school affairs. The fact 
27. 
is that the State may, and often does, intervene in local 
affairs in a variety of areas. An appeal to the State is 
not an alteration of the system, it is the system. But 
even assuming that the State must demonstrate some 
historical interest in public schooling or race relations, 
the Court's attempt to demonstrate that Initiative 350 
represents a unique thrust by the State into these areas 
~w_ ~~~.J.z#~A~~~~ 
is utterly tmpersaasi?e. The Court's own discussion 
~ 
indicates the breadth of the State's activity. The Common 
School Provisions of the State's Code of Laws is nearly 
200 pages long governing a broad variety of school 
matters. Any one who takes a moment to leaf through these 
pages of the State code will have little doubt that the 
State has taken seriously its constitutional obligation to 
provide public education. See Art. IX, §2 ("The 
legislature shall provide for a general and uniform system 
of public schools"); Seattle School District v. State, 90 
wash. 2d 476, 518, 585 P. 2d 71, 95 (1978). 
In 1 igh t of the wealth of regulation of the 
~~~s/d~~~ 
public schools by the State, it 1g Y~lear to me - just what 





satisfy the Col1'r t. Apparently the State may specify the 
'\ 
design and marking of school buses, §28A.03.079, and it 
may specify the rules and regulations concerning the 
training of school bus drivers, §28A.04.131, but it may 
not specify when these buses are to be used for racial 
integration'f-·Uol'-eover) 1 t is undoubtedly true that in many -
areas of school life, the State has chosen to delegate 
authority to local authorities. Yet these decisions to 
delegate are no less State decisions affecting public 
education. They are decisions as to what is properly left 
to local officials and what is properly left to the State. 
But Initiative 350 is just such a decision as well. 
In addition to public school affairs generally, 
the State has taken a direct interest in ending racial 
discrimination in the schools and elsewhere. See 
§ 4 9 . 6 0 • 01 0 e t seq. Article IX, §1 of the State 
Constitution specifically prohibits discrimination in the 
provision of public schooling: "It is the paramount duty 
of the state to make ample provision for the education of 
all children residing within its borders without 
distinction or preference on account of race, color, 
29. 
caste, or sex." The State Supreme Court has not 
interpreted this section of the State Constitution to 
prohibit race conscious school assignments in the absence 
of a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cf. Citizens 
Against Mandatory Bussing v. Palmason, 80 Wash. 2d 445, 
495 P. 2d 657 (1972) .16 But until today's decision one 
would have thought that the State Court could have 
rendered such a decision without violating the Federal 
Constitution. 
v 
We are not asked to decide the wisdom of a 
policy that limits the ability of local school districts 
to adopt mandatory reassignments for racial balance. We 
must decide only whether the Federal Constitution permits 
'keP~~~/;> 
the State to adopt such a policy. ~he Coort does -Rot in 
16 In Palmason, the washinton Supreme Court turned 
back a challenge to a desegregation plan adopted by the 
Seattle School District and approved by the State 
Supreintendent of Pulbic Instruction. The court held that 
opponents of the plan were not entitled to attack it by 
means of a local referendum: "Initiative and referendum 
procedures can be invoked at the local level only if their 
exercise is not in conflict with state law. • • • Clearly 
they cannot be used to interfere in the management of the 
state's school system." 80 Wash. 2d at 450, 495 P. 2d, at 
661. Judge Wright noted in his dissent the irony "that a 
federal court would now hold that the stte itself may not 
interfere in its own school system." 
30 • 
.a.RY \~-a::p i-~timat.e that the School Districts in this case 
were under a federal constitutional obligation to adopt 
mandatory busing. Nor is it suggested that having tried a 
system of mandatory race conscious school assignments, the 




Co u r t s imp 1 y oG~j~Q~oC;C:.:Iitri!S,__-t:(;eO.......:It;..~h~e  .... ~S..t:t-'ilaL.It:.fe!--)---:. 
~ 
t~ ~tea. I would Aot dictate to erre 
~ ~ 
Statf at \Jifta~ level offgo;;;nmen~ decisions affecting the 
public schools must be taken. I · 4iilo Aot ttnde! s tanO the 
~~~~£-e.(.~ 




TO: David DATE: June 16, 1982 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
81-9 Seattle 
This will be a suggestion with respect to Part 
III-B (pp. 16-19). 
I think III-B could be eliminated as a separate 
part. In III-B we are address~ng primarily our basic 
position that the Court strikes a blow at the very heart of 
state sovereignty. Some of what is now said in III-B can be 
used to advantage in the III-A argument - particularly the 
first paragraph in III-B and the first full paragraph on 
page 18. The remainder of III-B is expendable, except 
perhaps a sentence or two that you may wish to save for Part 
IV dealing with Hunter. 
If this suggestion is adopted, the structure of 
our opinion would be as follows: 
Part I - introduction and summarized facts to 
frame the issue. 
Part II - the governing principles, with 
particular emphasis on the constitutional law of 
desegregation. 
Part III - our basic attack on the Court opinion 
as an unprecedented interference ' with the exercise of state 
political authority. 
2. 
Part IV- distinguishing Hunter, but more briefly 
- much more briefly than at present. Your first draft gives 
Hunter more attention than it deserves. I am now persuaded 
this case is fundamentally different. Let us focus on the 
principal distinction between this case and Hunter, rather 
than go through a long and detailed point-by-point 
exposition of the differences. Hunter did create at the 
city level a new governmental structure that imposed a new 
obstacle forminorities to overcome. Initiative 350 did 
neither. Here we are dealing with the exercise of supreme 
authority by vote of the people establishing a statewide 
policy on a question always within its power, but not 
exercised until initiative 350. No new obstacle was 
created, as you have emphasized. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss 
' .· . ·.~ 
lfp/ss 06/16/82 
MEMORANDUM 
'T'O: David DATE: June 16, 1982 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
81-9 Seattle 
This will be a suqgAstion with re~p~ct to ~art 
I I!-B ( np • J 6-1.9 ) • 
I think !I!-B could be eliminated as a separate 
part. In III-B we are addressinq primarily our basic 
position that the ~ourt strikes a blow at the very heart of 
state sovpreignty. SomP of what ts now said in III-B can be 
u~ed to advantaqe in the III-A arqument - particularly the 
first parAgraph in III-B and the first full PAragraph on 
paqe 18. The remainder of III-R is exoen~able, except 
perhaps a sentence or two that you ~ay wish to save for Part 
IV dealinq with Hunter. 
If this suggestion is adopted, the structure of 
our opinion wouln be as f.ollm111s: 
Part "£ - i.ntroduction and summarized facts to 
frame the i.ssue. 
Part II - the governing principles, with 
parti.cular emphasis on the constitutional law of 
deseqregation. 
Part III - our basic attack on the Court opinion 
as an unpr~cedented interference with the exercise of state 
political. authority. 
2 . 
Part IV- disti.nguishing Hunter, but more briefly 
- much more briefly than at pres~nt. Your first draft gives 
Hunter more at tent ion than it deserves. I am now per sua.ded 
this case is fundamentally different. Let us focus on the 
principal distinction between this case and Hunter, rather 
than go through a long and ~etailed point-by-point 
exposition of the nifferences. Hunter did create at the 
city level a new governmental structure that imposed a new 
obstacle forminorities to overcome. Initiative 350 did 
neither. Here we are dealinq with th~ exercise of supreme 
authority by vote of the people establishing a statewide 
policy on a question _ab1ays wtthin its power, but not 
exercised until initiative 350. No new obstacle was 





TO: David DATE: June 16, 1982 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
81-9 Seattle 
In line with some of the thoughts we have 
discussed this morning, I have roughed out - and attach 
hereto - some language that may be considered in a revision 
of Part III-A. The purpose would be to emphasize, early in 
our opinion, what you and I both think is our strongest 
point. 
As I have indicated in a separate little memo, I 
believe Part III-B can be eliminated, and Part III can 
include what is the heart of our opinion. Feel free to 
state this as you think best, using only the enclosure to 
the extent it fits in with your revision. 
I am fully aware, David, that with both of us 
"scribbling" at the same time, I am making revisions .b..,~ 
especially difficult , ier yeu. I am prompted to proceed in 
this fashion only because we have a Conference tomorrow, and 
I also have a good deal of work to do on Mississippi State. 
I feel under no pressure to circulate Seattle even 
tomorrow. Let us do the best we can to destroy the Court 
opinion in about 15 to 18 typewritten pages. It is worth 





'1"0: navJ.d DATE: June 16, 1982 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
81-9 Seattle 
tn line with some of the thouqhts we hav~ 
discussea this morning, I have roughed out - an~ attach 
hereto - some language that may be considered in a revision 
of Part III-A. 'T'he purpose woula be to emphasize, earlv in 
our opinion, what you and I both think is our strongest 
poi.nt. 
As I have indicated in a separate little memo, I 
believe Part III-B can be eliminated, ana Part III can 
include what is the he>art of our opinion. Feel free to 
state this as you think heot, using only the enclosure to 
the extent it fits in with your revision. 
I am fully aware, David, that with hoth of us 
"scribbling" at the same time, I am making revisions 
especi.ally difficult for you. I am prompted to proceed in 
this fashi.on only because we have a Conference tomorrow, and 
r also have a good deal of \..rork to do on Mississl.ppi State. 
I feel under no pressure to circulate Seattle even 
tomorrow. Let us do the best we can to destroy the Court 
opinion in about 15 to 18 typewritten pages. It is worth 
doing it carefully. 




TO: David DATE: June 16, 1982 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
81-9 Seattle 
This is a "piecemeal" comment, addressed only to 
Part II. 
This is viewed as a busing case. Although the 
central issue is whether the 14th Amendment limits the power 
of a state to structure its own government, this issue is 
best understood - certainly from our viewpoint - in the 
context of what the Constitution requires with respect to 
desegregation. I therefore would commence Part II with a 
summary - and perhaps quotations in footnotes - of the basic 
principles of desegregation. 
The Court has never held that there is an 
affirmative duty to integrate in the absence of a finding of 
invalid segregation. No such finding has ever been made in 
washington. The state - whether acting through a school 
board or legislature or by referendum - was perfectly free 
to follow a neighborhood policy, and to take no affirmative 
steps to integrate pupils. Even where desegregation is 
ordered because of a constitutional violation, the Court has 
never held that racial balance itself is a constittuional 
requirement. This is said in Swann, possibly in Milliken I 
and either Dayton or Columbus I. And Pasadena held that 
even where there had been segregated schools, once 
,_ ' 
desegregation was accomplished no further duty existed to 
maintain integration. 
2. 
All of this can be said as briefly as possible, 
but driving home the fact that there has never been a 
constitutional violation in Washington, and that the Seattle 
school board acted on its own initiative in ordering 
mandatory busing to achieve racial balance. At that time, 
there had been no determination of state policy on the 
question of achieving racial balance in the schools by 
mandatory busing away from the neighborhood schools. Thus, 
the Seattle board acted within its general authority without 
specific direction from the legisture or people of the 
state. It was then free to act, and the question that we 
address primarily is whether its action created vested 
constitutional rights that limited indefinitely (perhaps 
forever!) the sovereign authority of the people of 
washington to enact otherwise perfectly valid laws. 
As I indicated illegibly in the margin a couple of 
times, we are not talking simply about "mandatory pupil 
assignment" by the school board. This occurs every year as 
population shifts require changes in attendance areas. The 
issue here concerns mandatory busing to achieve racial 
balance beyond a defined limit. Rather than undertake to 
spell all of this out whenever we mention it, I suggest that 
we define - in a note - the term "mandatory busing" to be 
used interchangeably with "mandatory busing to achieve 
racial balance". 
3. 
The second part of Part II, stating general 
principles should summarize the principles you already have 






TO: David DATE: June 16, 1992 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
81-9 Seattle 
This is a "piecemeal" comment, addresseo only to 
Part II. 
This is viewed as a busing case. Although the 
central issue is whether the 14th Amendment limits the power 
of a state to structure its own government, this issue is 
best understood - certainly from our viewpoint - in the 
context of what the Constitution requires with respect to 
deseqreqation. I therefore would commence Part II with a 
summary - and perhaps quotations in footnotes - of the basic 
principles of desegregation. 
The Court has never held that there is an 
affirmative duty to integrate in the absence of a finding of 
invalid segregation. No such finding has ever been made in 
Washington. The state - whether acting through a school 
board or legislature or by referendum - was perfectly free 
to follow a neighborhood policy, and to take no affirmative 
steps to integrate pupils. Even wh~re desegregation is 
ordered because of a constitutional violation, the Court has 
never held that racial balance itself is a constittuional 
requirement. This is said in Swann, possibly in ~illiken I 
and either Dayton or Columbus I. And Pasadena held that 
even where there had been segregated schools, once 
desegregation was accomplished no further duty existed to 
maintain integration. 
2. 
All of. this can be said as briefly as possible, 
but driving home the fact that there has never been a 
constitutional violation in Washington, and that the Seattle 
school board acted on its own initiative in ordering 
mandatory busing to achieve racial balance. At that time, 
there had been no determination of state policy on the 
question of achieving racial balance in the schools bv 
mandatory busing away from the neighborhood schools. Thus, 
the Seattle board acterl within its general authority without 
specific direction fr:om the J.egisture or people of the 
state. it was th~n fr:P.e to act, and the question that we 
address primarily is whether its action created vested 
constitutional riqhts that limited indefinitely (perhaps 
forev~r!) the sovereign authority of the people of 
Washinqton to enact otherwise perfectly valid laws. 
As I indicated illegibly in the margin a couple of 
times, we are not talking simply about "mandatory pupil 
assignment" by the school board. ~his occurs every year as 
population shifts requlre changes in attendance areas. The 
issue here concerns mandatory busing to achieve racial 
balance bevond a defined limit. Rather: than undertake to 
spell all of this out whenever we mention it, I suggest that 
we define - in a note - the term "mandatory busing" to be 
used interchangeably with "mandatory busing to achieve 
racial balance". 
3. 
The second ~art of Part !I, stating general 
principles should summarize the pri.nciPles you already have 
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Justice Powell, dissenting. 
The people of the State of washington, by a two 
to one vote, have adopted a neighborhood school pol icy. 
The policy is binding on local school boards but in no way 
, 
affects the authority of state or federal courts to order 
school transportation to remedy violations of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Nor does the policy affect the 
power of local school districts to establish voluntary 
transfer programs for racial integration or for any other 
purpose. 
In the absence of a constitutional violation, no 
decision of this Court compels a school district to adopt 
2. 
or maintain a mandatory busing program for racial 
integration. 1 Accordingly, the Court does not hold that 
the adoption of an identical policy by local school 
f[p_~} 
districts would be unconstitutional. In~tea<l, it holds 
that the adoption of a neighborhood school policy at the 
State level--rather than at the local level--violates the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
I dissent from the Court's unprecedented 
intrusion into the structure of a state government. The 
School Districts in this case were under no Federal 
Constitutional obligation to adopt mandatory busing 
programs. The State of Washington, the governmental body 
ultimately responsible for the provision of public 
education, has determined that certain mandatory busing 
programs are detrimental to the education of its children. 
"[T] he Fourteenth Amendment leaves the States free to 
distribute the powers of government as they will between 
their legislative and judicial branches." Hughes v. 
1Throughout this dissent, I use the term 
"mandatory busing" to refer to busing--or mandatory 
student reassignments--for the purpose of achieving racial 
balance. 
3. 
Superior Court, 339 u.s. 460, 467 (1950). In my view, 
that Amendment leaves the States equally free to 
distribute the powers of government between State and 
local governmental bodies. 
I 
At the November, 1978, general election, the 
voters of the State adopted Initiative 350 by a two to one 
majority. 2 The Initiative sets forth a neighborhood school 
policy binding on local school districts. It establishes 
a general rule prohibiting school districts from "directly 
or indirectly requir[ing] any student to attend a school 
other than the school which is geographically nearest or 
next nearest the student's place of residence." Wash. Rev. 
Code §28A.26.010 (1981). The rule may be avoided in 
individual instances only if the student requires special 
education; if there are health or safety hazards between 
the student's residence and the nearest or next nearest 
school; or if the nearby schools are overcrowded, unsafe, 
2The Initiative passed by almost 66% of the 
statewide vote. In Seattle the Initiative passed by over 
61% of the vote. It failed in only two of Seattle's 
legislative districts--one predominantly black and one 
predominantly white. 
4. 
or lacking in physical facilities. Ibid. 
The Initiative includes two significant 
limitations upon the scope of its neighborhood school 
policy. It expressly provides that nothing in the 
Initiative shall "preclude the establishment of schools 
offering specialized or enriched educational programs 
which students may voluntarily choose to attend, or of any 
other voluntary option offered to students. " 3 Moreover, 
and critical to this case, the authority of state and 
federal courts to order mandatory school assignments to 
remedy constitutional violations is left untouched by the 
Initiative: "This chapter shall not prevent any court of 
competent jurisdiction from adjudicating constitutional 
issues relating to the public schools." 4 
This suit was filed in United States District 
3 In addition to this reservation of authority to 
school districts, the Initiative also reserves "the 
authority of any school district to close school 
facilities." 28A.26.030. 
4unlike the constitutional amendment at issue in 
Crawford v. Los Angeles Bd. of Ed., __ U.S. __ (1982), 
Initiative 350 places no limits on the State courts in 
their interpretation of the State Constitution. Thus, if 
mandatory school assignments were required by the State 
Constitution-- although not by the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the Federal Constitution--Initiative 350 would not hinder 
a State from enforcing the State constitution. 
5. 
Court shortly after the Initiative was enacted. The 
Seattle School District, joined by the Tacoma and Pasco 
School Districts5 and certain individual plaintiffs, 
argued that the Initiative violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court 
agreed, and, in a split decision, the Court of Appeals 
affirmed. Relying on Hunter v. Erickson, 393 u.s. 385 
(1969), the Court of Appeals concluded that Initiative 350 
"both creates a constitutionally-suspect racial 
classification and radically restructures the political 
process of Washington by allowing a state-wide majority to 
usurp traditional local authority over local school board 
educational policies." 633 F. 2d, at 1344. 6 
5Tacoma School District No. 10 and Pasco School 
District No. 1 are the only other school districts in 
Washington with extensive integration programs. Pasco has 
relied upon school closings and mandatory busing to 
achieve racial balance in its schools. Only minority 
children are bused under the Pasco plan. 473 F. Supp., at 
1002. In addition to school closings, the Tacoma 
integration plan relies upon voluntary techniques--magnet 
schools and voluntary transfers. 
6Judge Wright dissented. In his view Initiative 
350 could not be said to embody a racial classification. 
The Initiative does not classify individuals on the basis 
of their race. It simply deals with a matter bearing on 
race relations. Moreover, no racial classification is 
created because the citizens of a State favor mandatory 
school reassignments for some purposes but not for reasons 
of race. The benefits and problems associated with busing 
for one reason are not the same as for another. Finally, 
Judge Wright could not understand how the exercise of 
Footnote continued on next page. 
6. 
II 
The principles that should guide us in reviewing 
the constitutionality of Initiative 350 are well 
established. To begin with, we have never held, or even 
intimated, that absent a federal constitutional violation, 
a State must choose to treat persons differently on the 
basis of race. In the absence of a federal constitutional 
violation requiring race-specific remedies, a policy of 
strict racial neutrality by a State would violate no 
federal constitutional principle. Cf. University of 
California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
In particular, a neighborhood school policy and 
a decision not to assign students on the basis of their 
race, does not offend the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 The 
authority by the State could create a racial 
classification. The State had not intervened by altering 
the legislative process in a way that burdened racial 
minorities. Charged by the State Constitution with the 
responsibility for the provision of public education, the 
State had simply exercised its authority to run its own 
school system. 
Judge Wright also addressed the District Court's 
alternative holdings that Initiative 350 is overbroad or 
that it was motivated by discriminatory intent. He found 
no basis for either conclusion. 
7see Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 
u.s. 1, 28 (1971) ("Absent a constitutional violation 
there would be no basis for judicially ordering assignment 
of students on racial basis. All things being equal, 
with no history of discrimination, it might well be 
Footnote continued on next page. 
7. 
Court has never held that there is an affirmative duty to 
integrate the schools in the absence of a finding of 
unconstitutional segregation. See Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 24 (1971); 
Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 u.s. 406, 417 
(1977) . Certainly there is no constitutional duty to 
adopt mandatory busing in the absence of such a 
constitutional violation. Indeed, even where 
desegregation is ordered because of a constitutional 
violation, the Court has never held that racial balance 
itself is a constitutional requirement. Id. And even 
where there have been segregated schools, once 
desegregation has been accomplished no further 
desirable to assign pupils to schools nearest their 
homes. 11 ) • 
Indeed, in the absence of a finding of segregation by 
the School District, mandatory busing on the basis of race 
raises constitutional difficulties of its own. Extensive 
pupil transportation may threaten liberty or privacy 
interests. See University of California Board of Regents 
v. Bakke, 438 u.s. 265, 300 n. 39 (opinion of Powell, J.); 
Keyes v. School District No. 1_, 413 u.s. 189, 240-250 
(1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). Moreover, when a State or school board assigns 
students on the basis of their race, it acts on the basis 
of a racial classification, and we have consistently held 
that 11 [a] racial classification, regardless of purported 
motivtion is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only 
upon an extraordinary justification... Personnel 
Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 u.s. 256, 
272 (1979). 
8. 
constitutional duty exists upon school boards or States to 
maintain integration. See Pasadena City Board of 
Education v. Spangler, 427 u.s. 424 (1976). 
Moreover, it is a well established principle 
that the States have "extraordinarily wide latitude •.. in 
creating various types of political subdivisions and 
conferring authority upon them." Holt Civic Club v. 
Tuscaloosa, 439 u.s. 60, 71 (1978) . 8 The Constitution 
does not dictate to the States a particular division of 
authority between legislature and judiciary or between 
state and local governing bodies. It does not protect or 
define institutions of local government. 
Thus, a State may choose to run its schools from 
the state legislature or through local school boards just 
as it may choose to address the matter of race relations 
8 " [A]ccording to the institutions of this country, 
the sovereignty in every State resides in the people of 
the State, and ••• they may alter and change their form of 
government at their own pleasure." Luther v. Borden, 7 
How. 1, 47 (1849). See Community Communications Co. v. 
Boulder, U.S. , (1982); Sailors v. Board of 
Education;--387 u.s:-Ias,-ro9 (1967) ("Save and unless the 
state, county, or municipal government runs afoul of a 
federally protected right, it has vast leeway in the 
management of its internal affairs"); United States v. 
Kagama, 118 u.s. 375, 379 (1886) (under the Constitution, 
sovereign authority resides either with the States or the 
Federal government, and "[t]here exist but these 
two") • 
9. 
at the State or local level. There is no constitutional 
requirement that the State establish or maintain local 
institutions of government or that it delegate particular 
powers to these bodies. The only relevant constitutional 
limitation on a State's freedom to order its political 
institutions is that it may not do so in a fashion 
designed to "[place] special burdens on racial minorities 
within the governmental process." Hunter v. Erickson, 
supra, at 391 (emphasis added}. 
In sum, in the absence of a prior constitutional 
violation, the States are under no constitutional duty to 
adopt integration programs in their schools, and certainly 
they are under no duty to establish a regime of mandatory 
busing. Nor does the Federal Constitution require that 
particular decisions concerning the schools or any other 
matter be made on the local as opposed to the State level. 
It does not require the States to establish local 




L L \ -----of these 
10. 
settled principles 
demonstrates the serious error of today's decision--an 
error that cuts deeply into the heretofore unquestioned 
right of a state to structure the decisionmaking authority 
of its government. In this case, by Initiatve 350, the 
State has adopted a policy of racial neutrality in student 
assignments. The pol icy in no way interferes with the 
power of State or Federal Courts to remedy constitutional 
violations. And if such a policy had been adopted by any 
of the school districts in this litigation there could 
have been no question that the policy was constitutiona1. 9 
The issue here arises only because the Seattle 
School Board--in the absence of a then established state 
policy--chose to adopt race specific school assignments 
with extensive busing. It is not questioned that the 
School Board itself, at any time thereafter, could have 
changed its mind and cancelled its integration program 
without violating the Federal Constitution. Yet this 
9The Court consistently has held "that the Equal 
Protection Clause is not violated by the mere repeal of 
race related legislation or policies that were not 
required by the Federal Constitution in the first place." 
Crawford v. Los Angeles Bd. of Ed., supra, at 
11. 
Court holds that neither the legislature or the people of 
the State of Washington could alter what the School Board 
had decided. 
The Court holds that the people of Washington by 
Initiative 350 created a racial classification, and yet 
must concede that identical action by the Seattle school 
board itself would have created no such classification. 
This is not an easy argument to answer because it seems to 
make no sense. School boards are the creation of supreme 
State authority, whether in a State constitution or by 
legislative enactment. Until today's decision no one 
would have questioned the authority of a State to abolish 
school boards altogether, or to require that they conform 
to any lawful State policy. And in the State of 
washington, a neighborhood school policy would have been 
lawful. 
Under today's decision this heretofore undoubted 
supreme authority of a State's electorate is to be 
curtailed whenever a school board--or indeed any other 
state board or local instrumentality--adopts a race 
specific program that arguably benefits racial minorities. 
12. 
Once such a program is adopted, only the local or 
subordinate entity that approved it will have authority to 
change it. The Court offers no authority or relevant 
explanation for this extraordinary subordination of the 
ultimate sovereign power of a state to action with respect 
to racial matters by subordinate bodies. It is a strange 
notion that local governmental bodies can forever preempt 
the ability of a State--the sovereign power--to address a 
matter of compelling concern to the State. The 
Constitution of the United States does not require such a 
bizarre result. 
Even if one assumes that somehow the federal 
Constitution now imposes special conditions on the 
exercise of state sovereignty once a local school board 
has acted, this is certainly not a case where a State--in 
moving to change a locally adopted policy--has established 
a racially discriminatory requirement. Initiative 350 
does not impede enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
If a Washington school district should be found to have 
established a segregated school system, Initiative 350 
will place no barrier in the way of a remedial busing 
13. 
order. Nor does Initiative 350 authorize or approve 
segregation in any form or degree. It is neutral on its 
face, and racially neutral as public policy. Children of 
all races benefit from neighborhood schooling, just as 
children of all races benefit from exposure to "ethnic and 
racial diversity in the classroom." Ante, at __ , quoting 
Columbus Board of Education v. Penick, 443 u.s. 449, 486 
{1979) {Powell, J., dissenting) .10 
Finally, Initiative 350 places no "special 
burdens on racial minorities within the governmental 
process," Hunter v. Erickson, supra, at 391, such that 
interference with the State's distribution of authority is 
justified. Initiative 350 is simply a reflection of the 
State's political process at work. It does not alter that 
process in any respect. It does not require, for example, 
10The policies in support of neighborhood schooling 
are various but all of them are racially neutral. The 
people of the State legitimately could decide that 
unlimited mandatory busing places too great a burden on 
the liberty and privacy interests of families and students 
of all races. It might decide that the reassignment of 
students to distant schools, on the basis of race, was too 
great a departure from the ideal of racial neutrality in 
State action. And, in light of the experience with 
mandatory busing in other cities, the State might conclude 
that such a program ultimately would lead to greater 
imbalance in the schools. See Estes v. Metropolitan 
Branches of the Dallas NAACP, 444 u.s. 437, 451 {1980) 
{Powell, ~ dissenting). 
14. 
that all matters dealing with race--or with integration in 
the schools--must henceforth be submitted to a referendum 
of the people. Cf. Hunter v. Erickson, supra. The State 
has done no more than precisely what the Court has said 
that it should do: 
political process" the 
It has "resolved through the 
"desirability and efficacy of 
~1-M-~~~~ 
[mandatory] school desegregation." Ante, at . 
1\ - /.24~~~~-
The political process in Washington, as in all 
States, permits persons who are dissatisfied at a local 
level to appeal to the State legislature or the people of 
the State for redress. It permits the people of a State 
to preempt local policies, and to formulate new programs 
and regulations. Such a process is inherent in the 
continued sovereignty of the States. This is our system. 
Any time a State chooses to address a major issue some 
persons or groups may be disadvantaged. In a democratic 
system there are winners and losers. But there is no 
inherent unfairness in this and certainly no 
Constitutional violation. 11 
11cf. James v. Valtierra, 402 u.s. 137, 142 (1971) 
("[O]f course a lawmaking procedure that 'disadvantages' a 
Footnote continued on next page. 
15. 
IV 
Nonetheless, the Court holds that Initiative 350 
"imposes substantial and unique burdens on racial 
minorities" in the governmental process. See ante, at 
JtW6jh• 'i! t! -~ 
Its authority for this holding is Hunter v. 
Erickson, supra. 12 In Hunter the people of Akron passed a 
charter amendment that "not only suspended the operation 
of the existing ordinance forbidding housing 
discrimination, but also required the approval of the 
electors before any future [anti-discrimination] ordinance 
could take effect." 393 u.s., at 389-390. Although the 
charter amendment was facially neutral, the Court found 
that it could be said to embody a racial classification: 
particular group does not always deny equal protection. 
Under any such holding, presumably a State would not be 
able to require referendums on any subject unless 
referendums were required on all, because they would 
always disadvantage some group. And this Court would be 
required to analyze governmental structures to determine 
whether a gubernatorial veto provision or a filibuster 
rule is likely to 1 disadvantage 1 any of the diverse an 
shifting groups that make up the American people."}. 
12The Court also relies at certain critical points 
in its discussion on the summary affirmance in Lee v. 
Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710 (WDNY 1970}, summarily aff 1 d, 
402 u.s. 935 (1971}. As we have often noted, however, 
summary aff irmances by this Court are of little 
precedential force. See Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 
453 u.s. 490, 500 (1981}. A summary affirmance "is not to 
be read as an adoption of the reasoning supporting the 
judgment under review." Zobel v. Williams, u.s. __ , 
n. 13 (1982}. 
16. 
"[T]he reality is that the law's impact falls on the 
minority. The majority needs no protection against 
discrimination." Id., at 391. By making it more 
difficult to pass legislation in favor of racial 
minorities, the amendment placed "special burdens on 
racial minorities within the governmental process." Ibid. 
Nothing in Hunter supports the Court's 
extraordinary in vas ion into the State's distribution of 
authority. Even could it be assumed that Initiative 350 
imposed a ~r burden on racial minorities, 13 it simply 
does not place unique political obstacles in the way of 
racial minorities. 
~~~~ 
In this case, as aJ tliagy ifHHea-ted, 
.1\ 
the political system has not been redrawn or altered. Nor -
have racial minorities been asked to bear ~~:""i cr-
.-- ,, 
compat:aeive- burden f!J...The political system is not altered 
13It is far from clear that in the absence of a 
constitutional violation, mandatory busing necessarily 
benefits racial minorities or that it is even viewed with 
favor by racial minorities. See Crawford v. Board of 
Education of the City of Los Angeles, U: S. __ , -r- r;. 
32 {1982). As the Court Tnaicates, thei0us1ng quest1on 1s 
complex and is best resolved by the political process. 
Moreover, it is significant that Initiative 350 
places no limits on voluntary programs or on court ordered 
reassignments. It permits school districts to order 
school closings for purposes of racial balance. And it 
permits school districts to order a student to attend the 
"next nearest"--rather than nearest--school to promote 
racial integration. 
17. 
because the State decides to regulate within an area 
subject to its control. And racial minorities are not 
uniquely or comparatively burdened by the adoption by the 
State of a policy that lawfully could be adopted by any 
School District in the State. 
Hunter is simply irrelevant. If anything, it is 
the Court 
ty~~~ 
that~ disrupts the normal cours~ of State 
government. 14 Under its holding, the people of the State 
p;J:.J-.> 
~-
~~ ~ 4-~ 
of Washingtonl\are forever barred~ from developingA• p;l,icy 4,.,~ 
~ ~. 
on mandatory busing becatt&e a School District go~ere 
~ @eeulia.c theory of a "vested 
vV~ ~~kA. 
t.&; ~ Ja--.:t-_ 
~ constitutional right to local decisionmaking," the State 
~~--
~ . ,.11 14The Court 1 s decision intrudes deeply into normal 
tr f ~-' State decisionmaking. Thus, if the admissions committee + of a State law school developed an affirmative action plan 
that came under fire, the Court apparently would find it 
unconstitutional for any higher authority to intervene 
unless that authority traditionally dictates admissions 
policies. Thus, as a constitutional matter, the Dean of 
the Law School, the faculty of the University as a whole, 
the University President, the Chancellor of the University 
System, and the Board of Regents might be powerless to 
intervene despite their greater authority under stat;la;: ~ 
After today 1 s decision it is unclear ~
whether the State may set policy in any area of race 
relations where a local governmental body arguably has 
done "more" than the Fourteenth Amendment requires. If 
local employment or benefits are distributed on a racial 
basis to the benefit of racial minorities, the State 
apparently may not intervene. In der the Court 1 s_/~ 
theory one must won er whether e Federal rnment ~ 
RO len~ger assert i s superior authority to ulate in 









~ policy that limits the ability of local school 
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to adoptAmandatory reassignments for racial balance. We 
must decide only whether the Federal Constitution permits 
the State to adopt such a policy. The School Districts in 
~~~~~~~~ 
7 
15Even acceptin the dubious n t'ion that a State 
must demonstrate some ast interest in public schooling or 
race relations befor intervening in these matters, the 
Court's attempt to demonstrate that Initiative 350 
represents a unique hrust by the State into these areas 
is uetEI~ unpersua ive. The Court's own discussion 
indicates the of the State's activity. The Common 
School Provisions of the State's Code of Laws is nearly 
200 pages long ) governing a broad variety of school 
matters. The State has taken seriously its constitutional 
obligation to provide public education. See Art. IX, §2 ; 
Seattle School District v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 5~ ~ 
585 P. 2d 71, 95 (1978). In light of the weal-4:-hA ?f 
regulation of the public schools by the State, it is 
) unclear ~ ;-ttM what degree of prior Staee iflterfereAae.,-~ 
by the State would satisfy the Cour~S ~~- ~ 
In addition to public school affairs generally, the 
State has taken a direct interest in ending racial 
discrimination in the schools and elsewhere. See 
§49.60.010 et ~ Article IX, §1 of the State 
Constitution:Spec~ally EfOhibits discrimination in ~e ,~ 
· · public school1;:il.g: "It is the paramount duty 1 1 
of the state to make ample provision for the education of f~~ · 
all children residing within its borders without 
distinction or preference on account of race, color, 
caste, or sex." The State Supreme Court has not 
interpreted this section of the State Constitution to 
prohibit race conscious school assignments in the absence 
of a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cf. Citizens 
Against Mandatory Bussing v. Palmason, 80 Wash. 2d 445, 
495 P. 2d 657 (1972). But until today's decision one would 
have thought that the State Court could have rendered such 




inte£8St to it~ 
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~ policy that limits the ability of local school 
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to adoptA mandatory reassignments for racial balance. We 
must decide only whether the Federal Constitution permits 
the State to adopt such a policy. The School Districts in 
? 
15Even acceptin the dubious n t'ion that a State 
must demonstrate some ast interest in public schooling or 
race relations befor intervening in these matters, the 
Court's attempt to demonstrate that Initiative 350 
represents a unique hrust by the State into these areas 
is uttEr~y unpersua ive. The Court's own discussion 
indicates the of the State's activity. The Common 
School Provisions of the State's Code of Laws is nearly 
200 pages long ) governing a broad variety of school 
matters. The State has taken seriously its constitutional 
obligation to provide public education. See Art. IX, §2 ; 
Seattle School District v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 5~ ~ 
585 P. 2d 71, 95 (1978). In light of the wea14::-h,1 ?f 
regulation of the public schools by the State, it is 
) unclear ~ ~ what degree of prior State l-fttgrfereRse.,-~ 
by the State would satisfy the Cour~$ ~~- ~ 
In addition to public school affairs generally, the 
State has taken a direct interest in ending racial 
discrimination in the schools and elsewhere. See 
§49.60.010 et ~ Article IX, §1 of the State 
Constitution:Spec~ally BfOhibits discrimination in ~he ,,-
. · public school1;h.g: "It is the paramount duty 1 1 
of the state to make ample provision for the education of f~~ · 
all children residing within its borders without 
distinction or preference on account of race, color, 
caste, or sex." The State Supreme Court has not 
interpreted this section of the State Constitution to 
prohibit race conscious school assignments in the absence 
of a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cf. Citizens 
Against Mandatory Bussing v. Palmason, 80 Wash. 2d 445, 
495 P. 2d 657 (1972). But until today's decision one would 
have thought that the State Court could have rendered such 
a decision without violating the Federal Constitution. 
' 
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no federal constitutional obligation ~ 
to adopt mandatory busing. H31vliAg tried a sy steft\"' of ~J..,..u.,~ 
~ uf~ . 
mandator.y b.!JS..i.o~ey- w-ere- free to r-etour te a vol1:1n.tary - 13~ ~} dee-~d.~~~ ~ ~ k 
program, !l'be Go~ pb~4:e tft.e State setttng poliey in ~ 
:k-~~J ,_;;{- ,.-flU~ 5~# 
tl::lis a,r..ea. "l:udeeEt; j. L deprives the State A of aU?' ~ 
~~~~ opportunity to address the questions ~resented ey tl::le-
~4~~~ 
asoptioR e~ mandatory busing. The Constitution does not 
'\ 
dictate to the States at what level of government 
decisions affecting the public schools must be taken. It , 
ce.;~ 





not authorize today's intrusion into the State's internal 
structure. 
lfp/ss 06/16/82 Rider A, p. 13 (Seattle) 
SEA13 SALLY-POW 
Application of these settled principles 
demonstrates the serious error of today's decision - an 
error that cuts deeply into heretofore unquestioned 
authority of a state to structure decision-making 
authority of its government. In Washington, as in many 
other states, use of an initiative - a popular referendum 
- to determine state policy is a valid and uniquely 
democratic legislative technique. See James v. Valtierra, 
at 137, 142 (1971). (?) In this case, by initiatve 350, 
the state adopted a statewide policy of racial neutrality 
in student assignments. As there had been no state 
segregated schools, the state was perfectly free to adopt 
this policy. The issue here arises only because the 
Seattle School Board - in the absence of a then 
established state policy and exercising its broad 
discretion - had chosen to adopt race specific school 
assignments with extensive busing. It is not questioned 
in this case that the school board itself, at any time 
thereafter, could have changed its mind and cancelled its 
2. 
integration program without violating the federal 
Constitution. 13 Yet this Court, by a process of reasoning 
that defies rational understanding, holds that neither the 
legislature or the people of the State of washington could 
alter what the school board had decided. 
The Court's reasoning is that the people of 
washington by initiative 350 created a racial 
classification, although identical action by the Seattle 
school board would have created no such classification. 
This is not an easy argument to answer because it is 
wholly illogical. School boards are the creation of 
supreme state authority, whether in a state constitution 
or by legislative enactment. Until today's decision no 
one would have questioned that school boards could have 
been abolished altogether or the operation of public 
schools could be restructured in any neutral way approved 
by the legislature or the people. Under today's decision 
this heretofore undoubted supreme authority of a state's 
electorate is to be curtailed whenever a school board - or 
indeed any other state board or local instrumentality -
adopts a race specific program that arguably benefits 
3. 
racial minorities. Once such a program is adopted, only 
the local or subordinate entity that approved it will have 
authority to change it. The Court offers no explanation 
for this extraordinary subordination of the ultimate 
sovereign authority of a state to action with respect to 
racial matters by subordinate bodies. The Constitution of 
the United States does not require such a bizarre result. 
B 
This dissent well could conclude at this point. 
Yet, even if one assumes that somehow the federal 
Constitution imposes special conditions on the exercise of 
state sovereign authority once a local school board has 
acted, this is not a case where a state - in moving to 
change a locally adopted policy - has established some 
racially discriminatory requirement. It is fundamental to 
bear in mind that no finding has been made in this or in 
any other case of schools in Washington segregated by 
state action. Nor does initiative 350 authorize or 
approve segregation in any form or degree. It is neutral 
on its face, and neutral as public policy. It merely 
limits - to a specified extent - the discretionary 
4. 
authority of school boards to seek racial balance by 
mandatory busing beyond certain limits. The rationale of 
the initiative is that children of all races benefit from 
neighborhood schooling, just as children of all races 
benefit from exposure to "ethnic and racial diversity in 
the classroom". Columbus Board of Education v. Penick, 
443 u.s. 449, 486 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
Note to David: The above is a rough shot at rewriting 
III-A. There may be flaws in my rather simplistic 
reasoning, and I count on you to consider it critically. 
If I am right, this sort of argument has considerable 
force. The difficulty is that having made it, there is 
not much to be said. 
If we accept the substance of what I have 
dictated above, it would be a substitute for all of 
present III-B. In any event, it seems to me that most, if 
not all, of III-B commencing with the last sentence at the 





Possible Substitute language 
for III-A (pp. 13-15) 
Application of these settled principles 
demonstrates the serious error of today's decision - an 
error that cuts deeply into heretofore unquestioned right 
of a state to structure decision-making authority of its 
government. In Washington, as in many other states, use 
of an initiative - a popular referendum - to determine 
state policy is a valid and uniquely democratic 
legislative technique. See James v. Valtierra, at 137, 
142 (1971). In this case, by Initiatve 350, the state 
adopted a policy of racial neutrality in student 
assignments. As there had been no state segregated 
schools, Washington was perfectly free to adopt this 
policy. 
The issue here arises only because the Seattle 
School Board - in the absence of a then established state 
policy and exercising its broad discretion - had chosen to 
adopt race specific school assignments with extensive 
busing. It is not questioned that the school board 
itself, at any time thereafter, could have changed its 
mind and cancelled its integration program without 
violating the federal Constitution. 13 Yet this Court, by 
2. 
a process of reasoning that defies rational understanding, 
holds that neither the legislature or the people of the 
State of washington could alter what the school board had 
decided. 
The Court holds that the people of Washington by 
Initiative 350 created a racial classification, and yet 
concedes that identical action by the Seattle school board 
itself would have created no such classification. This is 
not an easy argument to answer because it seems to make no 
sense. School boards are the creation of supreme state 
authority, whether in a state constitution or by 
legislative enactment. Until today's decision no one 
would have questioned the authority of a state to abolish 
school boards altogether, or to require that they conform 
to any lawful state policy. And in the State of 
Washington, a neighborhood school policy would have been 
lawful. Under today's decision this heretofore undoubted 
supreme authority of a state's electorate is to be 
curtailed whenever a school board - or indeed any other 
state board or local instrumentality - adopts a race 
specific program that arguably benefits racial minorities. 
3 • 
Once such a program is adopted, only the local or 
subordinate entity that approved it will have authority to 
change it. The Court offers no authority or relevant 
explanation for this extraordinary subordination of the 
ultimate sovereign power of a state to action with respect 
to racial matters by subordinate bodies. The Constitution 
of the United States does not require such a bizarre 
result. 
This dissent well could conclude at this point. 
Yet, even if one assumes that somehow the federal 
Constitution now imposes special conditions on the 
exercise of state sovereignty once a local school board 
has acted, this is certainly not a case where a state - in 
moving to change a locally adopted policy - has 
established some racially discriminatory requirement. It 
is essential to bear in mind that no finding has been made 
in this or in any other case, that schools in washington 
have been segregated by state action. Thus, there had 
been no constitutional violation to be remedied by the 
Seattle board or the state. Nor does initiative 350 
authorize or approve segregation in any form or degree. 
4. 
It is neutral on its face, and neutral as public policy. 
It merely limits the discretionary authority of school 
boards to seek racial balance by mandatory busing beyond 
certain limits. The rationale of the initiative is that 
children of all races benefit from neighborhood schooling, 
just as children of all races benefit from exposure to 
"ethnic and racial diversity in the classroom". Columbus 
Board of Education v. Penick, 443 u.s. 449, 486 
{1979) {Powell, J., dissenting). {David: other authority 
for this?) 
Note to David: The above is a rough shot at rewriting 
III-A. There may be flaws in some of my rather simplistic 
reasoning, and also some repetition. I count on you to 
get this straight. But, if I am right, this sort of 
argument has considerable force. The difficulty is that 
having made it, there is not much left to be said. 
In any event, it seems to me that most, if not 
all, of III-B commencing with the last sentence at the 
5. 
bottom of page 14, can be eliminated as a secondary type 
of argument. 
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Washington v. Seattle School District: No. 81-9 21) 
Justice Powell, dissenting. 
,. 
The people of the State of Washington, by a two 
to one vote, have adopted a neighborhood school policy. 
The policy is binding on local school bQar~but in no way 
affects the authority of state or federal courts to order 
school transportation to remedy violations of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Nor does the policy affect the 
power of local school districts to establish voluntary 
transfer programs for racial integration or for any other 
purpose. 
In the absence of a constitutional violation, no 
decision of this Court compels a school district to adopt 
-
2. 
or maintain a mandatory busing program for racial 
integration. 1 Accordingly, the Court does not hold that 
a.,..~.,.~~ 
the adopt ion of I( aR ieeH~iea-~ . pol icy by local school 
districts would be unconstitutional. Rather, it holds 
~.a... 
that the adopt ion of a .......e isaeorhood-- sefioei pol icy at the 
~~ "" 
State level--?~~"t8aQ e-£ at the local level--violates the 
1'\ 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
I dissent from the Court's unprecedented 
intrusion into the structure of a state government. The 
School Districts in this case were under no Federal 
Constitutional obligation to adopt mandatory busing 
programs. The State of Washington, the governmental body 
ultimately responsible for the provision of public 
education, has dete,rmin~that certain mandatory busing 
programs are detrimental to the education of its children. 
"[T]he Fourteenth Amendment leaves the States free to 
distribute the powers of government as they will between 
their legislative and judicial branches." Hughes v. 
lThroughout this dissent, I use the term 
"mandatory busing" to refer to busing--or mandatory 
student reassignments--for the purpose of achieving racial 
balance. t--H-~~ , 
3. 
Superior Court, 339 u.s. 460, 467 (1950). In my view, 
that Amendment leaves the States equally free to decide 
matters of concern to the State at the State, rather than 
local, level of government. 
I 
At the November, 1978, general election, the 
voters of the State adopted Initiative 350 by a two to one 
majority. 2 The Initiative sets forth a neighborhood school 
policy binding on local school districts. It establishes 
a general rule prohibiting school districts from "directly 
or indirectly requir[ing] any student to attend a school 
other than the school which is geographically nearest or 
next nearest , the student's place of residence." Wash. Rev. 
Code §28A.26.010 (1981). The rule may be avoided in 
individual instances only if the student requires special 
education; if there are health or safety hazards between 
the student's residence and the nearest or next nearest 
school; or if the nearby schools are overcrowded, unsafe, 
2The Initiative passed by almost 66% of the 
statewide vote. In Seattle the Initiative passed by over 
61% of the vote. It failed in only two of Seattle's 





or lacking in physical facilities. Ibid. 
The Initiative includes two significant 
limitations upon the scope of its neighborhood school 
policy. It expressly provides that nothing in the 
Initiative shall "preclude the establishment of schools 
offering specialized or enriched educational programs 
which students may voluntarily choose to attend, or of any 
other voluntary option offered to students." §28A.26.050. 
Moreover, and critical to this case, the authority of 
state and federal courts to order mandatory school 
assignments to remedy constitutional violations is left 
untouched by the Initiative: "This chapter shall not 
prevent any court of competent jurisdiction from 
adjudicating constitutional issues relating to the public 
schools." §28A.26.060. 3 
This suit was filed in United States District 
3unlike the constitutional amendment at issue in 
Crawford v. Los Angeles Bd. of Ed., __ u.s. __ (1982}, 
Initiative 350 places no limits on the State courts in 
their interpretation of the State Constitution. Thus, if 
mandatory school assignments were required by the State 
Constitution--although not by the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the Federal Constitution--Initiative 350 would not hinder 
a State from enforcing ~te State Constitution. 
~tf;L 
5. 
Court shortly after the Initiative was enacted. The 
Seattle School District, joined by the Tacoma and Pasco 
School Districts4 and certain individual plaintiffs, 
argued that the Initiative violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court 
agreed, and, in a split decision, the Court of Appeals 
affirmed. Relying on Hunter v. Erickson, 393 u.s. 385 
(1969), the Court of Appeals concluded that Initiative 350 
"both creates a constitutionally-suspect racial 
classification and radically restructures the political 
process of washington by allowing a state-wide majority to 
usurp traditional local authority over local school board 
educational policies." 633 F. 2d, at 1344. 5 
4Tacoma School District No. 10 and Pasco School 
District No. 1 are the only other school districts in 
Washington with extensive integration programs. Pasco has 
Lelied ~n -~Qbool closings and mandatory busing to 
achieve racial &alance in its schools. Only minority 
children are bused under the Pasco plan. 473 F. Supp., at 
1002. In addition to school closings, the Tacoma 
integration plan relies upon voluntary techniques--magnet 
schools and voluntary transfers. 
5Judge Wright dissented. In his view Initiative 
350 could not be said to embody a racial classification. 
The Initiative does not classify individuals on the basis 
of their race. It simply deals with a matter bearing on 
race relations. Moreover, no racial classification is 









The principles that should guide us in reviewing 
the constitutionality of Initiative 350 are well 
established. To begin with, we have never held, or even 
intimated, that absent a federal constitutional violation, 
a State must choose to treat persons differently on the 
basis of race. In the absence of a federal constitutional 
violation requiring race-specific remedies, a policy of 
strict racial neutrality by a State would violate no 
federal constitutional principle. Cf. University of -
California Regents v. Bakke, 438 u.s. 265 (1978). 
In particular, a neighborhood school policy and 
created because the citizens of a State favor mandatory 
school reassignments for some purposes but not for reasons l>~ 
of race. The benefits and problems associated with busing ~ 
9 
~ 
for one reasonLare not the same as for anotherk Finally, \ Y~+- _ 
Judge Wright could not understand how the exercise of ~~ 
authority by the State could create a racial ~'f 7 
classification. The State had not intervened by altering 
the legislative process in a way that burdened racial 
minorities. Charged by the State Constitution with the 
responsibility for the provision of public education, the 
State had simply exercised its authority to run its own 
school system. 
Judge Wright also addressed the District Court's 
alternative holdings that Initiative 350 is overbroad or 
that it was motivated by discriminatory intent. He found 
no basis for either conclusion. 
c:/ 
e · 1 · ) t~ " (. , · .; 
7. 
a decision not to assign students on the basis of their 
race, does not offend the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 The 
Court has never held that there is an affirmative duty to 
integrate the schools in the absence of a finding of 
unconstitutional segregation. See Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 u.s. 1, 24 (1971); 
Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 u.s. 406, 417 
(1977) . Certainly there is no constitutional duty to 
adopt mandatory busing in the absence of such a violation. 
6see Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 
u.s. 1, 28 (1971) ("Absent a constitutional violation 
there would be no basis for judicially ordering assignment 
of students on racial basis. All things being equal, 
with no history of discrimination, it might well be 
desirable to assign pupils to schools nearest their 
homes.") • 
Indeed, in the absence of a finding of segregation by 
the School District, mandatory busing on the basis of race 
raises constitutional difficulties of its own. Extensive 
pupil transportation may threaten liberty or privacy 
interests. See University of California Board of Regents 
v. Bakke, 438 u.s. 265, 300 n. 39 (opinion of Powell, J.); 
Keyes v. School District No. 1_, 413 u.s. 189, 240-250 
(1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). Moreover, when a State or school board assigns 
students on the basis of their race, it acts on the basis 
of a racial classification, and we have consistently held 
that " [a] racial classification, regardless of purported 
motivation is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only 
upon an extraordinary justification." Personnel 
Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 u.s. 256, 
272 (1979). 
8 0 
Indeed, even where desegregation is ordered because of a 
constitutional violation, the Court has never held that 
racial balance itself is a constitutional requirement. 
Id. And even where there have been segregated schools, 
once desegregation has been accomplished no further 
constitutional duty exists upon school boards or States to 
maintain integration. See Pasadena City Board of 
Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 {1976). 
Moreover, it is a well established principle 
that the States have "extraordinarily wide latitude ... in 
creating various types of political subdivisions and 
conferring authority upon them." Holt Civic Club v. 
Tuscaloosa, 439 u.s. 60, 71 {1978) .7 The Constitution 
7 " [A]ccording to the institutions of this country, 
the sovereignty in every State resides in the people of 
the State, and ... they may alter and change their form of 
government at their own pleasure." Luther v. Borden, 7 
How. 1, 47 {1849). See Community Communications Co. v. 
Boulder, u.s. , {1982); Sailors v. Board of 
Education;-387 u.s:-I05,~9 {1967) {"Save and unless the 
state, county, or municipal government runs afoul of a 
federally protected right, it has vast leeway in the 
management of its internal affairs"); United States v. 
Kagama, 118 u.s. 375, 379 {1886) {under the Constitution, 
sovereign authority resides either with the States or the 
Federal government, and "[t]here exist but these 
two") . 
9. 
does not dictate to the States a particular division of 
authority between legislature and judiciary or between 
state and local governing bodies. It does not ~~ er ~ 
define institutions of local government. 
Thus, a State may choose to run its schools from 
the state legislature or through local school boards just 
as it may choose to address the matter of race relations 
at the State or local level. There is no constitutional 
requirement that the State establish or maintain local 
institutions of government or that it delegate particular 
powers to these bodies. The only relevant constitutional 
limitation on a State's freedom to order its political 
institutions is that it may not do so in a fashion 
designed to "[place] special burdens on racial minorities 
within the governmental process." Hunter v. Erickson, 
supra, at 391 (emphasis added}. 
In sum, in the absence of a prior constitutional 
violation, the States are under no constitutional duty to 
adopt integration programs in their schools, and certainly 
they are under no duty to establish a regime of mandatory 
busing. Nor does the Federal Constitution require that 
particular decisions concerning the schools or any other 
matter be made on the local as opposed to the State level. 
10. 
It does not require the States to establish local 
governmental bodies or to delegate unreviewable authority 
to them. 
III 
Application of these settled principles 
demonstrates the serious error of today' s dec is ion--an 
error that cuts deeply into the heretofore unquestioned 
right of a state to structure the decisionmaking authority 
of its government. In this case, by Initiatve 350, the 
State has adopted a policy of racial neutrality in student 
assignments. The policy in no way interferes with the 
power of State or Federal Courts to remedy constitutional 
violations. And if such a policy had been adopted by any 
of the school districts in this litigation there could 
have been no question that the policy was constitutional. 8 
The issue here arises only because the Seattle 
School Board--in the absence of a then established State 
policy--chose to adopt race specific school assignments 
8The Court consistently has held 11 that the Equal 
Protection Clause is not violated by the mere repeal of 
race related legislation or policies that were not 
required by the Federal Constitution in the first place. 11 
Crawford v. Los Angeles Bd. of Ed., supra, at 
11. 
with ~xtensive busing. 
~t'l) h ret-
It is not questioned that the 
School "!mara- itself, at any time thereafter, could have 
changed its mind and cancelled its integration program 
without violating the Federal Constitution. Yet this 
Court holds that neither the legislature or the people of 
the State of Washington could alter what the School ~~ ~JsNt(tr 
had decided. 
The Court ~at the people of Washington by 
Initiative 350 created a racial classification, and yet 
must agree that identical action by the Seattle School 
j~;I~i(. t tself would have created no such classification. 
This is not an easy argument to answer because it seems to 
make no sense. School boards are the creation of supreme 
State authority, whether in a State Constitution or by 
legislative enactment. Until today's decision no one 
would have questioned the authority of a State to abolish 
school boards altogether, or to require that they conform 
to any lawful State policy. And in the State of 
Washington, a neighborhood school policy would have been 
lawful. 
Under today's decision this heretofore undoubted 
supreme authority of a State's electorate is to be 
curtailed whenever a school board--or indeed any other 
•' . 
12. 
state board or local instrumentality--adopts a race 
specific program that arguably benefits racial minorities. 
Once such a program is adopted, only the local or 
subordinate entity that approved it will have authority to 
change i.t. The Court offers no authority or relevant 
explanation for this extraordinary subordination of the 
ultimate sovereign power of a State to act~ with respect 
to racial matters by subordinate bodies. It is a strange 
~t-o ~~14-· --
-- . notiont\that' lo~al governmental bodies can forever preempt 
the ability of a State--the sovereign 
concern 
power--to address a ~ 
~b£; ... ) 
the State. -'tt- e S J-;t-matter · of compelling to 
Constitution of the United States does not require such a 
bizarre result. 
Even if one assumes that somehow the Federal 
Constitution now imposes special conditions on the 
exercise of Sta.te sovere.ignty once a local school board 
has acted, this is certainly not ~se where a State--in 
moving to change a locally adopted .policy--has established 
a racially discriminatory requirement. Initiative 350 
does no.t impede enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
If a washington school district should ·be found to have 
established a segregated school system, Initiative 350 
will place no barrier in the way of a remedial busing 
13. 
order. Nor does Initiative 350 authorize or approve 
segregation in any form or degree. It is neutral on its 
face, and racially neutral as public policy. Children of 
all races benefit from neighborhood schooling, just as 
children of all races benefit from exposure to "ethnic and 
racial diversity in the classroom." Ante, at __ , quoting 
Columbus Board of Education v. Penick, 443 u.s. 449, 486 
(1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) •9 
Finally, Initiative 350 places no "special 
burdens on racial minorities within the governmental 
process," Hunter v. Erickson, supra, at 391, such that 
interference with the State's distribution of authority is 
justified. Initiative 350 is simply a reflection of the 
9The policies in support of neighborhood schooling 
are various but all of them are racially neutral. The 
people of the State legitimately could decide that 
unlimited mandatory busing places too great a burden on 
the liberty and privacy interests of families and students 
of all races • . It might decide that the reassignment of 
students to distant schools, on the basis of race, was too 
great a departure from the ideal of racial neutrality in 
State action. And, in light of the experience with 
mandatory busing in other cities, the State might conclude 
that such a program ultimately would lead to greater 
racial imbalance in the schools. See Estes v. 
Metropolitan Branches of the Dallas NAACP, 444 u.s. 437, 
451 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
14. 
State's political process at work. It does not alter that 
process in any respect. It does not require, for example, 
that all matters dealing with race--or with integration in 
the schools--must henceforth be submitted to a referendum 
of the people. Cf. Hunter v. Erickson, supra. The State 
has done no more than precisely what the Court has said 
that it should do: It has "resolved through the 
political process" the "desirability and efficacy of 
[mandatory] school desegregation" where there has been no 
unlawful segregation. Ante, at __ ,. ~ 
~ V' 
The political process in Washington, as in &H 
States, permits persons who are dissatisfied at a local 
, level to appeal to the State legislature or the people of 
the State for redress. It permits the people of a State 
to preempt local policies, and to formulate new programs 
and regulations. Such a process is inherent in the 
continued sovereignty of the States. This is our system. 
Any time .a State chooses to address a major issue some 
persons or groups may be disadvantaged. In a democratic 
system there are winners and losers. But there is no 
inherent unfairness in this and certainly no 
Constitutional violation. 10 
Footnote(s) 10 will appe~r on following pages. 
• • i' ~ 
15. 
IV 
Nonetheless, the Court holds that Initiative 350 
"imposes substantial and unique burdens on racial 
minorities" in the governmental process. See ante, at 
Its authority for this holding 
~h~ 
is l( Hunter v. 
Erickson, supra. 11 In Hunter the people of Akron passed a 
charter amendment that "not only suspended the operation 
of the existing ordinance forbidding housing 
discrimination, but also required the approval of the 
electors before any future [anti-discrimination] ordinance 
10cf. James v. Valtierra, 402 u.s. 137, 142 (1971) 
("[O]f course a lawmaking procedure that 'disadvantages' a 
particular group does not always deny equal protection. 
Under any such holding, presumably a State would not be 
able to require referendums on any subject unless 
referendums were required on all, because they would 
always disadvantage some group. And this Court would be 
required to analyze governmental structures to determine 
whether a gubernatorial veto provision or a filibuster 
rule is likely to 'disadvantage' any of the diverse an 
shifti~~ groups that make up the American people."). 
The Court also relies at certain critical points 
in its discussion on the summary affirmance in Lee v. 
Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710 (WDNY 1970), summarily aff'd, 
402 u.s. 935 (1971). As we have often noted, however, 
summary affirmances by this Court are of little 
precedential force. See Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 
453 u.s. 490, 500 (1981). A summary affirmance "is not to 
be read as an adoption of the reasoning supporting the 
judgment under review." Zobel v. Williams, u.s. __ , 
n. 13 (1982) • 
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could take ef feet." 393 U.S. , at 389-390. Although the 
charter amendment was facially neutral, the Court found 
that it could be said to embody a racial classification: 
"[T] he reality is that the law's impact falls on the 
minority. The majority needs no protection against 
discrimination." Id., at 391. By making it more 
difficult to pass legislation in favor of racial 
minorities, the amendment placed "special burdens on 
racial minorities within the governmental process." Ibid. 
Nothing in Hunter supports the Court's 
extraordinary invasion into the State's distribution of 
authority. Even could it be assumed that Initiative 350 
imposed a burden on racial minorities, 12 it simply does 
12It is far from clear that in the absence of a 
constitutional violation, man~atory busing necessarily 
benefits racial minorie+es or that it is even viewed with 
favor by racial minorities. See Crawford v. Board of 
Education of the City of Los Angeles, __ u.s. __ , __ n. 
32 (1982}. As the Court indicates, the busing question is 
complex and is best resolved by the political process. ~ 
Moreover, it is significant that Initiative 350 
places no limits on voluntary programs or on court ordered 
reassignments. It permits school districts to order 
school closings for purposes of racial balance. 
§28A.26.030. And it permits school districts to order a 
student to attend the "next nearest"--rather than nearest-
-school to promote racial integration. 
17. 
not place unique political obstacles in the way of racial 
minorities. In this case, unlike in Hunter, the political 
system has not been redrawn or altered. Nor have racial 
minorities been asked to bear "special burdens." The 
political system is not altered because the State decides 
to regulate within an area subject to its control. And 
racial minorities are not uniquely or comparatively 
burdened by the adoption by the State of a policy that 
lawfully could be adopted by any School District in the 
State. 
Hunter is simply irrelevant. :U aRyth-ing, j t is 
the Court that by its decision today disrupts the normal 
course of State government.l3 Under its unprecedented 
13The Court's decision intrudes deeply into normal 
State decisionmaking. Under its holding the people of the 
State of washington apparently are forever barred from 
developing a different policy on mandatory busing where a 
School District previously has adopted one of its own. 
This principle would not seem limited to the question of 
mandatory busing. Thus, if the admissions committee of a 
State law school developed an affirmative action plan that 
came under fire, the Court apparently would find it 
unconstitutional for any higher authority to intervene 
unless that authority traditionally dictated admissions 
policies. As a constitutional matter, the Dean of the Law 
School, the faculty of the University as a whole, the 
University President, the Chancellor of the University 
System, and the Board of Regents might be powerless to 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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theory of a "vested constitutional right to local 
decisionmaking," the State apparently is now forever 
barred from addressing the perplexing problems of how best 
to educate fairly all children in a multi-racial society 
where, as in this case, the local school board has acted 
first. 14 
intervene despite their greater authority under State law. 
After today's decision it is unclear whether the 
State may set policy in any area of race relations where a 
local governmental body arguably has done "more" than the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires. If local employment or 
benefits are distributed on a racial basis to the benefit 
of racial minorities, the State apparently may not 
thereafter ever intervene. Indeed, under the Court's 
theory one must wonder whether--under the Equal Protection 
component of the Fifth Amendment--even the Federal 
Government could assert its superior authority to regulate 
in these areas. 
14Even accepting the dubious notion that a State 
must demonstrate some past control over public schooling 
or race relations before now intervening in these matters, 
ante, at 19, the Court's attempt to demonstrate that 
Initiative 350 represents a unique thrust by the State 
into these areas is unpersuasive. The Court's own 
discussion indicates the comprehensive character of the 
State's activity. The Common School Provisions of the 
State's Code of Laws~ nearly 200 pages long, governing a ~ 
broad variety of school matters. The State has taken 
seriously its constitutional obligation to provide public 
education. See Art. IX, §2 ~ Seattle School District v. 
State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 518, 585 P. 2d 71, 95 (1978). In 
light of the wide range of regulation of the public 
schools by the State, it is wholly unclear what degree of 
prior concern or control by the State would satisfy the 




We are not asked to decide the wisdom of a State 
pol,icy that ' limits the ability of lOCijil school districts 
to adopt--on their own volition--mandatory reassignments 
for racial · bal~nce. 
\ 
. . 
We must decide only whether the 
' ' " 
Federal Constitution permits ~he State to adopt such a 
policy. The School ' Districts in this case were under no 
feder_al constitutional obligation ' to adopt mandatory 
busing. 
\ 
Absent such an obligation, · the State--exercising 
.( 
' . 
its SOVE;!reign author-ity over all. subprdinate agencies--
should be free to reject ·this debatable restriction on 
Court's new doctrine. 
In addition ~o public school affairs generally, the 
State has taken a direct interest in ending racial 
discrimination in 1 the schoots and elsewhere. See 
§49.60.010 .et seq. Article IX, §1 of the State 
Constitution specifically prohibits discrimination in 
public scho6ls: "It is the paramount duty of the state to 
make ample provision for the education of all children 
residing within its borders without distinction or 
preference on account of race, color, caste, or se~." The 
State Supreme Court has not interpreted this section of 
the State Constitution to prohibit race conscious school 
assignments in the absence of a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Cf. Citizens Against Mandatory 
Bussing v. Palmason, 80 Wash. 2d 445, 495 P. 2d 657 
(1972). But until today's decision one would have thought 
that the State Court could have rendered such a decision 
without violating the Federal Constitution. ~ 
20. 
liberty. But today's decision denies this right to a 
State. In this case, it deprives the State of Washington 
of all opportunity to address the unresolved 
questions resulting from extensive mandatory busing. The 
Constitution does not dictate to the States at what level 
of government decisions qffecting the public schools must 
be taken. It certainly does not strip the States of their 
sovereignty. It therefore does not authorize today's 
intrusion into the State's internal structure. 15 
15As a former school board member for many years, I 
/\accept the privilege of a dissenting Justice to add a 
personal note. In my view, the local school board--
responsible to the people of the district it serves--is 
the best qualified agency of a State government to make 
decisions affecting education within its district. As a 
policy matter, I would not favor reversal of the Seattle 
Board's decision to experiment with a mandatory busing 
program, despite my own doubts as to the educational or 
social merit of such a program. See Estes v. Metropolitan 
Branches of the Dallas NAACP, 444 u.s. 437, 438-458 
(Powell, J., ---aissenting). But this case presents a 
question, not of educational policy or even the merits of 
busing for racial balance. The question is one of a 
State's sovereign authority to structure and regulate its 
own subordinate bodies. 
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The people of the State of Washington, by a two to one 
vote, have adopted a neighborhood school policy. The policy 
is binding on local school districts but in no way affects the 
authority of state or federal courts to order school transpor-
tation to remedy violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Nor does the policy affect the power of local school districts 
to establish voluntary transfer programs for racial integra-
tion or for any other purpose. 
In the absence of a constitutional violation, no decision of 
this Court compels a school district to adopt or maintain a 
mandatory busing program for racial integration. 1 Accord-
ingly, the Court does not hold that the adoption of a neigh-
borhood school policy by local school districts would be un-
constitutional. Rather, it holds that the adoption of such a 
policy at the State level-rather than at the local level-vio-
lates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
I dissent from the Court's unprecedented intrusion into the 
structure of a state government. The School Districts in 
1 Throughout this dissent, I use the term "mandatory busing" to refer to 
busing-or mandatory student reassignments-for the purpose of achiev-
ing racial integration. 
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this case were under no Federal Constitutional obligation to 
adopt mandatory busing programs. The State of Washing-
ton, the governmental body ultimately responsible for the 
provision of public education, has determined that certain 
mandatory busing programs are detrimental to the education 
of its children. "[T]he Fourteenth Amendment leaves the 
States free to distribute the powers of government as they 
will between their legislative and judicial branches." 
Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U. S. 460, 467 (1950). In 
my view, that Amendment leaves the States equally free to 
decide matters of concern to the State at the State, rather 
than local, level of government. 
I 
At the November, 1978, general election, the voters of the 
State adopted Initiative 350 by a two to one majority. 2 The 
Initiative sets forth a neighborhood school policy binding on 
local school districts. It establishes a general rule prohibit-
ing school districts from "directly or indirectly requir[ing] 
any student to attend a school other than the school which is 
geographically nearest or next nearest the student's place of 
residence." Wash. Rev. Code§ 28A.26.010 (1981). The rule 
may be avoided in individual instances only if the student re-
quires special education; if there are health or safety hazards 
between the student's residence and the nearest or next 
nearest school; or if the nearby schools are overcrowded, un-
safe, or lacking in physical facilities. Ibid. 
The Initiative includes two significant limitations upon the 
scope of its neighborhood school policy. It expressly pro-
vides that nothing in the Initiative shall "preclude the estab-
. lishment of schools offering specialized or enriched educa-
2 The Initiative passed by almost 66% of the statewide vote. In Seattle 
the Initiative passed by over 61% of the vote. It failed in only two of Seat-
tle's legislative districts-one predominantly black and one predominantly 
white. 
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tional programs which students may voluntarily choose to 
attend, or of any other voluntary option offered to students." 
§ 28A.26.050. Moreover, and critical to this case, the au-
thority of state and federal courts to order mandatory school 
assignments to remedy constitutional violations is left un-
touched by the Initiative: "This chapter shall not prevent any 
court of competent jurisdiction from adjudicating constitu-
tional issues relating to the public schools." § 28A.26. 060. 3 
This suit was filed in United States District Court shortly 
after the Initiative was enacted. The Seattle School Dis-
trict, joined by the Tacoma and Pasco School Districts4 and 
certain individual plaintiffs, argued that the Initiative vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The District Court agreed, and, in a split decision, 
the Court of Appeals affirmed. Relying on Hunter v. 
Erickson, 393 U. S. 385 (1969), the Court of Appeals con-
cluded that Initiative 350 "both creates a constitutionally-sus-
pect racial classification and radically restructures the politi-
cal process of Washington by allowing a state-wide majority 
to usurp traditional local authority over local school board 
educational policies." 633 F. 2d, at 1344. 5 
' Unlike the constitutional amendment at issue in Crawford v. Los An-
geles Ed. of Ed., -- U. S. -- (1982), Initiative 350 places no limits on 
the State courts in their interpretation of the State Constitution. Thus, if 
mandatory school assignments were required by the State Constitution-
although not by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution-
Initiative 350 would not hinder a State from enforcing its Constitution. 
'Tacoma School District No. 10 and Pasco School District No. 1 are the 
only other school districts in Washington with extensive integration pro-
grams. Pasco has relied upon school closings and mandatory busing to 
achieve racial integration in its schools. Only minority children are bused 
under the Pasco plan. 473 F. Supp., at 1002. In addition to school clos-
ings, the Tacoma integration plan relies upon voluntary techniques-mag-
net schools and voluntary transfers. 
5 Judge Wright dissented. In his view Initiative 350 could not be said 
to embody a racial classification. The Initiative does not classify individ-
uals on the basis of their race. It simply deals with a matter bearing on 
I 
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II 
The principles that should guide us in reviewing the con-
stitutionality of Initiative 350 are well established. To begin 
with, we have never held, or even intimated, that absent a 
federal constitutional violation, a State must choose to treat 
persons differently on the basis of race. In the absence of a 
federal constitutional violation requiring race-specific reme-
dies, a policy of strict racial neutrality by a State would vio-
late no federal constitutional principle. Cf. University of 
California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978). 
In particular, a neighborhood school policy and a decision 
not to assign students on the basis of their race, does not of-
fend the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 The Court has never 
race relations. Moreover, no racial classification is created because the 
citizens of a State favor mandatory school reassignments for some pur-
poses but not for reasons of race. The benefits and problems associated 
with busing for one reason-e. g. for racial integration-are not the same 
as for another-e. g. to avoid safety hazards. Finally, Judge Wright could 
not understand how the exercise of authority by the State could create a 
racial classification. The State had not intervened by altering the legisla-
tive process in a way that burdened racial minorities. Charged by the 
State Constitution with the responsibility for the provision of public educa-
tion, the State had simply exercised its authority to run its own school 
system. 
Judge Wright also addressed the District Court's alternative holdings 
that Initiative 350 is overbroad or that it was motivated by discriminatory 
intent. He found no basis for either conclusion. These alternative hold-
ings were not addressed by the Court of Appeals majority. Nor are they 
relied upon by the Court today. Accordingly, they are not discussed in 
this dissent. 
6 See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Ed. of Ed. , 402 U.S. 1, 28 
(1971) ("Absent a constitutional violation there would be no basis for judi-
cially ordering assignment of students on racial basis. All things being 
equal, with no history of discrimination, it might well be desirable to assign 
pupils to schools nearest their homes."). 
Indeed, in the absence of a finding of segregation by the School District, 
mandatory busing on the basis of race raises constitutional difficulties of its 
own. Extensive pupil transportation may threaten liberty or privacy in-
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held that there is an affirmative duty to integrate the schools 
in the absence of a finding of unconstitutional segregation. 
See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 
402 U. S. 1, 24 (1971); Dayton Board of Education v. 
Brinkman, 433 U. S. 406, 417 (1977). Certainly there is no 
constitutional duty to adopt mandatory busing in the absence 
of such a violation. Indeed, even where desegregation is or-
dered because of a constitutional violation, the Court has 
never held that racial balance itself is a constitutional re-
quirement. I d. And even where there have been segregated 
schools, once desegregation has been accomplished no further 
constitutional duty exists upon school boards or States to 
maintain integration. See Pasadena City Board of Educa-
tion v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424 (1976). 
Moreover, it is a well established principle that the States 
have "extraordinarily wide latitude . . . in creating various 
types of political subdivisions and conferring authority upon 
them." Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U. S. 60, 71 
(1978). 7 The Constitution does not dictate to the States a 
terests. See University of California Board of Regents v. Bakke, 438 
U. S. 265, 300 n. 39 (opinion of POWELL, J.); Keyes v. School District No. 
1, 413 U. S. 189, 240-250 (1973) (POWELL, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). Moreover, when a State or school board assigns students 
on the basis of their race, it acts on the basis of a racial classification, and 
we have consistently held that "[a] racial classification, regardless of pur-
ported motivation is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only upon an 
extraordinary justification." Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts 
v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256, 272 (1979). 
' "[A]ccording to the institutions of this country, the sovereignty in 
every State resides in the people of the State, and ... they may alter and 
change their form of government at their own pleasure." Luther v. Bor-
den, 7 How. 1, 47 (1849). See Community Communications Co. v. 
Boulder,-- U. S. --, -- (1982); Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 
U. S. 105, 109 (1967) ("Save and unless the state, county, or municipal gov-
ernment runs afoul of a federally protected right, it has vast leeway in the 
management of its internal affairs"); United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 
375, 379 (1886) (under the Constitution, sovereign authority resides either 
} 
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particular division of authority between legislature and judi-
ciary or between state and local governing bodies. It does 
not define institutions of local government. 
Thus, a State may choose to run its schools from the state 
legislature or through local school boards just as it may 
choose to address the matter of race relations at the State or 
local level. There is no constitutional requirement that the 
State establish or maintain local institutions of government 
or that it delegate particular powers to these bodies. The 
only relevant constitutional limitation on a State's freedom to 
order its political institutions is that it may not do so in a 
fashion designed to "[place] special burdens on racial minor-
ities within the governmental process." Hunter v. 
Erickson, supra, at 391 (emphasis added). . 
In sum, in the absence of a prior constitutional violation, 
the States are under no constitutional duty to adopt integra-
tion programs in their schools, and certainly they are under 
no duty to establish a regime of mandatory busing. Nor 
does the Federal Constitution require that particular deci-
sions concerning the schools or any other matter be made on 
the local as opposed to the State level. It does not require 
the States to establish local governmental bodies or to dele-
gate unreviewable authority to them. 
III 
Application of these settled principles demonstrates the se-
rious error of today's decision-an error that cuts deeply into 
the heretofore unquestioned right of a state to structure the 
decisionmaking authority of its government. In this case, by 
Initiatve 350, the State has adopted a policy of racial neutral-
ity in student assignments. The policy in no way interferes 
with the power of State or Federal Courts to remedy con-
stitutional violations. And if such a policy had been adopted 
with the States or the Federal government, and "[t]here exist ... but 
these two"). 
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by any of the school districts in this litigation there could 
have been no question that the policy was constitutional. 8 
The issue here arises only because the Seattle School Dis- / 
trict-in the absence of a then established State policy-
chose to adopt race specific school assignments with exten-
sive busing. It is not questioned that the District itself, at 
any time thereafter, could have changed its mind and can-
celled its integration program without violating the Federal 
Constitution. Yet this Court holds that neither the legisla-
ture or the people of the State of Washington could alter 
what the District had decided. 
The Court argues that the people of Washington by Initia-
tive 350 created a racial classification, and yet must agree 
that identical action by the Seattle School District itself 
would have created no such classification. This is not an 
easy argument to answer because it seems to make no sense. 
School boards are the creation of supreme State authority, 
whether in a State Constitution or by legislative enactment. 
Until today's decision no one would have questioned the au-
thority of a State to abolish school boards altogether, or to 
require that they conform to any lawful State policy. And in 
the State of Washington, a neighborhood school policy would 
have been lawful. 
Under today's decision this heretofore undoubted supreme 
authority of a State's electorate is to be curtailed whenever a 
school board-or indeed any other state board or local instru-
mentality-adopts a race specific program that arguably 
benefits racial minorities. Once such a program is adopted, 
only the local or subordinate entity that approved it will have 
authority to change it. The Court offers no authority or rel-
evant explanation for this extraordinary subordination of the 
8 The Court consistently has held "that the Equal Protection Clause is 
not violated by the mere repeal of race related legislation or policies that 
were not required by the Federal Constitution in the first place." 
Crawford v. Los Angeles Bd. of Ed., supra, at-. 
I 
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ultimate sovereign power of a State to act with respect to ra-
cial matters by subordinate bodies. It is a strange notion-
alien to our system-that local governmental bodies can for-
ever preempt the ability of a State-the sovereign power-to 
address a matter of compelling concern to the State. The 
Constitution of the United States does not require such a bi-
zarre result. 
This is certainly not a case where a State-in moving to 
change a locally adopted policy-has established a racially 
discriminatory requirement. Initiative 350 does not impede 
enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment. If a Washing-
ton school district should be found to have established a seg-
regated school system, Initiative 350 will place no barrier in 
the way of a remedial busing order. Nor does Initiative 350 
authorize or approve segregation in any form or degree. It 
is neutral on its face, and racially neutral as public policy. 
Children of all races benefit from neighborhood schooling, 
just as children of all races benefit from exposure to "ethnic 
and racial diversity in the classroom." Ante, at--, quot-
ing Columbus Board of Education v. Penick, 443 U. S. 449, 
486 (1979) (POWELL, J., dissenting). 9 
Finally, Initiative 350 places no "special burdens on racial 
minorities within the governmental process," Hunter v. 
Erickson, supra, at 391, such that interference with the 
State's distribution of authority is justified. Initiative 350 is 
9 The policies in support of neighborhood schooling are various but all of 
them are racially neutral. The people of the State legitimately could de-
cide that unlimited mandatory busing places too great a burden on the lib-
erty and privacy interests of families and students of all races. It might 
decide that the reassignment of students to distant schools, on the basis of 
race, was too great a departure from the ideal of racial neutrality in State 
action. And, in light of the experience with mandatory busing in other 
cities, the State might conclude that such a program ultimately would lead 
to greater racial imbalance in the schools. See Estes v. Metropolitan 
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simply a reflection of the State's political process at work. It 
does not alter that process in any respect. It does not re-
quire, for example, that all matters dealing with race-or 
with integration in the schools-must henceforth be submit-
ted to a referendum of the people. Cf. Hunter v. Erickson, 
supra. The State has done no more than precisely what the 
Court has said that it should do: It has "resolved through 
the political process" the "desirability and efficacy of [manda-
tory] school desegregation" where there has been no unlawful 
segregation. Ante, at--. 
The political process in Washington, as in other States, 
permits persons who are dissatisfied at a local level to appeal 
to the State legislature or the people of the State for redress. 
It permits the people of a State to preempt local policies, and 
to formulate new programs and regulations. Such a process 
is inherent in the continued sovereignty of the States. This 
is our system. Any time a State chooses to address a major 
issue some persons or groups may be disadvantaged. In a 
democratic system there are winners and losers. But there 
is no inherent unfairness in this and certainly no Constitu-
tional violation. 10 
IV 
Nonetheless, the Court holds that Initiative 350 "imposes 
substantial and unique burdens on racial minorities" in the 
governmental process. See ante, at--. Its authority for 
this holding is said to be Hunter v. Erickson, supra. 11 In 
10 Cf. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 142 (1971) ("[O]f course a law-
making procedure that 'disadvantages' a particular group does not always 
deny equal protection. Under any such holding, presumably a State 
would not be able to require referendums on any subject unless referen-
dums were required on all, because they would always disadvantage some 
group. And this Court would be required to analyze governmental struc-
tures to determine whether a gubernatorial veto provision or a filibuster 
rule is likely to 'disadvantage' any of the diverse an shifting groups that 
make up the American people."). 
11 The Court also relies at certain critical points in its discussion on the 
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Hunter the people of Akron passed a charter amendment 
that "not only suspended the operation of the existing ordi-
nance forbidding housing discrimination, but also required 
the approval of the electors before any future [anti-dis-
crimination] ordinance could take effect." 393 U. S., at 
389-390. Although the charter amendment was facially neu-
tral, the Court found that it could be said to embody a racial 
classification: "[T]he reality is that the law's impact falls on 
the minority. The majority needs no protection against dis-
crimination." ld., at 391. By making it more difficult to 
pass legislation in favor of racial minorities, the amendment 
placed "special burdens on racial minorities within the gov-
ernmental process." Ibid. 
Nothing in Hunter supports the Court's extraordinary in-
vasion into the State's distribution of authority. Even could 
it be assumed that Initiative 350 imposed a burden on racial 
minorities, 12 it simply does not place unique political obstacles 
in the way of racial minorities. In this case, unlike in 
Hunter, the political system has not been redrawn or altered. 
The authority of the State over the public school system, act-
summary affirmance in Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710 (WDNY 1970), 
summarily affd, 402 U. S. 935 (1971). As we have often noted, however, 
summary affirmances by this Court are of little precedential force. See 
Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U. S. 490, 500 (1981). A summary 
affirmance "is not to be read as an adoption of the reasoning supporting the 
judgment under review." Zobel v. Williams,-- U.S.--,-- n. 13 
(1982). 
'
2 It is far from clear that in the absence of a constitutional violation, 
mandatory busing necessarily benefits racial minorities or that it is even 
viewed with favor by racial minorities. See Crawford v. Board of Educa-
tion of the City of Los Angeles,- U.S.-,- n. 32 (1982). As the 
Court indicates, the busing question is complex and is best resolved by the 
political process. Ante, at --. 
Moreover, it is significant that Initiative 350 places no limits on volun-
tary programs or on court ordered reassignments. It permits school dis-
tricts to order school closings for purposes of racial balance. § 28A.26. 030. 
And it permits school districts to order a student to attend the "next 
nearest"-rather than nearest-school to promote racial integration. 
81-9-DISSENT 
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ing through Initiative or the legislature, is plenary. Thus, 
the State's political system is not altered when it adopts for 
the first time a policy, concededly within the area of its au-
thority, for the regulation of local school districts. And cer-
tainly racial minorities are not uniquely or comparatively 
burdened by the State's adoption of a policy that would be 
lawful if adopted by any School District in the State. 
Hunter, therefore, is simply irrelevant. It is the Court I 
that by its decision today disrupts the normal course of State 
government. 13 Under its unprecedented theory of a vested 
constitutional right to local decisionmaking, the State appar-
ently is now f~rever ~arr~d from addressing the perplexing 
problems of how best to educate fairly all children in a multi-
racial society where, as in this case, the local school board has 
acted first. 14 
13 The Court's decision intrudes deeply into normal State 
decisionmaking. Under its holding the people of the State of Washington 
apparently are forever barred from developing a different policy on manda-
tory busing wherea~District previously has adopted one of its own. 
This principle would not seem limited to the question of mandatory busing. 
Thus, if the admissions committee of a State law school developed an affir-
mative action plan that came under fire, the Court apparently would find it 
unconstitutional for any higher authority to intervene unless that authority 
traditionally dictated admissions policies. As a constitutional matter, the 
Dean of the Law School, the faculty of the University as a whole, the Uni-
versity President, the Chancellor of the University System, and the Board 
of Regents might be powerless to intervene despite their greater authority 
under State law. 
After today's decision it is unclear whether the State may set policy in 
any area of race relations where a local governmental body arguably has 
done "more" than the Fourteenth Amendment requires. If local employ-
ment or benefits are distributed on a racial basis to the benefit of racial 
minorities, the State apparently may not thereafter ever intervene. In-
deed, under the Court's theory one must wonder whether-under the 
Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment-even the Federal 
Government could assert its superior authority to regulate in these areas. 
14 Even accepting the dubious notion that a State must demonstrate 
some past control over public schooling or race relations before now inter-
vening in these matters, ante, at 19, the Court's attempt to demonstrate 
81-9-DISSENT 
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We are not asked to decide the wisdom of a State policy 
that limits the ability of local school districts to adopt-on 
their own volition-mandatory reassignments for racial bal-
ance. We must decide only whether the Federal Constitu-
tion permits the State to adopt such a policy. The School 
Districts in this case were under no federal constitutional ob-
ligation to adopt mandatory busing. 'Absent such an obliga-
tion, the State-exercising its sovereign authority over all 
subordinate agencies-should be free to reject this debatable 
restriction on liberty. But today's decision denies this right 
to a State. In this case, it deprives the State of Washington 
of all opportunity to address the unresolved questions result-
ing from extensive mandatory busing. The Constitution 
does not dictate to the States at what level of government de-
that Initiative 350 represents a unique thrust by the State into these areas 
is unpersuasive. The Court's own discussion indicates the comprehensive 
character of the State's activity. The Common School Provisions of the 
State's Code of Laws are nearly 200 pages long, governing a broad variety 
of school matters. The State has taken seriously its constitutional obliga-
tion to provide public education. See Art. IX, § 2; Seattle School District 
v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 518, 585 P. 2d 71, 95 (1978). In light of the wide 
range of regulation of the public schools by the State, it is wholly unclear 
what degree of prior concern or control by the State would satisfy the 
Court's new doctrine. 
In addition to public school affairs generally, the State has taken a direct 
interest in ending racial discrimination in the schools and elsewhere. See 
§ 49.60.010 et seq. Article IX, § 1 of the State Constitution specifically pro-
hibits discrimination in public schools: "It is the paramount duty of the 
state to make ample provision for the education of all children residing 
within its borders without distinction or preference on account of race, 
color, caste, or sex." The State Supreme Court has not interpreted this 
section of the State Constitution to prohibit race conscious school assign-
ments in the absence of a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cf. 
Citizens Against Mandatory Bussing v. Palmason, 80 Wash. 2d 445, 495 
P. 2d 657 (1972). But until today's decision one would have thought that the 
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cisions affecting the public schools must be taken. It cer-
tainly does not strip the States of their sovereignty. It 
therefore does not authorize today's intrusion into the State's 
internal structure. 15 
" As a former school board member for many years , I accept the privi-
lege of a dissenting Justice to add a personal note. In my view, the local 
school board-responsible to the people of the district it serves-is the 
best qualified agency of a State government to make decisions affecting 
education within its district. As a policy matter, I would not favor rever-
sal of the Seattle Board's decision to experiment with a reasonable manda-
tory busing program, despite my own doubts as to the educational or social 
merit of such a program. See Estes v. Metropolitan Branches of the Dal-
las NAACP, 444 U. S. 437, 438-458 (POWELL, J., dissenting). But this 
case presents a question, not of educational policy or even the merits of 
busing for racial integration. The question is one of a State's sovereign 
authority to structure and regulate its own subordinate bodies. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKtvtUN 
~up-rtmt <!Jour! of tlp~ 'Jlnitdr .$)httts-
2Jll u.s J:rin-gfon, ~. C!J. 20 ~)!. .;l 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
June 21, 1982 
Re: No. 81-9 - Washington v . Seattle School Dist. No. 1 
In response to Lewis' dissent, now in print, I shall make 
the following changes in the Court's opinion: 
1. Footnote 17 on page 17 will be revised to read: 
ul 7JUSTICE POWELL finds Hunter completely 
irrelevant, dismissing it with the conclusory statement 
that 'the political system [of Washington] has not been 
redrawn or altered. ' Post, at 10 (emphasis in original ) . 
But the dissent entirely fails to address the relevance 
of Hunter to the reallocation of decisionmaking authority 
worked by Initiative 350 . The evil condemned by the 
Hunter Court was not the particular political obstacle of 
mandatory referenda imposed by the Akron charter 
amendment; it was, rather, the comparative structural 
burden placed on the political achievement of minority 
interests. Thus, in Hunter, the procedures for enacting 
racial legislation were modified in such a way as to 
place effective control in the hands of the city-wide 
electorate. Similarly here, the power to enact racial 
legislation has been reallocated . In each case , the 
effect of the challenged action was to redraw 
decisionmaking authority over racial matters -- and only 
over racial matters in such a way as to place 
comparative burdens on minorities . While JUSTICE POWELL 
and the United States find it crucial that the _proponents 
of integrated schools remain free to use Washington's 
initiative system to further their ends, that was true in 
Hunter as well: proponents of open housing were not 
barred from invoking Akron's initiative procedures to 
repeal the charter amendment, or to enact fair housing 
legislation of their own . It surely is an excessively 
formal exercise, then, to argue that the procedural 
revisions at issue in Hunter imposed special burdens on 
minorities, but that the selective allocation of 
decisionmaking authority worked by Initiative 350 does 
not erect comparable political obstacles. Indeed , Hunter 
would have been virtually identical to this case had the 
Akron charter amendment simply barred the city council 
from passing any fair housing ordinance , as Initiative 
350 forbids the use of virtually all mandatory 
desegregation strategies . Surely , however, Hunter would 
not have come out the other way had the charter amendment 
t 
Page 2. 
made no provision for the passage of fair housing 
legislation, instead of subjecting such legislation to 
ratification by referendum. 
''The United States also would note that Initiative 
350's 'modification of state policy [was] not the result 
of any unusual political procedure,' Brief for the United 
States 30, for initiatives and referenda are often used 
by the Washington electorate . But that observation 
hardly serves to distinguish this case from Hunter, since 
the fair housing charter amendment was added through the 
unexceptional use of Akron's initiative procedure. See 
393 u.s., at 387." 
2. At the end of the penultimate sentence of the full 
paragraph on page 18, following "393," I shall drop a footnote 
(new 18) reading as follows : 
n
18 nespite the force with which it is written, then, 
JUSTICE POWELL's essay on 'the heretofore unquestioned 
right of a State to structure the decisionmaking 
authority of its government,' post , at 6 -- as well as 
his observations on a State's right to repeal programs 
designed to eliminate de facto se rega ~~ on -- is largely 
beside the point . The State's ower has not_ been 
questioned at any point during this lit'igation. The 
s~arrow uest 'on before us is whether the State has 
" exer c 1 ~ed i s pow§!r in such a way as to p face special , 
and therefore imperm~ burdens on minority 
interests ." 
,q~ 
3. On page 22, following the citation of Lee v. Nyquist, ~ ? 
in the fifth line, I shall add the following footnote (to be~· 
numbered 23) : 
n
23 Throughout his dissent, JUSTICE POWELL insists 
that the Court has created a 'vested constitutional right 
to local decisionmaking,' post, at 11, that under our 
holding 'the people of the State of Washington apparently 
are forever barred from developing a different policy on 
mandatory busing where a School District previously has 
adopted one of its own,' id., at 11, n.l3, and that 
today's decision somehow -raises doubts abou t 'the 
authority of a State to abolish school boards 
altogether.' ~' at 11. See also id., at 8, and at 11, 
n.l4. These statements evidence a basic misunderstanding 
of our decision. Our analys.i_s vests no r jghts, and has J 
nothing to do with wheth er sc hOo l Soa ra action predates 
that taken by the State. Instead, what we find 
o~~ ectt3~ab l~about Initiative 350 is the comparative t:::;::-
bu den 1t imposes on minority participation in the 
Page 3. 
political process -- that is, the racial nature of the 1 7 
way in which it structures the process of dec1sionmaking. 
It is evident, then, that the horribles paraded by the 
dissent, post, at 11, n.l3 -- which have nothing to do 
with the ability of minorities to participate in the 
process of self-government -- are entirely unrelated to 
this case. It is equally clear, as we have noted at 
several points in our opinion, that the State remains } J' ... _ 
free to vest all decisionmaking power in state officials, ~
or to remove authority from local school boards in a 
race-neutral manner." 
4. On page 26, I shall modify the final sentence of the 
full paragraph to read: 
"And legislation of the kind challenged in Hunter 
similarly falls into an inherently suspect category." 
5. On page 27, following the second full sentence after 
the words 11 based on race, 11 I shall add a footnote (to be 
numbered 29) reading as follows: 
u
29 Thus we do not hold, as the dissent implies, 
post, at 7, that the State's attempt to repeal a 
desegregation program creates a racial classification, 
while 'identical action' by the Seattle School Board does 
not. It is the State's race-conscious restructuring of 
its decisionmaking process that is impermissible, not the 
simple repeal of the Seattle Plan. 11 
Other footnotes would be renumbered accordingly. 
,'' 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
j;ttpftmt Q}O'Urlcf tlrt 'J!tnittb j;tatts 
'~htsftingfctt. ~. <!}. 2ll,?J1~ 
June 21, 1982 
Re: No. 81-9 Washington v. Seattle School Dist. #1 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me in your dissent. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
June 23, 1982 
81-9 Washington v. Seattle School District 
Dear Harry: 
In view of the additions made in your opinion for 
the Court, I will add - in response - the two notes I now 
circulate. 
Sincerely, 
~.rust ice Blackmun 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
t 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL,JR . 
.:§uprtntt <!Jcurl of tlrt ~nitth .;§taftg 
._asfringtcn. ~. <!f. 211.?'1~ 
June 23, 1982 
81-9 Washington v. Seattle School District 
Dear Harry: 
In view of the additions made in your opinion for 





cc: The Conference 
The following two footnotes will be added to my 
dissenting opinion in Washington v. Seattle School 
District No. 1--81-9. 
Add as new footnote 13 at page 11: 
The Court repeatedly states that the effect of 
Initiative 350 is "to redraw decisionmaking authority over 
racial mmaters--and only over racial matters--in such a 
way as to place comparative burdens on minorities." Ante, 
at ___ , n. 17 (emphasis added). But the decision by th~ 
State to exercise its authority over the schools and over 
racial matters in the schools does not place a comparative 
burden on racial minorities. In Hunter, as we have 
understood it, "fair housing legislation alone was subject 
to an automatic referendum requirement." Gordon v. Lance, 
403 u.s. 1, 5 (1971) (emphasis added). By contrast, 
Initiative 350 merely places mandatory busing among the 
much larger group of matters--covering race relations, 
administration of the schools, and a variety of other 
matters- - addressed at the State level. See note , 
infra. Racial minorities, if indeed they are burdened by 
Initiative 350, are not comparatively burdened. In this 
respect, they are in the same position as any other group 
of persons who are disadvantaged by regulations drawn at 
the State level. 
Add at page 12, as a new footnote 15: 
15. Responding to this dissent, the Court 
denies that its opinion limits the authority of the people 
of the State of washington and the~egislature to control 
or regulate school boards. It fu}her states that "the 
State remains free to vest all decisionmaking power in 
state officials, or to remove authority from local school 
boards in a race-neutral manner." Ante, at , n. 23. 
These are puzzling statements that seem entirely at odds 
with much of the text of the Court's opinion. It will be 
surprising if officials of the State of Washington--with 
the one exception mentioned below--will have any clear 
idea as to what the State now lawfully may do. 
--~ ----- _._ - •.. ,, _____ _. .-.---....-.--.....----.------ ... ~-,..-------~____,-.._ __ ~~~..,.T-"!'C':!lt~~~S:4' r"'~-~ 
The Court does say that "[i]t is the State's 
race-conscious restructuring of its decisionmaking process 
that is impermissible, not the simple repeal of the 
Seattle plan". Ante, at , n. 29. Apparently the Court 
is saying that, despite-what else may be said in its 
3Pinion, the people of the State--or the State 
aegislature--may repeal the Seattle plan, even though 
neither the people nor the legislature validly may 
prescribe statewide standards. I perceive no logic in--
and certainly no constitutional basis for--a distinction 
between repealing the Seattle plan of mandatory busing and 
establishing a statewide policy to the same effect. The 
people of a State have far greater interest in the general 
problems associated with compelled busing for purpose of 




JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
~rttttt <!}ourlltf tqt ~a ~hd:ts 
._Mlfi:ngtott. !fJ. (!}. 21lgi~$ 
June 24, 1982 
Re: No. 81-9 Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1 
Dear Lewis: 
I shall have no further response to your footnote addi-
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To: Justice Powell 
From: David 
Re: The Busing Cases: Nos. 81-9; 81-38 
I have thought a bit more about these cases after 
our discussion of yesterday. The Washington case is the more 
difficult of the two--because of Hunter v. Erikson. Even so, 
I think Hunter can be readily distinguished for two reasons: 
I. By contrast to Hunter, the busing limitation 
imposes no special burden on a minority. 
The essential point here is that busing, unlike 
fair-housing legislation, is not necessarily beneficial to 
minority students. In the case of de jure segregation busing 
may be needed to remove the stigma of official discrimination. 
Even here your opinions have noted the risks posed by busing 
to desegregation itself as well as to other goals. Outside 
the context of de jure segregation, the dangers posed by 
busing would seem even more pressing because not balanced by 
the desire to remove the taint of official action. As you 
have noted it is not always clear what interest the 
busing/integration cases seek to protect. When there has not 
been a fourteenth amendment violation, mandatory busing 
2. 
presumably seeks to expose students to the benefits of 
integration. But these benefits are open to black and white 
alike. A decision to cease busing in this circumstance 
"hurts" blacks and whites both--both are deprived of the 
benefits of integrated education. Similarly, both are helped 
by being assigned to closer schools. 
II. By contrast to Hunter, there has been no 
radical restructuring of the political process. 
In at least three ways the Washingto Initiative does 
not appear to have placed any unusual obstacle in the way of 
minority groups. First, the Initiative process is itself a 
well established mode of legislation in Washington. The 
process was not altered in this case; it was merely used. 
Second, the state retains a certain amount of control over the 
operation of the schools. It appears from the state's brief 
that most school decisions are made at the state level. 
Third, I would assume that many decisions pertaining to racial 
matters are made at the state level. Finally, there has been 
no change in procedure akin to the Hunter situation. 
I think that James v. Valtierra, 402 u.s. 137 
(1971), has some bearing on this argument. That case involved 
Article XXXIV of the state constitution which provided that no 
low-rent housing project could be developed by a state public 
3. 
body until the project was approved by a majority of those 
voting at a community e lee t ion. 
the Article violated the 14th 
A 3-judge court found that 
Amendment on the Hunter 
principle. This Court reversed. The Court found first that 
the Article was racially neutral: "The Article requires 
referendum approval for any low-rent public housing project, 
not only for projects which will be occupied by a racial 
minority." Second, "California's entire history demonstrates 
the repeated use of referendums to give citizens a voice on 
questions of public policy .••. A lawmaking procedure that 
'disadvantages' a particular group does not always deny equal 
protection." Finally, "an examination of California law 
reveals that persons advocating 
been singled out for mandatory 
group must face that obstacle. 
low- income housing have not 
referendums while no other 
Mandatory referendums are 
reequired for approval of state constitutional amendments" 
etc. 
I suppose it can be argued that the Washington plan 
does not fall under Valtierra because it is not "racially 
neutral." But I think it can be said that 
Initiative may--in effect--prohibit busing 
integration, this does not mean that it is 




in the setting 
of de facto segregation presumably fall equally upon blacks 
and whites alike. 
4. 
There seems to be a continuum of governmental action 
from Hunter to Valtierra. I think that this Initiative is on 
the Valtierra side of the line. 
r l 
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April 2, 1982 
Re: No. 81-9 - Washington v. Seattle School District 
No. 1 
Dear Lewis: 
Would you be disposed to take on a dissent in 
this case? 
Justice Powell 
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JUSTICE w ... J . BRENNAN, JR. Apri 1 2, 1982 
RE: No. 81-9 Washington v. Seattle School District 
Dear Chief: 
Harry has agreed to take the opinion for the Court 
in the above. 
The Chief Justice 
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Despite these efforts, the District in 1977 came under in-
crea ·ng pressure/to accelerate its program Of desegrega-
tio . 2 n response, the District's Board of Directors (School 
Board) enacted a resolution defining "racial imbalance" as 
"the situation that exists when the combined minority stu-
dent enrollment in a school exceeds the districtwide com-
bined average by 20 percentage points, provided that the sin--gl~t . . . of no school will excee 50 
percent of the student body." 473 upp. 96, 1006 (WD 
Wash.1979). The District resolved to eliminate all such im-
balance from the Seattle public schools by the beginning of 
the 1979-1980 academic year. 'l 
In September 1977, the District implemented a "magnet" 
program, designed to alleviate racial isolation by enhancing 
educational offerings at certain schools, thereby encouraging 
voluntary student transfers. A "disproportionate amount of 
the overall movement" inspired by the program was under-
taken by Negro students, however, id., at 1006, and racial 
imbalance in the Seattle schools was found to have actually 
increased between the 1970-1971 and 1977-1978 academic 
years. The District therefore concluded that mandatory re-
1979). 
' Sewral community organizations threatened legal action if the District 
did not initiate a more effectiYe integration effort, while the Mayor of Seat-
tle and a number of community leaders, by letter dated May 20, 1977, 
urged the District to adopt "a definition of racial isolation and measurable 
goals leading to the elimination of racial isolation in the Seattle Public 
Schools prior to a Court ordered and mandated desegregation remedy." 
App. 139. 
' The District Court found that the actions of the School Board were 
prompted by its members' "desire~·~ off threatened litigatio;1, their 
desire to preYent the threatene loss of federal funds, their desire to re-
lieve the black students of the disproportionate burden which they had 
borne in the voluntar~· efforts to balance the schools racially and their per-
ception that racial balance in the schools promotes the attainment of equal 
educational opp01tunity and is beneficial in the preparation of all students 
for democratic citizenship regardless of their race." 473 F . Supp., at 1007. 
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assignment of students was necessary if racial isolation in its 
schools was to be eliminated. Accordingly, in h 1978, 
the School Board enacted the so-calle<("Seattle Plan for de-
segregation. The plan, which makes eXtensive use of busing 
and mandatory reassignments, desegT~tes ---elemeirtary 
schools by "pairing" and "triading" predominantly minority 
·with predominantly white attendance areas, and by basing 
student assignments on attendance zones rather than on 
race. The racial makeup of secondary schools is moderated 
by "feeding" them from the desegregated elementary 
schools. App. 142-143. The District represents that the 
plan results in the reassignment of roughly equal numbers of 
white and minority students, and allows most students to 
spend roughly half of their academic careers attending a 
school near their homes. Brief for Appellee Seattle School 
District 5. 
The desegregation program, implemented in the 1978-1979 
academic year, apparently was effective: the District Court 
found that the Seattle Plan "has substantially reduced the 
number of racially imbalanced schools in the district and has 
substantially reduced the percentage of minority students in 
those schools which remain racially imbalanced." 473 F. 
Supp., at 1007. 
B 
In late 1977, shortly before the Seattle Plan was formally 
adopted by the District, a number of Seattle residents who 
opposed the desegregation strategies being discussed by the 
School Board formed an organization called the Citizens for ~~ 
Voluntary Integration Committee (CiVIC). This organiza- _ C I V l L 
tion, which the District Court found "was formed because of 
its founders' opposition to The Seattle Plan," 473 F. upp., at ..1 ~- _ . ,. n 1:\ .-
101J , a empte o e 1Jom 1mplemen ation of the Board's r'~" A>V 
mandatory desegregation program though litigation in state ~ 
court; when these efforts failed, CiVIC drafted a statewide ~ ~~ 
initiative designed to terminate the use of mandatory busing k '5 ~~ 
f7~ 
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for purposes of racial integration.~ This proposal, known as 
Initiative 350, provided that "no school board ... shall di-
rectly or indirectly require any student to attend a school 
other than the school which is geographically nearest or next 
nearest the student's place of residence ... and which offers 
the course of study pursued by such student. ... " See 
Wash. Rev. Code § 28A.26.010 (1981). 5 The initiative then 
set out, however, a number of broad exceptions to this re-
quireme~t: tudent ~ 6eyonCI his neighbor-
hood sc \ . he "reqmres special education, care or . guid-
ance," 0 "there are health or safety hazards, either natural 
or man made, or physical barriers or obstacles ... between 
the student's pl~~ of residence and the nearest or next 
nearest school," (OP'if "the school nearest or next nearest to 
his place of residence is unfit or inadequate because of over-
crowding, unsafe conditions or lack of physical facilities." 
See i~~d. Initiative 350 also speci~call:y _proscrib~d use of 
t.Ls:ven epumerated ~ods of _"ind~t]" s~ssign­
ment-among them the redefinition of attendance zones, the 
pamng of schools, and the use of "feeder" schools-that are a 
part of the Seattle Plan. See § 28A.26.030. The initiative 
envisioned busing for racial purposes in only one circum-
stance: it did not purport to "prevent any court of competent 
juris<!ictjq_n from adJucticafl'n constitUtiOnat"issue s· retatTn to 
tTie pUblic schoo s. ___........_ 
'Washington's Constitution reserves to the people of the State "the 
power to propose bills, laws, and to enact or reject the same at the polls, 
independent of the legislature." Wash. Const. Art. II, ~ 1. Such initia-
tiYes are placed on the ballot upon the petition of 8'/C of the State's voters 
registered and voting for goYernor at the last preceding regular guberna-
torial election. § 1(a). If passed by the electorate, an initiative may not 
be repealed by the state legislature for two years, although it may be 
amended \\ithin two years by a \'Ote of two-thirds of each house of the leg-
islature. § 41. See generally Comment, Judicial ReYiew of Laws En-
acted by Popular Vote, 55 Wash. L. ReY. 175 (1979). 
"The text of Initiative 350 is now codified as Wash. Rev. Code 
~§ 28A.26.010--28A.26.900 (1981). 
....___,,..._ _ ?' 
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Its proponents placed Initiative 350 on the Washington bal-
lot for the November 1978 general election. During the en-
suing campaign, the District Court concluded, the leadership 
..of CiVIC "acted legally and respon~bly," and did not address 
"itsappeals fo the raciar61ases of the voters." 473 F. Supp., 
at ~i: the same 1ime, however, the court's findings I 
demonstrate that the initiative was directed SOiely ataeseg-
regative busing in general, and at the Seattle Plan in particu-
lar. Thus, "[e]xcept for the assignment of students to effect 
racial balancing, the drafters of Initiative 350 attempted to 
preserve to school districts the maximum flexibility in the as-
signment of students," id., at 1008, and "[e]xcept for racially-
balancing purposes" the initiative "permits local school dis-
tricts to assign students other than to their nearest or next 
nearest schools for most, if not all, of the major reasons for 
which students are at present assigned to schools other than 
their nearest or next nearest schools." /d., at 1010.6 In 
campaigning for the measure, CiVIC officials accurately rep-
resented that its passage would result in "no loss of school 
district flexibility other than in busing for desegregation pur-
poses," id., at 1008, and it is evident that the campaign fo-
cused almost exclusively on the ·wisdom of "forced busing" for 
integration. See id., at 1009. 
On November 8, 1978, two months after the Seattle Plan 
went into effect, Initiative 350 passed by a substantial mar-
gin, drawing almost 66Ck of the vote statewide. The 
initative failed to attr~ct ~upport in two state le~­
lative districts ;both in Seattle. n the City as a whole, now-
ever, the ·initiative passed with some 61 Ck of the vote. 
Within the month, the District, together with the Tacoma 
and Pasco school districts,~ initiated this suit against the 
• At the beginning of the 1978--1979 academic year, approximate]~· 
300,000 of the 769,040 students enrolled in Washington's public schools 
were bused to school. NinetY-fi\'e percent of these students were trans-
ported for reasons unrelareato race. 473 F."'S""upp., at 1002. 
; Along with Seattle, Tacoma School District No. 10 and Pasco School 
District No. 1 are the only districts in the State of Washington with com-
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State in United States District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Washington, challenging the constitutionality of Ini-
tiatiYe 350 under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. The United States and several 
community organizations intervened in support of the Dis-
trict ' ; CiVIC intervened on behalf of the defendants. 
After a nine-day trial, the District Court made extensive 
and detailed findings of fact. The court eter~d that 
"[t]nose Seattle-SChools which are most crowded are located 
in those areas of the city \\'here the preponderance of minor-
ity families live." 473 F. Supp., at 1001. Yet the court 
found that Initiative 350, if implemented, "will prevent the 
racial balancing of a significant number of Seattle schools and 
will cause the school system to become more raciallv imbal-
ap than it presently is," "will rna e it 1mposs1b e or Ta-
coma sc~ their present racial balance," and 
will make "doubtful'' the prospects for integratiOn of the 
Pasco schools. !d. , at 1010: see id. , at 1001, 1011. Except 
for desegrega!Jye ~ing, however, the court found. t~al­
most all or t'hebusmg of students currently taking place in 
~==-~ -- _.......,__ ____ -
prehensiYe integration programs. and therefore the three are the only dis-
tricts affected by Initiatiw 350. See 473 F. Supp., at 1009. Since 1965, 
Pasco has made use of school closures and a mandatory busing program to 
overcome the racial isolation caused b~· segregated housing patterns: if stu-
dents attended the schools nem·est their homes, three of Pasco's seven ele-
mentary schools would haYe a primarily white and three a primarily minor-
it~· student body. 1d., at 1002-1003. The Tacoma school district has 
made use of schooi closures, racially controlled enrollment at magnet 
schools, and \'oluntary transfers-though not mandatory busing-to en-
hance racial balance in its schools. ld., at 1003-1004. 
' Several of the interYenor plaintiffs also alleged that the District had en-
gaged in de jw·e segregation, and therefore was operating an unconstitu-
tional dual school system. The District Court therefore bifurcated the liti-
gation, first addressing the constitutionality of InitiatiYe 350. Because of 
the court's conclusions on that question, the allegations of de jw·e segrega-
tion did not go to trial and haYe not been addressed by the District Court or 
by the Court of Appeals. 
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[Washington] is permitted bv Initiative 350." ld., at 1010. 
And \\'hile the cour ound that racia 1as ... is a factor in 
the opposition to the 'busing' of students to obtain racial bal-
ance," id., at 1001, it also f2fnd that voters ,ure.;noved to 
support Initiative 3~0 for "a lm b r f e ons," so that "[i]t 
is 1mposs1 le to ascertain al of those reasons [o]r to deter-
mine the relative impact of those reasons upon the elector-
ate." ld., at 1010. 
The District Court then held Initiative 350 unconstitu-
tional, for three in~ re~sons. /.~he court first con-
cluded that the initiative established :M-i{n ermissible racial 
classification, in violation of Hunter v. Erickson, 393 . S. -. 1 ..JA- 385 (1969), and Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710 (WDNY 
Lyv ~ ·~ 1970) (three-judge court), summaril~' affd, 402 U. S. 935 
) .W . _ (1971), "because it permits busing for non-racial reasons but 
~ :~ forbids it for racial rea~." 473 F. Supp., at 1012. The 
-: .~ court next held Initiat~50 invalid because "a raciallJ wdis-
(,A-'. criminatory _pu~ose was one of the factors which motivated 
H the conception'ano adoption of the initi9-~e." !d., at 1013. ~ 
Finally, the District Court reasoned t~Initiative 350 was 
unconstitutionally ove ·br d, because in the absence of a 
. , v~ court or er 1t an·ed even school boards that had engaged in 
1-r""'...:. ~ de .iure segregation from taking steps to foster integration.'" 
• The District Court acknowledged that it was impossible to determine 
~ , whether the supporters of InitiatiYe 350 "subjective!~· [had] a racially dis-
criminatory intent or purpose," because "[a]s to that subjective intent the 
secret ballot raises an impenetrable barrier." 473 F. Supp., at 1014. The 
court looked instead to objective fa<:tors. noting that it "marked [a] depar-
ture from the norm ... for the autonom~· of school boards to be restricted 
relatiYe to the assignment of students,'' and that it marked a similar "de-
parture from the procedural norm" for "an administrative decision of a 
subordinate local unit of government ... [to be] overridden in a statewide 
initiative." !d., at 1016. These factors, when coupled with the "racially 
disproportionate impact of the initiative," its "historical background," and 
"the sequence of events leading to its adoption," were found to demon-
strate that a "racially discriminatory intent or purpose was at least one 
motivating factor in the adoption of the initiatiYe." Ibid . 
'"The District Court noted that school boards that had practiced de jure 
81-9-0PINION 
8 WASHINGTON r. SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1 
I d., at 1016. The court permanently enjoined implementa-
tion of the initiative's restrictions. 
On the merits, a divided panel of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, relying entirely on 
the District Court's first rationale. 633 F. 2d 1338 (1980). 11 
By subjecting desegregative student assignments to unique 
treatment, the Court of Appeals concluded, Initiative 350 
"both creates a constitutionally-suspect racial classification 
and radically restructures the political process of Washington 
by allowing a state-wide majority to usurp traditional local 
authority over local school board educational policies." 633 
F. 2d, at 1344. In doing so, the court continued, the initia-
tive "1·emove[ s} from local school boards their existing au-
thority, and in large part their capability, to enact programs 
designed to desegregate the schools." !d., at 1346 (emphasis 
in original; citation omitted). The court found such a result 
contrary to the principles of Hunter v. Erickson, supm, and 
Lee v. y 1.s , tpm. e cour ac now e ged that the 
issue would be a different one had a successor school board 
attempted to rescind the Seattle Plan. Here, however, "a 
different governmental body-the state-wide electorate-re-
scinded a pohcy voluntadly enacted by locally elected school 
boards already subject to local political control." 633 F. 2d, 
at 1346. 12 
segregation are under an affirmatiYe obligation to eliminate the effects of 
that practice. 473 F. Supp., at 1016. See Columbus Board of Education 
v. Penick, 443 U. S. 449, 458-459 (1979). 
"The Court of Appeals therefore did not address the District Court's al-
ternatiYe finding that InitiatiYe 350 had been adopted for discriminator~· 
reasons, or its conclusion that the initiath·e was O\'erbroad. 633 F. 2d, at 
1342. 
' 2 After the decision on the merits, the District Court had declined to 
award attorney's fees to the plaintiff school districts because the districts 
are state-funded entities. App. to Juris. Statement C-1. The Court of 
Appeals reversed on this issue, concluding that the District Court had 
abused its discretion in denying fees. The Court of Appeals determined 
81-9-0PINION 
WASHINGTON v. SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.1 9 
The State appealed to this Court. We noted probable ju-
risdiction to address an issue of signifi~ our Nation's 
system of education. --U.S.-- (1981). -
II 
A 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment guarantees racial minorities the right to full participa-
tion in the political life of the community. It is beyond dis-
pute, of course, that given racial or ethnic groups may not be 
denied the franchise, or have the value of their vote inten-
tionally diluted. See White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 
(1973); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536 (1927). But the 
Fourteenth Amendment also reaches "a political structure 
that treats all individuals as equals," Mobile v. Bolden, 446 
U. S. 55, 84 (1980) (STEVENS, J., concurring in the judg-
ment), yet more subtly distorts governmental processes in 
such a way as to__plac~ ecial burdens <!n the ability of minor-
ity groups to achieve beneficial legislation. 
1his principle receive 1 s clearest expresion in Hunter v. 
Erickson, supra, a case that involved attempts to overturn 
antidiscrimination legislation in Akron, Ohio. The Akron 
city council, pursuant to its ordinary legislative processes, 
had enacted a fair housing ordinance. In response, the local 
citizenry, using an established referendum procedure, see 
393 U. S., at 390, and n. 6; 39~394, and n. -- (Harlan, J., 
concurring), amended the city charter to provide that ordi-
nances regulating real estate transactions "on the basis of 
race, color, religion, national origin or ancestry must first be 
approved by a majority of the electors voting on the question 
-~-
that the school districts fell within the language of the attorney's fees stat-
utes, 42 U. S. C. § 1988 and 20 U. S. C. § 3205, seen. 28, iu.fra, and it rea-
soned that "(a]s long as a publicly-funded organization advances important 
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at a regular or general election before said ordinance shall be 
effective." /d., at 387. This action "not only suspended the 
operation of the existing ordinance forbidding housing dis-
crimination, but also required the approval of the electors be-
fore any future [fair housing] ordinance could take effect." 
I d., at 389-390. In essence, the amendment changed the re-
quirements for the adoption of one type of local legislation: to 
enact an ordinance barring housing discrimination on the 
basis or race or religion, proponents had to obtain the ap-
proval of the city council and of a majority of the voters city-
wide. To enact an ordinance preventing housing discrimina-
tion on other grounds, or to enact any other type of housing 
ordinance, proponents needed the support of only the city 
council. 
In striking down the charter amendment, the Hunter 
Court recognized that, on its face, the provision "draws no 
distinctions among racial and religious groups." 393 U. S., 
at 390. But it did differentiate "between those groups who 
sought the law's protection against racial ... discriminations 
in the sale and rental of real estate and those who sought to 
regulate real property transactions in the pursuit of other 
ends," ibid., thus "disadvantag[ing] those who would benefit 
from laws barring racial . . . discriminations as against those 
who would bar other discriminations or who would otherwise 
regulate the real estate market in their favor." /d., at 391. 
In "reality," the burden imposed by such an arrangement 
necessaril.Y "falls on the minority. The majority needs no 
protection against discrimination and if it did, a referendum 
might be bothersome but no more than that." Ibid. In ef-
fect, then, the charter amendment served as an "ex licitly 
racial classification treating racial housing matters differ-
~ial~icc,at389. 
This rna e e amen men co 1 u wnally suspect: "the 
State may no more disadvantage any particular group by 
making it more difficult to enact legislation in its behalf than 
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it may dilute any person's vote or give any group a smaller 
representation than another of comparable size." I d., at 393 
(emphasis added). 
[& v. NJ!..quist, 318 F. Supp. 710 (WDNY 1970) (three-
judge court), offers an application of the Hunter doctrine in a 
sett~nilar to the one now before us. That 
case involved the New York education system, which made 
use of both elected and appointed school boards and which 
conferred extensive authority on state education officials. 
In an effort to eliminate de facto segregation in New York's 
schools, those officials had directed the city of Buffalo-a 
municipality with an appointed school board-to implement 
an integration plan. While these developments were pro-
ceeding, however, the New York Legislature enacted a stat-
ute barring state education officials and appointed-though 
not elected-school boards from "assign[ing] or compell[ing] 
[students] to attend any school on account of race ... or for 
the purpose of achieving [racial] equality in attendance . . . at 
any school." 318 F. Supp., at 712. 1'1 
Applying Hunter, the three-judge District Court invali-
dated the statute, noting that under the provision "[t]he 
Commissioner [of Education] and local appointed officials are 
prohibited from acting in [student assignment] matters only 
where racial criteria are involved." Id., at 719. In the 
court's view, the statute therefore "place[ d) burdens on the 
implementation of educational policies designed to deal with 
race on the local level" by "treating educational matters in-
volving racial criteria differently from other educational mat-
ters and making it more difficult to deal with racial imbalance 
in the public schools." I d., at 719 (emphasis in original). 
This drew an impermissible distinction "between the treat-
ment of problems involving racial matters and that afforded 
"' As does InitiatiYe 350, the New York statute apparently permitted Yol-
untary student transfers to achieve integration. Seen. 16, in.fi·a. 
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other problems in the same area." I d., at 718. This Court 
affirmed the District Court's judgment without opinion. 402 
u. s. 935 (1971). 
These cases yield a simple but central principle. As Jus-
tice Harlan noted while concurring m ffi'e Court's opinion in 
Hunter, la\\'S structuring political institutions or allocating 
poli~l"...!C~ "neutral principles"-such as the 
executh~e ve tO, or tne t~ically b§lens<Lm~.JeQJ.tirementsJor 
amend in state constitutions-are not sub· ect to e ual pro-
tectiOn at ac , t oug t ey may "make 1 more ifficult for 
minorities to achieve favorable legislation." 393 U. S., at 
394. Because such laws make it more difficult for el•ery 
group in the community to enact comparable laws, they "pro-
vid[e] a just framework within which the diverse political 
groups in our society may fairly compete." I d., at 393. 
Thus, the political majority may generally restructure the po-
litical process to place obstacles in the path of everyone seek-
ing to secure the benefits of governmental action. But a dif-
ferent analysis is required when the State allocates 
governmenT~fpower non-ne,9tralJ.y, by explicitly using the 
L. ~;acta { na~ure of a decision to detel~mine the deciSlOnmaking 
process. ~tate action of this kind, the Court said, "places 
special burdens on racial minorities within the governmental 
process," id., at 391 (emphasis added), thereby "making it 
more difficult for certain racial and religious minorities [than 
for other members of the community] to achieve legislation 
that is in their interest." /d., at 395 (emphasis added) (Har-
lan, J., concurring). Such a structuring of the political proc-
ess, the Court said, was "no more permissible than [is] deny-
ing [members of a racial minority] the vote, on an equal basis 
with others." I d., at 391. 
III 
We believe that the Court of Appeals properly focused on 
Hunter and Lee, for we find the principle of those cases dis-
positive of the issue here. In our view, Initiative 350 mUSt 
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fall because it does "not attemp[t] to allocate governmental 
power on the basis of any general principle." Hwzte1· v. 
Erickson, 393 U. S., at 395 (Harlan, J., concurring). In-
stead, it uses the racial ng,tml- of an issue to define the gov-
ernmental decisionmaking structure, thus imposes substan-
tial and unique burdens on racial minorities. 
A 
Noting that InitiatiYe 350 nowhere mentions "race" or 
"integration," appellants suggest that the legislation has no 
racial overtones; they maintain that Hunter is inapposite be-
cause the initiative simply permits busing for certain enumer-
ated purposes while neutrally forbidding it for all other rea-
sons. We find it difficult to believe that appellants' analysis 
is seriously advanced, however, for despite its facial neu~ral­
ity there is little doubt that the imbative was effectively 
d1'1iwn for racial purposes. Neither the imtiative's sponsors, 
nortneDiStrictCourt, nor the Court of Appeals had any dif-
ficulty perceiving the racial nature of the issue settled by Ini-
tiative 350. Thus, the District Court found that the text of 
the referendum was carefully tailored to interfere only with 
desegregative busing.~~ Proponents of the initiative candidly 
"represented that there would be no loss of school district 
flexibility other than in busing for desegregation purposes." 
473 F. Supp., at 1008. And, as we have noted, Initiative 350 
in fact allows school districts to bus their students "for most, 
if not all," of the non-integrative purposes required by their 
educational policies. ld., at 1010. The Washington elector-
ate surely was aware of this, for it was "assured" by CiVIC 
officials that "'99£k of the school districts in the state"'-those 
that lacked mallcratory ii1tegi·ation prog1·am~would not be 
affected by the passage of 350." I d., at 1008-1009. It is be-
"The Court of Appeals accepted the District Court's characterization of 
the initiative, and eYen the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals agreed 
that Initiati\'e 350 addresses a "racial" problem. 633 F. 2d, at 1353. 
-
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yond reasonable dispute, then, that the initiative was enacted 
"'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects 
upon" busing for integration. Personnel Administrator of 
Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256, 279 (1979). 
Even accepting the view that Initiative 350 was enacted j? ~ ~ t9{ t(, :S. 
for such a purpose, the United States-which has changed its 
position during the course of this litigation, and now supports 
the State-maintains that busing for integration, unlike the 
fair housing ordinance involved in Hunter, is not a peculiarly 
"racial" issue at all. Brief for United States 17, n. 18. 
Again, we are not persuaded. It undoubtedly is true, as the 
United States suggests, that the proponents of mandatory 
integration cannot be classified by race: Negroes and whites 
may be counted among both the supporters and the oppo-
nents of Initiative 350. And it should be equally clear that 
white as well as Negro children benefit from exposure to 
"ethnic and racial diversity in the classroom." Columbus 
. p ard of Education v. Penick, 443 U. S. 449, 486 (1979) 
V <PowELL, J., dissenting). See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 
U. S. 717, 783 (1974) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). 15 But nei-
ther of these factors serves to distinguish Hunter, for we ? 
may fairly assume that members of the racial majority both 
favored and benefited from Akron's fair housing ordinance. 
Cf. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman,-- U. S. --, --
(1982) (slip op. 11-12, and n. 17); Gladstone, Realtors v. Vil-
lage of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 111, 115 (1979). 
In any event, our cases suggest that desegregation of the 
public schools, like the Akron open housing ordinance, at bot-
';Appellants and the United States do not challenge the propriet~· of 
race-conscious student assignments for the purpose of achieYing integra-
tion, eYen absent a finding of prior de jure segregation. We therefore do 
not specificall~· pass on that issue. See generall)· Su·aHH \'. Charlotte-
MeckleHbei'{J Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971); North Carolina 
State Board of Education\'. Sl!'aHH, 402 U. S. 43, 45 (1971). Cf. UHirer-
sity o.f jlb /((orHia Regents "· Bakke , 438 U. S. 265, 300, n. 39, 312-314 
(1978)\(opinion of POWELL, J.). 
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tom inures primarily to the benefit of the minority, and is de-
signed for that purpose. Education has come to be "a princi-
pal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in 
preparing him for later professional training, and in helping 
him to adjust normally to his environment." Brown v. 
Boa1·d of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 493 (1954). When that 
enYironment is largely shaped by members of different racial 
and cultural groups, minority children can achieve their full 
measure of success only if they learn to function in-and are 
fully accepted by-the larger community. Attending aneth-
nically diverse school rna~· help accomplish this goal by pre-
paring minority children "for citizenship in our pluralistic so-
ciety," Estes Y. Metropolitan !1!Jl'nches of tlze Dallas 
NAACP, 444 U. S. 437, 451 (1980t(POWELL, J., dissenting), 
while, we may hope, teaching members of the racial majority 
"to live in harmony and mutual respect" with children of mi-
nority heritage. Colw1~s Board of Education v. Penick, 
443 U. S., at 485, n. 5 (POWELL, J., dissenting). Lee v. 
Nyquist settles this point, for the Court there accepted the 
proposition that mandatory desegregation strategies present 
the type of racial issue implicated by the Hunter doctrine. )I ; 
'"The United States seeks to distinguish Lee by suggesting that the stat-
ute there at issue "clear!~· prohibited" all attempts to ameliorate racial im-
balance in the schools, while Initiative 350 permits voluntary desegrega-
tion efforts. Brief for United States 25. Even assuming that this 
distinction would otherwise be of constitutional significance, its premise is 
not accurate. The legislation challenged in Lee did permit voluntary inte-
gration efforts, for it expressly exempted from its restrictions "the assign-
ment of a pupil in the manner requested or authorized b~· his parents or 
guardian." 318 F. Supp., at 712. Thus, as the District Court in Lee 
noted, the statute "denie[ d) appointed officials the power to implement 
uon-volzwtary programs for the improvement of racial balance.'' /d., at 
715 (emphasis added). The difficulty in Lee-as in this case-stemmed 
from the Lee District Court's conclusion that a voluntary program would 
not sen-e to integrate the community's schools: "Voluntary plans for 
achieving racial balance ... have not had a significant impact on the prob-
lems of racial segregation in the Buffalo public schools; indeed it would ap-
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It is undeniable that busing for integration-particularly 
when ordered by a federal court-now engenders consider-
ably more controversy than does the sort of fair housi~nor i-
nance debated in Hunter. See Estes v. Met1'0'J ·an 
Branches o.ftlze Dallas NAACP, 444 U. S., at 448-45 (Pow-
ELL, J., dissenting). But in the absence of a constitutional vi- } 
olation, the desirability an~cac~~ool dese~~tion 
are matter§._ to '9e resolv~tnrough_ the eoiilical .,Er£CeSS. 
For present purposes, it is enough that minorities may c·on-
sider busing for integration to be "legislation that is in their 
interest." Hunter v. E1·ickson, 393 U. S., at 395 (Harlan, 
J., concurring). Given the racial focus of Initiative 350, this 
suffices to trigger application of the Hunter doctrine. 
B 
We are also satisfied that the practical effect of Initiative 
350 is to work a reallocation of RO~r of the kind condemned 
in Hunte1·. The initiative removes the authority to address a 
racial problem-and only a racial problem-from the existing 
decisionmaking body, in such a way as to burden minority in-
terests. Those favoring the elimination of de facto school 
segregation now must seek relief from the state legislature, 
or from the statewide electorate. Yet authority over all 
other student assignment decisions, as well as over most 
other areas of educational policy, remains vested in the local 
school board. Indeed, by specifically exempting from Initia-
tive 350's proscriptions most non-racial reasons for assigning 
students away from their neighborhood schools, the initiative 
expressly requires those championing school integration to 
surmount a considerably higher hurdle than persons seeking 
comparable legislative action. As in Hunter, then, the com-
pear that racial isolation is actually increasing." Ibid. Thus the statute 
challenged in Lee and InitiatiYe 350 operated in precisely the same way to 
"deny ... student[s] the right to attend a fully integrated school.'' Brief 
for United States 25. 
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munity's political mechanisms are modified to place effective 
decisionmaking authority over a racial issue at a different 
level of government. 17 In a very obvious sense, the initiative 
thus "disadvantages those who would benefit from laws bar-
ring" de facto desegregation "as against those who ... would 
otherwise regulate" student assignment decisions; "the real-
ity is that the law's impact falls on the minority." Hunter v. 
Erickson, 393 U. S., at 391. 
The State appellants and the United States, in response to 
this line-0" ana ys1s, argue that Initiative 350 has not wor ed 
any reallocati~_Qf_~::--They note t at the State neces-
sanfy retainsplenary authority over Washington's system of 
education, and therefore they suggest that the initiative 
"In Hunter, the procedures for enacting racial legislation were modified 
in such a way as to place effective control in the hands of the citywide elec-
torate; here, the power to enact racial legislation has been reallocated. In 
each case, the effect of the challenged action was to redraw decisionmaking 
authority over racial matters-and only over racial matters-in such a way 
as to place comparative burdens on minorities. While the United States 
observes that the proponents of integrated schools remain free to use 
Washington's initiative system to further their ends, that was true in 
Hunter as well: proponents of open housing were not barred from invoking 
Akron's initiative procedures to repeal the charter amendment, or to enact 
fair housing legislation of their own. It surely is an excessively formal ex-
ercise, then, to argue that the procedural revisions at issue in Hunte1· im-
posed special burdens on minorities, but that the selective allocation of 
decisionmaking authority worked by Initiative 350 does not erect compara-
ble political obstacles. Indeed, in a sense the situation here is less favor-
able tr minority interests than was the arrangement in Hunter, for the Ak-
ron cb rter amendment at least made provision for the passage of fair 
housing legislation, while Initiative 350 on its face forbids virtually all man-
datory desegregation strategies. The United States would note that Ini-
tiative 350's "modification of state policy [was] not the result of any unusual 
political procedure," Brief for United States 30, for initiatives and refer-
enda are often used by the Washington electorate. But that observation 
hardly serves to distinguish this case from Hunter, since the fair housing 
charter amendment was added through the unexceptional use of Akron's 
initiative procedure. See 393 U. S., at 387. 
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amounts to nothing more than an unexceptional example of a 
State's intervention in its own school system. In effect, they 
maintain that the State functions as a "super school board," 
Tr. of Oral Arg. 5, 17, which typically involves itself in all ar-
eas of educational policy. And, the argument continues, if 
the State is the body that usually makes decisions in this 
area, Initiative 350 worked a simple change in policy rather 
than a forbidden reallocation of power. Cf. C1·al.t:(o1·d v. Los 
Angeles Board of Education, post. 
This at fi_r.st..,glance would seem to be a potent ar~ment, 
for States traditionally have been accorded the widest lati-
tude in ordering their internal governmental processes, see 
Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U. S. 60, 71 (1978), and 
school boards, as creatures of the State, obviously must give 
effect to policies announced by the state legislature. But 
"insisting that a State may distribute legislative power as it 
desires ... furnish[es] no justification for a legislative struc-
ture which otherwise would violate the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Nor does the implementation of this change through 
popular referendum immunize it." Hunter v. Erickson, 393 1 
U. S., at 392. The issue here, after all, is not whether 
Washington h~ !:,he .. ati't'h'OiJty to intervene in the affairs of 
local' school boards; it is, rather, whether the State has E;l'er-
cised that authorit r in a manner consiste witfi the E ual 
Pro~~n h~use. s t e ourt noted in unter, "t ough 
Akron mig t ave proceeded by majority vote ... on all its 
municipal legislation, it has instead chosen a more complex 
system. Having done so, the State may no more disad-
vantage any particular group by making it more difficult to 
enact legislation in its behalf than it may dilute any person's 
vote." Id., at 392-393. Washington also has chosen to 
make use of a more complex governmental structure, and a 
close examination both of the Washington statutes and of the 
Court's decisions in related areas convinces us that Hunter is 
fully applicable here. Q .-______ __.., 
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At the outset, it is irrelevant that the State might have 
vested all decisonmaking authority in itself, so long as the po-
litical structure it in fact erected imposes comparative bur-
dens on minority interests; that much is settled by Hunter 
and by Lee. 1" And until the passage of Initiative 350, Wash-
ington law in fact had established the local school board, 
rather than the State, as the entity charged \\'ith making de-
cisions of the type at issue here. Like all 50 States, see Brief 
for National School Boards Assn. as Amic11s C1n·iae 11, 
14-16, Washington of course is ultimately responsible for pro-
viding education within its borders, see Wash. Const., Art. 
IX; Wash. Rev. Code *28A.02.010 (1981); ch. 28A.41 (estab-
lishing a uniform school financing system); Seattle Scllool 
Dist. v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P. 2d 71 (1978), and it 
therefore has set certain procedural requirements and mini-
mum educational standards to be met by each school. See, 
e. g., §§ 28A.Ol.010, 28A.Ol.020 (length of school day and 
year); ch. 28A.27 (mandatory attendance); ch. 28A.67 
(teacher qualifications); ch. 28A.05 and 
§§ 28A.58. 750-28A.58. 754 (curriculum). But Washington 
has chosen to meet its educational responsibilities primarily 
through "state and local officials, boards, and committees," 
§ 28A.02.020, and the responsihll.j.ty to devise and tailor edu-
cational programs to suit local needs has emphatically been 
vested in the local school boards. 
Thus "each ~~on S'Chool district board of directors" is 
made "accountable for the proper operation of [its] district .!£ 
the local community and its electorate." § 28A.58.758(1). 
''The Court noted in Hunter that Akron "might have proceeded by ma-
jority vote ... on all its municipal legislation," 393 U. S., at 392; the char-
ter amendment was inYalidated because the citizens of Akron did not re-
serve all power to themse!Yes, but rather distributed it in a non-neutralf-
manner. In Lee, of course, the State had unquestioned authority to vest 
all power overeducation in state officials. ------
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To this end, each school board is "vested with the .final I 
responsibility for the setting of policies ensuring quality in 
the content and extent of its educational program" (emphasis 
added). Ibid. School boards are given responsibility for, 
among many other things, "establish[ing] performance crite-
ria" for personnel and programs, for assigning staff "accord-
ing to board enumerated classroom and program needs," for 
setting requirements concerning hours of instruction, for 
establishing curriculum standards "relevant to the particular 
needs of district students or the unusual characteristics of the 
district," and for evaluating teaching materials. 
§ 28A.58. 758(2). School boards are generally directed to 
"develop a program identifying student learning objectives 
for their district[s]," ~~ 28A.58.090; see also § 28A.58.092, to 
select instructional materials, § 28A.58.103, to stock libraries 
as they deem necessary, § 28A.58.104, and to initiate a vari-
ety of optional programs. See, e. g., §§ 28A.34.010, 
28A.35.010, 28A.58.105. School boards, of course, are given 
broad corporate po\\'ers. § § 28A.58.010, 28A.58.075, 
28A.59.180. Significantly for present purposes, school 
boards are directed to determine which students should be 
bused to school and to provide those students with transpor-
tation. § 28A.24.055. 
Indeed, the notion of school board responsibility for local 
educational programs is so firmly rooted that local boards are 
subject to disclosure and reporting provisions specifically de-
signed to ensure the board's "accountability" to the people of 
the community for "the educational programs in the school 
distric[t]." ~28A.58.758(3). And, perhaps most relevantly 
here, before the adoption of Initiative 350 the Washington 
Supreme Court had found it within the general discretion of 
local school authorities to settle problems related to the de-
nial of "equal educational opportunity." IH Citizens Against 
'" Indeed, even the State's efforts to help ensure equal opportunit~· in 
education and to encourage desegregation are cast in cooperatiYe terms, 
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Mandatory Bussing v. Palmason, 80 Wash. 2d 445, 453, 495 
P. 2d 657, 663 (1972). It therefore had squarely held that a 
program of desegregative busing was a proper means of fur-
thering the school board's responsibility to "administe[r] the 
schools in such a way as to provide a sound education for all 
children." ld., at 456, 495 P. 2d, at 664. 21' See State ex rel. 
Citizens Against Mandatory Bussing v. Brooks, 80 Wash. 2d 
121, 492 P. 2d 536 (1972); State e:r rel. Lukens v. Spokane 
School Dist1·ict, 147 Wash. 467, 474, 266 P. 189, 191 (1928). ~~ 
Given this statutory structure, we have little difficulty con-
cluding that Initiative 350 worked a maior reorde1jng_Q!J,he 
State's educati~ikii~cess:--Befol·e adop-
tion of the 1111 Ia 1ve, the power to determine what programs 
would most appropriately fill a school district's educational 
needs-including programs involving student assignment and 
desegregation-was firmly committed to the local board's 
discretion. The question whether to provide an integrated 
learning environment rather than a system of neighborhood 
schools surely involved a decision of that sort. See Citizens 
and are designed to assist school districts in implementing programs of 
their choosing. See, e. g., Wash. ReY. Code §* 28A.21.010(3), 
28A.21.136(1) and (3) (1981): cf. § 28A.58.245(3). 
2\' The Washington Supreme Court noted that "as long as the school board 
authorized or required students to attend schools geographically situated 
close to their homes, they had such a rig-ht. But the right existed only 
because it was giYen to them b~· the school authorities." 80 Wash. 2d. at 
452, 495 P. 2d, at 662. 
2
' We also note that the State has not attempted to resen·e to itself exclu-
siYe power to deal with racial issues generally. Municipalities in Washing-
ton have been giYen broad po\\'ers of self-goYernment, see generally Wash. 
Const., Arndt. 40: Wash. ReY. Code ~§ 35.22.020, 35.23.440, 35.27.370, 
35.30.010 (1981); Wash. ReY . Code Tit. 35A (Optional Municipal Code), and 
Washington courts specifically haYe held that municipalities haw the 
power to enact antidiscrimination ordinances. See, e. g., Seattle Nen·spa-
per-Web Pressmen's Union Local No. !26 v. City of Seattle, 24 Wash. App. 
462, 604 P. 2d 170 (1979). Cf. 5 E. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations 
§ 19.23, p. 425 (3d ed. reY. 1981). 
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Against Mandato1·y Bussing v. Palmason, 80 Wash. 2d, at 
459-460, 495 P. 2d, at 66~667. After passage of Initiative 
350, authority over all but one of those areas remained in the 
hands of the local board. By placing uower o~er dese~·ega­
tive busing at the state leve1, then, Initiative 350 plainly zrdif-
ferentiates between the treatment of problems involving ra-
cial matters and that afforded other problems in the same 
area." Lee v. Ny uist 318 u ., at 718. The District 
Court and t ourt of Appeals similar y cone u the 
initiative estructur th as in o olitical proces and 
we see no son to challenge the determinations o rts fa-
miliar with loca Cf. Millike1 y, 418 U.S., at 
769 (WHITE, J., dissenting). 
That we reach this conclusion should come as no surprise, 
for when faced with a similar educational scheme in Milliken 
v. Bradley, supra, 22 the Court concluded that the actions of a 
local school board could not be attributed to the State that 
had created it. We there addressed the Michigan education 
system, which vests in the State constitutional responsibility 
for providing education: "'The policy of [Michigan] has been 
to retain control of its school system, to be administered 
throughout the State under State laws by local State agen-
cies ... to carry out the delegated functions given [them] by 
the legislature."' Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S., at 794 
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting), quoting School Dist1--ict of the 
City of Lansing v. State Board of Education, 367 Mich. 591, 
595, 116 N.W. 2d 866, 868 (1962). See Milliken v. Bradley, 
supra, at 726, n. 5. To fulfill this responsibility, the State of 
Michigan provided a substantial measure of school district 
funding, established standards for teacher certification, de-
termined part of the curriculum, set a minimum school term, 
approved bus routes and textbooks, established disciplinary 
22 One amicus observes that many States employ a similar educational 
structure. See Brief for National School Boards Assn. as Amicus Clll·iae 
11, 14-16, App. 1a-10a. 
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procedures, and under certain circumstances had the power 
even to remove local school board members. See id., at 
795-796 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). See id., at 726, n. 5, 
727 (describing State controls over education); id., at 768 and 
n. 4 (WHITE, J., dissenting) (same); id., at 794 (MARSHALL, 
J., dissenting) (same). 
Yet the Court, noting that "[n]o single tradition in public \ 
education is more deeply rooted than local control over the 
operation of schools," concluded that the "Michigan educa-
tional structure ... in common with most States, provides 
for a large measure of local control." /d., at 741-742. Rely-
ing on this analysis, the Court determined that a Michigan 
school board's assignment policies could not be attributed to 
the State, and therefore declined to permit interdistrict bus-
ing as a remedy for one school district's acts of unconstitu-
tional segregation. If local school boards operating under a 
similar statutory structure are considered separate entities 
for purposes of constitutional adjudication when they make 
segregative assignment decisions, it is difficult to see why a 
different analysis should apply when a local board's deseg-
regative policy is at issue. 
In any event, we believe that the question here is again 
settled by Lee. There, state control of the educational 
sfstem waslfilly as complete as it now is in Washington. 
See generally N.Y. Educ. Law §§ 305, 306, 308--310 (McKin-
ney) (1969 and Supp. 1981). The state statute under attack 
reallocated power over mandatory desegregation in two 
ways: it transferred authority from the State Commissioner 
of Education to local elected school boards, and it shifted au-
thority from local appointed school boards to the state legisla-
ture. 2;l When presented ·with this restruc!u!}ng Qf !:.he politi-
cal proces_§ , the District Court deciaredtliat Tt" could -
"" When authority to initiate desegregation programs was remoYed from 
appointed school boards and from state education officials, the only body 
capable of exercising power over such programs was the state legislature. 
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"conceive of no more compelling case for the application of 
the Hunter principle." 318 F. Supp., at 719. This Court of 
course affirmed the District Court's judgme We see...!!Q_ 
relevant distinction between this case a Lee; · deed, it is 
di cult to imagine a m ·e precise para le . 2• 
c 
To be sure, "the simple repeal or modification of deseg-
regation or anti-discrimination laws, without more, never has 
been viewed as embodying a presumptively invalid racial 
classification." Cmw(ord v. Los Angeles Board of Educa-
tion, post, at--, (slip op. 10). See Dayton Board of Ed1l-
cation v. B1-inkman, 443 U. S. 526, 531, n. 5 (1979); Hunter 
v. Erickson, 393 U. S., at 390, n. 5. As Justice Harlan 
noted in Hunter, the voters of the polity may express their 
displeasure through an established legislative or referendum 
procedure when particular legislation "arouses passionate op-
position." I d., at 395 (concurring opinion). Had Akron's 
"The United States makes only one attempt to distinguish Lee in this 
regard: Lee is inapposite, the United States maintains, because the statute 
at issue there "blocked desegregation efforts even b~· 'a school district sub-
ject to a pre-existing order to eliminate segregation in its schools,"' and 
therefore-purportedly in contrast to Initiative 350-"interfere[d] with the 
efforts of individual school districts to eliminate de jure segregation." 
Brief for the United States 25, quoting Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp., at 
715. If by this statement the United States seeks to place the District 
Court's holding and this Court's affirmance in Lee on the ground that the 
New York statute interfered with Buffalo's attempts to eliminate de jure 
segregation, its submission is simply inaccurate. At the time of the Lee 
litigation, Buffalo had not been found guilty of practicing intentional seg-
regation. See Arthur v. l\'yquist, 573 F. 2d 134, 137 (CA2 1978). As the 
United States notes, Buffalo was under a "pre-existing order to eliminate 
segregation in its schools"-but that order was issued by the New York 
Commissioner of Education, because he had found Buffalo's schools de 
facto segregated. Appeal of Di.ron, 4 N.Y. Educ. Dept. Reports 115 
(1965). See Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp., at 714-715. Lee did not con-
cern de jure segregation; it is to be explained only as a straightforward 
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fair housing ordinance been defeated at a referendum, for ex-
ample, "Negroes would undoubtedly [have lost] an important 
political battle, but they would not thereby [have been] de-
nied equal protection." /d., at 394. 
Initiative 350, however, works something more than the 
"_!!lere r~al" of a desegregation law by the political enti ty 
that created it. It b rde s all future attem ts t in e ·ate 
lWashington schools in 1stncts t rou out the ta e, y lodgmg ec1sionmaking authority over the question at a new and remote level of government. Indeed, the initiative, like t~ent at issue in Hunter, has its most per-
nicious effect on integration programs that do "not arouse ex-
traordinary controversy." I d., at 396 (emphasis in original). 
In such situations the initiative makes the enactment of ra-
cially beneficial legislation difficult, though the particular 
program involved might not have inspired opposition had it 
been promulgated through the usual legislative processes 
used for comparable legislation. 23 This imposes direct and 
undeniable burdens on minority interests. "If a govern-
mental institution is to be fair, one group cannot always be 
expected to win," id., at 394; by the same token, one group 
cannot be subjected to a debilitating and often insurmount-
able disadvantage. 
IV 
In the end, appellants are reduced to suggesting that 
Hunter has been effectively overruled by more recent deci-
z; That phenomenon is graphically demonstrated b~· the circumstances of 
this litigation. The long-standing desegregation programs in Pasco and 
Tacoma, as well as the Seattle middle school integration plan, have func-
tioned for years without creating undue controversy. Yet they have been 
swept away, along with the Seattle Plan, by Initiative 350. As a practical 
matter, it seems most unlikely that proponents of desegregative busing in 
smaller communities such as Tacoma or Pasco will be able to obtain the 
statewide support now needed to permit them to desegregate the schools 
in their communities. 
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sions of this Court. As they read it, Hunter applied a simple 
"disparate impact" analysis: it invalidated a facially neutral 
ordinance because of the law's adverse effects upon racial mi-
norities. Appellants therefore contend that Hunter was 
swept away, along with the disparate impact approach to 
equal protection, in Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229 
(1976), and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. 
Corp., 429 U. S. 252 (1977). Cf. James v. Valtierra, 402 
u. s. 137 (1971). 
Appellants unquestionably are correct when they suggest 
that "purposeful discrimination is 'the condition that offends 
the Cons 1 u 10 , ersonnel Admunstmtor of Massachu-
setts v. Feeney, 442 U. S., at 274, quoting Swann v. Clza1·-
lotte-Mecklenbem Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 16 
(1971), for the "central purpose of the Equal Protection 
Clause ... is the prevention of official conduct discriminating 
on the basis of race." Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S., at 
239. Thus, when facially neutral legislation is subjected to 
equal protection attack, an inquiry into intent is necessary, to 
determine whether the legislation in some sense was de-
signed to accord disparate treatment on the basis of racial 
considerations. Appellants' suggestion that this analysis 
somehow conflicts with Hunte1·, however, misapprehends the 
basis of the Hunter doctrine. We have not insisted on a par-
ticularized in uiry into motivati · a e ual rotection 
cases: "A racia classification, regardless of purported moti-
vation, is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only upon 
an extraordinary justification." Personnel Administrator of 
Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U. S., at 272. And legislation 
of the kind challenged in Hunter falls into this inherently sus-
pect category. 26 
There is one immediate and crucial difference between 




2b The State does not suggest that Initiative 350 furthers the kind of com-
pelling interest necessary to overcome the strict scrutiny applied to ex- 4e_~ 
~~~ 
j~ 
plicit racial classifications. 
81-9-0PINION 
WASHINGTON v. SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.1 27 
such as Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights consid-. 
ered classifications facially unrelated to race, the charter 
amendment at issue in Hunter dealt in explicitly racial terms 
·with legislation designed to benefit minorities "as minor-
ities," not legislation intended to benefit some larger group of 
underprivileged citizens among whom minorities were dis- ~ 
proportionately represented. This does not mean, of course, 
that every attempt to address a racial issue gives rise to an 
impermissible racial classification. See Crau:ford v. Los An-
geles Board of Education, post. But w_!1en the~l proc-
ess or the decisionmaking mechanism used to add1·ess racially 
coi1s'Cious legis ation-an on y such legi--slatio~ngled 
out for peculiar and disadvantageous treatment, thegov~n­
mental action plainly "rests on 'distinctions based on race."' 
Jmnes v. 'altterrcr;4'0~ 1 1, quoting Hunter v. 
Erickson, 393 U. S., at 391. And when the State's alloca-
tion of power places unusual burdens on the ability of racial 
groups to enact legiSlatiOn specffi"cally designed to overcome 
the "special condition" of prejudice, the governmental action 
seriously "curtail[s] the operation of those political processes 
ordinarily t~ relied upon to protect minorities." United /?~ 
States v. Carolene Products Co. 304 U. S. 144, 152-153, n. 4 c.-~ ~ 
(1938). In a mos 1rec s nse, this implicates the judiciary's 
special role in safeguarding the interests of those groups that 
are "relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as 
to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian 
political process." San Antonio School Dist. v. Rod1-iguez, 
411 u. s. 1, 28 (1973). 2' 
Hunter recognized the considerations addressed above, 
and it therefore rested on a principle that has been vital for 
27 We also note that singling out the political processes affecting racial is-
sues for uniquely disadYantageous treatment ineYitably raises dangers of 
impermissible motivation. When political institutions are more generally 
restructured, as JuSTICE BRENNAN has noted in another context: "The 
very breadth of [the] scheme ... negates any suggestion" of improper pur-
pose. Walz v. Taa· Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 689 (1970) (concurring 
opinion). 
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over a century-that "the core of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is the prevention of meaningful and unjustified official 
distinctions based on race." 393 U. S., at 391. Just such 
distinctions infected the reallocation of decisionmaking au-
thority considered in Hunter, for minorities are no less pow-
erless with the vote than without it when a racial criterion is 
used to assign governmental power in such a way as to ex-
clude particular racial groups "from effective participation in 
the political proces[s]." Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S., at 94 
(WHITE, J., dissenting). Certainly, a State requirement 
that "desegregation or anti-discrimination laws," Crau:ford 
v. Los Angeles Bom·d of Education, post, at -- (slip op. 
10), and only such laws, be passed by unanimous vote of the 
legislature would be constitutionally suspect. It would be 
equally questionable for a community to require that laws or 
ordinances "designed to ameliorate race relations or to pro-
tect racial minorities," id., at-- (slip op. 11), be confirmed 
by popular vote of the electorate as a whole, while compara-
ble legislation is exempted from a similar procedure. The 
amendment addressed in Hunte1·-and, as we have ex-
plained, the legislation at issue here-was less obviously per-
nicious than are these examples, but was no different in 
principle. 
v 
In reaching this conclusion, we do not undervalue the mag-
nitude of the State's interest in its system of education. 
Washington could have reserved to state officials the right to 
make all decisions in the areas of education and student as-
signment. It has chosen, however, to use a more elaborate 
system; having done so, the State is obligated to operate that 
system ·within the confines of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
That, we believe, it has failed to do. 2>. 
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Affinned. 
2> Appellants also challenge the Court of Appeals' award of attorney's 
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fees to the school district plaintiffs, see n. 12. supm, arguing that state-
funded entities are not eligible to receive such awards from the State. In 
our view, this contention is without merit. The districts are plainly par-
ties covered b~· the language of the fees statutes. See 42 U. S. C. ~ 1988 
(1976 eel., Supp. IV) ("In any action ... to enforce a provision of sections 
1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and1986 of this title ... the court, in its discretion, 
may allow the prevailing party, other tlza11 the United States, a reasonable 
attorney's fee as part of its costs.") (emphasis added); 20 U. S. C. ~ 3205 
(1976 eel., Supp. IV) ("Upon the entry of a final order by a court of the 
United States against a ... State ... for failure to comply with ... the 
fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States as [it] per-
tain[s] to elementary and secondary education, the court, in its discretion 
... may allow the prevailing pal'ty, other tlwn the United States, a reason-
able attorney's fee as part of its costs.") (emphasis added). Nothing in the 
history of the statutes suggests that this language was meant to exclude 
state-funded entities. To the contrary, the Courts of Appeals have held 
with substantial unanimity that· publicly-funded legal services organiza-
tions may be awarded fees. See, e. g., Dennis v. Chang, 611 F. 2d 1302 
(CA9 1980); Holley v. Larine, 605 F. 2d 638 (CA2 1979), cert. denied sub 
nom. Blum v. Holley, 446 U. S. 913 (1980); Lund v. Affleck, 587 F. 2d 75 
(CAl 1978). And when it enacted § 1988, Congress cited with approval a 
decision awarding fees to a state-funded organization. See H.R. Rep. No. 
94-1558, p. 8, n. 16 (1976) (citing l11carcerated Men q(A/len County Jail v. 
Fair, 507 F. 2d 281 (CA6 1974). In any event, the underlying congi·es-
sional policies are served by awarding fees in cases such as the one before 
us: no matter what the source of their funds, school boards have limited 
budgets, and allowing them fees "encourage[s] compliance >Yith and en-
forcement of the civil rights laws." Dennis v. Chang, 611 F. 2d, at 1306. 
See id., at 1306--1307. While appellants suggest that it is incongruous for 
a State to pay attomey's fees to one of its school boards, it seems no less 
incongruous that a local board would feel the need to sue the State for a 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. We see no reason to disturb the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals on this point. 
